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Abstract
The Royal African Company of England traded European commodities, such as
alcohol, cloth, and firearms, for African goods and slaves. The Company sold stock
to finance its business activities and paid local chiefs in West Africa for exclusive
access to trade. Chapter 1 of the thesis studies rent-seeking associated with the slave
trade in West Africa. Chapter 2 examines trade and ownership of stock by elites
and non-elites. Chapter 3 analyses turning points in the number of slaves exported
from Africa and its individual regions.
In Chapter 1, I measure rent-seeking in the slave trade using new data from
archival sources. In seventeenth-century Ghana, the Royal African Company paid
African chiefs for exclusive access to trade along the caravan routes. The total value
of these payments was 18 times a Company agent’s salary and 145 times the annual
cost of living. The Glorious Revolution in 1688 facilitated competition from other
English merchants, and payments increased after this. Using an event study, I find
that payments increased the most to chiefs in locations where they could stop or
redirect trade coming from inland to the coast. The Company made larger payments
to chiefs whose cooperation was most important in deterring other English merchants
from competing with the Company. The highest-ranking chiefs received the highest
value of payments per capita. European cloth was the most sought after type of
payment – head chiefs used European cloth for prestige and received most of the
European cloth.
In Chapter 2, I examine Royal African Company stock transfers from 1672
to 1712. I highlight three new stylized facts. Firstly, neither elites nor non-elites
dominated stock transfers before the book value of stock quadrupled in 1691,
suggesting that the experience of the capital market was widespread among elites
and non-elites. Secondly, the decreased share in stock transferred by some types of
elites between 1685 and 1690 occurred against the background of political events
that reduced the Company’s future prospects. Thirdly, non-elites dominated the
buying and selling of stock after the stock was quadrupled in 1691, suggesting that
Company decisions played a major role in explaining its capital market experience.
In the final chapter, Chapter 3, I determine to what extent turning points in
slave exports were unique to specific regions, and to what extent they were common
across all of Africa. I use the Bai and Perron (2003) structural break test to show
that slave exports from all of Africa began falling in 1815. This is earlier than the
traditional view in the literature that the slave trade effectively ended in the 1850s.
Demand shocks, particularly the British abolition of the slave trade in 1807, are
relatively important in explaining the end of the slave trade at the regional level.
The downward-sloping trend of slave exports began in 1784 for the Bight of Biafra,
1808 for the Windward and Gold Coasts, and 1815 for the Bight of Benin, West
Central Africa, and Southeast Africa. Supply shocks, such as wars and conflicts, are
relatively important in explaining the dynamics of the slave trade in specific regions.
ix
Chapter 1
Competition and Rent-Seeking
During the Slave Trade
1.1 Introduction
Slaves, according to one view, were a common property resource and competition
might dissipate any rents associated with the slave trade.1 But according to other
views competition for the slave trade was restricted by barriers to entry, enabling
rents. Were slaves “the business of kings, rich men, and prime merchants?”2 In
this paper, I measure rent-seeking during the slave trade using a new dataset of
more than 20,000 payments made by the Royal African Company (the Company)
to African chiefs in the seventeenth-century Gold Coast (present-day Ghana).
The Company maintained forts and factories3 on the West African coast,
where it exchanged European commodities for African commodities and slaves.
Chiefs4 granted use-rights to the Company in exchange for, inter alia, ground and
1Thomas and Bean (1974) summarize this view. “In sum, the tragic irony of the trans-Atlantic
slave trade was that nobody connected with it gained very much, and even the Africans who were
not enslaved may as a group have lost more than they gained. The African slavers behaved much
like modern fishermen, only they were fishers of men” (Thomas & Bean, 1974, p. 887). See also
Darity (1985).
2See Rodney (1969), Hopkins (1973, Chapter 2), Evans and Richardson (1995), Iliffe (2017,
Chapter 7). Evans and Richardson (1995) challenge Thomas and Bean (1974). “We shall argue
that, contrary to the claims of Thomas and Bean, the export trade in slaves from Africa was
characterised not by perfect competition but by market imperfections and product differentiation.
The latter permitted the generation of economic surpluses or rents” (Evans & Richardson, 1995, p.
668).
3Forts were fortified buildings, while factories were lodges or small trade-posts (Van Dantzig,
1980).
4The term “chiefs” is used in the widest sense to include head chiefs (e.g. kings, queens, princes),
officeholders (e.g. chancellors, chiefs of the army, state treasurers), and chieftains (i.e. chiefs of
local towns or villages).
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customary payments.5 Merchants from inland had to pass along caravan routes to
reach the forts and factories on the coast. The Company paid chiefs for exclusive
access to trade with caravan merchants from inland, in order to keep the trade
flowing to the Company.6
Using manuscript records, I construct data on the Company’s payments to
chiefs in the Gold Coast (present day Ghana) from 1679 to 1704. The available
records allow for an event study before and after the Glorious Revolution in
1688 facilitated competition from other English merchants. I hand-entered
a new database of 24,529 payments made by the Company to chiefs in the
seventeenth-century Gold Coast. I use the data to answer three questions.
What was the distribution of payments across chiefs? State chiefs received 75
per cent of the total value of payments. Of the state chiefs, head chiefs (king, queen,
prince) received 62 per cent and officeholders (African chancellor, treasurer, chief of
army) received 13 per cent.7 Chieftains, or settlement chiefs, received 19 per cent
of the total value of payments. Of the chieftains, individuals received 15 per cent
while groups of chieftains received four per cent. In the manuscript records there
are 20 head chiefs, 44 officeholders, and more than 29 chieftains. Head chiefs, the
highest-ranking chiefs in the seventeenth-century Gold Coast, received the highest
payments per capita. The value of payments was quantitatively important from the
perspectives of both the Company and the chiefs. Payments were 18 times higher
than the salary of a European agent employed by the Company in Africa during the
period8 and were 145 times the cost of subsistence in the seventeenth-century Gold
5Ground payments are similar to land rent since the land was controlled by chiefs and there
was no transfer of land ownership from chiefs to the Company (Daaku, 1970, p. 50). Customary
payments are payments made in relation to customary occassions, such as planting, harvesting, and
other special occasions like Christmas.
6See Davies (1957, Chapter 6), Daaku (1970, Chapter 3), Hopkins (1973, Chapter 3), Curtin
(1975a, Chapter 7), Arhin (1979, Chapter 2), Kea (1982, Chapter 8), Northrup (2002, Chapter 3),
Austin (2005, Chapter 5), Law (1997, 2001, 2006, Volumes 1 to 3), Ro¨nnba¨ck (2015a, Chapter 2).
These payments were recorded in the Account Journals as: (1) customary payments, or payments
made in relation to customary occassions, such as planting, harvesting, and “dancing;” (2) dasheys,
or gifts; (3) ground payments, or payments in exchange for rights to build and maintain forts or
factories; (4) palavara, or payments associated with settling differences with chiefs; (5) promise
gifts, or payments made after taking an oath of allegiance to the Company; (6) service payments,
or payments made for services rendered by dependants (e.g. men and soldiers) of chiefs; (7) ship
customs, or payments made for anchored ships of the Company; (8) trade gifts, or payments made
to promote trade with the Company; (9) trusted, or advanced payments made in relation to any
payments, particularly ground payments and ship customs, or loans; and (10) war or conflict aids,
or payments made to allies of the Company during war or conflict.
7Head chiefs were ahenfo kese, or royals, and ahenfo, or nobles by birth. Officeholders were
afahene, or rulers of an administrative unit; okyeame, or the chancellor called fetere or fitiro; day,
or the state treasurer, governor of the capital, and chief of the army; and brafo, a high-ranking
officer (Kea, 1982, Chapter 3).
8From 1683 to 1704, the Company had six to ten forts or factories in West Africa (Davies, 1957,
2
Coast.9 Head chiefs’ share in payments increased when the Company faced more
competition from other English merchants. The findings are related to the literature
arguing that the slave trade was the “business of kings, rich men, and prime
merchants.”10 In this paper, I provide quantitative evidence that the distribution
of payments across chiefs was unequal. Head chiefs benefited the most from these
payments.
What commodities were included and how did this change over time? 95 per
cent of the total value of payments were commodities. European cloth was 44 per
cent, firearms 12 per cent, and alcohol 11 per cent of the total value of payments.
Gold was only five per cent. After 1688, European cloth’s share in the total value of
payments increased, while firearms’ share remained almost the same, and alcohol’s
share declined. European cloth was used to signal authority and demonstrate
prestige.11 Head chiefs received 69 per cent of the total value of European cloth,
which was 50 percentage points greater than other chiefs (officeholders, individual
chieftains, and groups of chieftains) received in the same period. The findings are
related to the literature arguing that Europeans did not solely influence the goods
they supplied.12 Instead Europeans supplied goods in response to African demand.13
In this paper, I highlight the importance of payments as a channel through which
head chiefs obtained luxury goods, particularly European cloth, to signal prestige.
Did payments rise after the Glorious Revolution in 1688 reduced company
privileges, facilitating competition from other English merchants? In 1672, King
Charles II granted rights and other privileges to the Royal African Company to
monopolise English trade in West Africa. The privileges consisted of power to
seize the ships and cargoes of interlopers, access to a royal-sponsored court that
determined cases against interlopers, and power to detain captured interlopers in the
Company’s forts on the African coasts for indefinite periods. “Interloper” was the
name given by the Company to an English merchant who traded without permission
from the Company. These privileges were withdrawn in the Glorious Revolution in
1688, lowering the risks and cost for interlopers, which in turn facilitated competition
between the Company and interlopers.14 The Company made payments to chiefs
pp. 247-248).
9For details, see footnote 70.
10See, for examples, Hopkins (1973), Evans and Richardson (1995), Ro¨nnba¨ck (2015b).
11See for example Thornton (1998, Chapter 2). In Section 5, I present qualitative evidence from
Company correspondence.
12See Rodney (1988)’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
13See, for examples, Thornton (1998) and Whatley (2018). I thank Professor Ann Carlos for
pointing out my findings are similar with what Carlos and Lewis (2010) found in the case of native
Americans.
14The interlopers were a problem for the Company from its establishment in 1672, but the
3
who had territorial jurisdiction over the caravan routes and who had power to direct
caravan merchants to their forts and factories. After 1688, the Company increased
the payments, as the chiefs’ threat to stop trade flowing to the Company became
more credible.
The Company knew the chiefs controlled the flow of trade to the forts
and factories on the coast. The Akani-Twifo routes were the main caravan
routes.15 After 1688, the Company faced the threat of competition from other
English merchants. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, I find that
payments made to chiefs on the Akani-Twifo caravan routes that were not final
destinations (henceforth “non-coast caravan routes”) rose significantly relative to
payments made to chiefs in other locations after the Glorious Revolution in 1688.
On average, the increased share in total surplus of chiefs on non-coast caravan
routes was more than six times as much as the increased share in total surplus of
chiefs in other locations after 1688.
I argue that the increase in payments can be explained by the chiefs’ increased
bargaining power. The Company paid chiefs for exclusive access to trade. Chiefs on
the non-coast caravan routes had the greatest power to extract payments because
they could stop or redirect trade. After 1688, the Company made greater payments
to the chiefs whose compliance was most important in deterring competition from
other English merchants. I show that the increased bargaining share of chiefs on the
non-coast caravan routes was greater than the increased bargaining share of chiefs
in other locations.
I perform three main robustness checks of the estimation results. Firstly, I
show that the results are robust when the value of payments is calculated using the
average price.16 Secondly, I show that the results are robust when payments are
measured in terms of volume rather than value. Thirdly, I show that the results are
robust when “business-related” payments17 are included or excluded from the total
value of payments.
I contribute to the literature on rent-seeking in Africa during the slave
Company’s position vis-a`-vis interlopers weakened after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. See Davies
(1957, Chapter 3), Carlos and Brown-Kruse (1996), Zahedieh (2010), Pettigrew (2013, Chapter 1).
15The map of the Akani-Twifo caravan routes was drawn from Kea (1982, Chapter 7). The
map was adopted from The National and Private Advantages of the African Trade Considered by
Malachy Postlethwayt, Second Edition, London, 1722. A printed copy of the map is found in
Donnan (1965). I compared the map to Wilks (1975, Chapter 1).
16The baseline results are calculated using the minimum price observed in the whole period of
the sample from 1679 to 1704, as this will stop results from being driven by inflation. I also show
that the results are robust to the value of payments being calculated using current prices.
17Business-related payments are payments made as agreed between the chiefs and the Company
when the forts and factories were built. These are customary payments, ground payments, ship
customs, and service payments.
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trade.18 Descriptive evidence demonstrates the existence of rent-seeking in Africa
during the slave trade. In this paper, I show that the trade in commodities and slaves
in Africa was “the business of kings, rich men and prime merchants,” especially those
who found themselves in the right place and at the right time and took advantage
of the situation. The quantitative evidence supports a dynamic “hunters-of-rent”
view of rent-seeking in the African slave trade. African chiefs who could stop or
redirect trade from inland could extract payments from the Company, particularly
when competition from other English merchants increased.
I also contribute to the literature on European dependence on African
collaborators. In particular, I contribute to the literature on the collaboration
between the European merchants and African chiefs in the pre-colonial period19 In
this paper, I document the distribution, composition, and dynamics of payments
made to chiefs in seventeenth-century Ghana by the Royal African Company, who
did not control local trade like the chiefs did, and had to bargain with chiefs for
access to trade with local merchants. This paper is part of a broader literature
showing how Europeans depended on African collaborators for their pre-colonial or
colonial goals.20
Finally, I contribute to the literature on strategies adopted by multinational
chartered companies at home and abroad to compete with individual traders.21
In this paper, I use quantitative analysis to understand the competition strategies
adopted by the Company in its Gold Coast operations.22 The Company increased
its payments to chiefs whose compliance was most important in deterring other
18See, for examples, Hopkins (1973), Evans and Richardson (1995), Law (1997, 2001, 2006),
Behrendt, Latham, and Northrup (2010), Ipsen (2015), Ro¨nnba¨ck (2015b), Whatley (2018). For
rent-seeking in general, see Olken and Barron (2009).
19See, for examples, Gemery and Hogendorn (1974), Hubbell (2001), M. A. Klein (2001), Lovejoy
and Richardson (2001), Northrup (2002), Lovejoy and Richardson (2004), Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011), Sparks (2013), Lovejoy (2014), Ro¨nnba¨ck (2015a).
20For recent works on European and African collaboration during colonial period, see
Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014), Lowes and Montero (2018), Lechler and McNamee (2018).
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (in press) review its consequences on present-day Africa.
21Carlos and Brown-Kruse (1996), Law (1997, 2001, 2006), Pettigrew (2013).
22On strategies adopted by the Company in its Gold Coast operations, see Law (1997, 2001, 2006)
who digitized into three volumes of more than 3,000 letters sent by company agents to their officers
at the Cape Coast Castle, the Company’s headquarters in West Africa. “The RAC’s factories also
regularly reported on the operations of other traders operating with the Company. In particular,
they offer considerable detailed information on the operations of English ‘interlopers’, trading in
competition with the Company and in defiance of its monopoly rights” (Law, 1997, p. x). The
Company distributed a lion’s share of its British exports to the Gold Coast. The distribution of
exports to West Africa from 1680 to 1704 was £143,204 (16 per cent of total exports) to Gambia,
Sierra Leone, and Sherbro, £162,207 (18 per cent) to Windward Coast, £325,389 (36 per cent)
to Gold Coast, £131,288 (15 per cent) to Ardra and Whydah, £35,741 (four per cent) to Benin,
New Calabar, and Old Calabar, £69,485 (eight per cent) to Angola, and £34,371 (four per cent)
to miscellaneous and unnamed destinations (Davies, 1957, p. 233).
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English merchants from competing with the Company.
In Section 1.2, I provide historical background. In Section 1.3, I present
the methodology and data. In Section 1.4, I discuss the distribution of payments
to chiefs. In Section 1.5, I discuss the composition of payments. In Section 1.6, I
discuss the results of the difference-in-differences estimation strategy, mechanisms,
and main robustness checks of the results. The conclusion is in Section 1.7.
1.2 Historical Background
1.2.1 Payments by the Company to Chiefs
Chiefs exercised control of land and allocated use-rights to local and foreign
individuals. The Company paid chiefs for rights to build and maintain forts and
factories on the coast. The payments included customary payments, dasheys or
gifts, and ground payments.23 The Company understood that the payments to
chiefs kept trade flowing to the Company’s forts and factories. This is shown in the
correspondence between the Company agent at Egya and the Council24 at Cape
Coast Castle on 9 June 1687:
“Since my arrivall here have understood that the Braffo25 and
Quarranteers26 have debarred any traders from coming hither, on
account that they are not paid their monthly customes for ground rent”
(Correspondence 2/663).27
Indeed, chiefs could stop the flow of trade, and the Company was aware of
this. Correspondence between the Company agent at Komenda and the Council at
Cape Coast Castle on 1 July 1698 states:
23See footnote 6 for a comprehensive list of payments. Chiefs did not always participate directly
in trade. They found it more advantageous to encourage traders and then tax. See, for example,
(Hopkins, 1973). “Indeed, in some cases, as among the Akan states of the southern Gold Coast,
public authorities deliberately refrained from engaging in trade directly, not because they were
insensitive to commercial opportunities, but because they judged it more advantageous to encourage
private traders and then to tax them” (Hopkins, 1973, p. 62). Karl Polanyi views that there were
only “commercial diplomats” in Dahomey. “No private merchants, only swarms of dependent
porters and distinguished officials briefed as military guards and commercial diplomats form the
personnel of the typical caravan” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 94). Law (1977b, pp. 555-556) dismisses
Polanyi’s view as “essentially mythological.”
24The Council of the Company in West Africa consisted of the Agent-General, the Chief Merchant,
Second Merchant, and Third Merchant (Davies, 1957, p. 243).
25Braffo was a high-military officer.
26Quarrenteers were chieftains or settlement chiefs.
27This excerpt is from Letter 663 in Volume 2 of Law (1997, 2001, 2006).
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“Therefore hope your Worshipps would be pleased to order me to give
some dashes, or else it will be a mighty hinderance of trade to this place,
severall Cabbosheers28 stopping the traders coming to the Castle and
sending them to the Dutch, saying they have had noe dashes from the
English to send traders” (Correspondence 3/440).
The Company paid chiefs to direct inland traders to their forts and
factories, and not to other merchants. There are many examples of such payments
in the Company’s correspondence. Appendix A.1 shows a directory of such
correspondence. In one letter, a Company agent reminded the Agent-General in
Cape Coast Castle about the Queen of Agona, who wanted to know how much
ground payment the Company would offer her, in exchange for prohibiting trade
with interlopers or smugglers:
“I have little to add but that the Queen is urgent to know what you’l
allow &ca for ground rent, which she says when it is agreed on no canoes
shall be suffered to go off to interlopers” (Correspondence 3/1113).
In another letter, an agent told the Agent-General that gifts should be presented to
the King of Akwamu to procure trade and to stop trade from going to competitors:
“Pray do not faile to give Ahenesa29 a gift, to be understood firelocks
and spirrits, alsoe send some good powder and bright musketts. Ahenesa
desires, the same, in soe doing wee may procure a traid and to hinder
our neighbours” (Correspondence 1/409).
The Gold Coast was a major exporter of gold in the seventeenth century. It
also exported slaves, but only became a major exporter of slaves in the middle of
the eighteenth century.30 During this period, the Akani-Twifo caravan routes were
the main caravan routes. Figure 1.5 depicts the Akani-Twifo caravan routes and the
African settlements in the seventeenth-century Gold Coast. Slaves and the Akani
gold, regarded by English merchants as high-quality gold, were transported from
inland to coastal settlements along these caravan routes.31
28Caboceers were chieftains or settlement chiefs.
29Ahenesa was the King of Akwamu.
30See, for examples, Daaku (1970, Chapter 2), Hopkins (1973, Chapter 3), Bean (1974), Kea
(1982, Chapter 7), Inikori (2007).
31An English ship’s captain remarked that the Akani “are the best traders to our ships and
castles, and have the purest gold,” as quoted in Kea (1982, p. 248). See also Daaku (1970, Chapter
2).
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1.2.2 The Glorious Revolution in 1688 and Payments by the
Company to Chiefs
In 1672, King Charles II granted the Company rights to monopolise English trade
in West Africa, from the Cape Blanco (Western Sahara) to the Cape of Good Hope
(South Africa). His brother James, Duke of York and later King James II, served as
the governor of the Company from its creation in 1672 until the Glorious Revolution
in 1688. A “sub-governor office” was created because the governorship was reserved
for a member of the royal family. This was a privilege that the East India Company
of England, for example, never had.32
The Company received privileges from the English government during the
Stuart monarchy before 1688. Firstly, King James II received shares from the
Company and became its largest shareholder. Secondly, the Company was granted
the power to seize ships and cargoes of interlopers. The Royal Navy provided
support by sending its warships to the African and Caribbean coasts to aid the
Company in intercepting interlopers. Thirdly, the Company was given access to
a royal-sponsored court situated on the African coast that acted on cases filed by
the Company against interlopers. The Company itself elected the members of the
court. Fourthly, the Company was permitted to detain interlopers in its African
forts indefinitely. Finally, the Company had access to government officials in the
English West Indies through its connection to the Lords of Trade, whose members
were privy councillors. The Lords instructed government officials in the English
West Indies to prosecute interlopers caught in their territories, and to confiscate
slaves belonging to interlopers and turn them over to the Company. In exchange,
the Company paid tax to the government and maintained the English forts and
factories on the African coast.33
Such privileges increased the risks faced by interlopers. Firstly, they risked
having their ships and cargoes seized by the Company. Secondly, they faced the
risk of trial at the royal-sponsored court without a jury. Thirdly, they risked being
detained in the Company forts. Fourthly, they risked being intercepted by English
port authorities or by government officials in the English West Indies.34
32See, for examples, Scott (1903) and Scott (1910). “The stock-holders were to elect annually
one governor, one sub-governor, one deputy-governor and twenty-four assistants. This part of the
constitution is similar to that of the English India Company at this date, except that the twenty-four
officials are here called assistants instead of committees, and that a new office – that of sub-governor
– is created. The latter difference is accounted for by the fact that the governorship of the African
Company was an honorary appointment filled by members of the royal family” (Scott, 1910, p. 20).
See also (Scott, 1903, p. 245).
33See, for examples, Root (1917), Davies (1957, Chapter 3), Carlos and Brown-Kruse (1996),
Pettigrew (2013, Prologue).
34The literature supports this view. “Because these firms did not have the overheads associated
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The Glorious Revolution in 1688 affected the privileged position of the
Company. Before 1688, it was costly for other English merchants to infringe on
the monopoly rights of the Company. After 1688, the risks of getting caught and
prosecuted decreased, which decreased the average cost faced by other English
merchants. The withdrawal of privileges after 1688 exposed the Company to more
attacks and criticism from its competitors.35 Figure 1.1 shows the Company’s
share of the total number of slaves taken from Africa.36 In the pre-1688 period the
Company’s share was 39 per cent. The share fell to 28 per cent in the post-1688
period.37 From the point of view of the Company, the threat of competition from
other English merchants increased after 1688. During this period, the Company
had more reasons to make payments to chiefs, especially to chiefs on non-coast
caravan routes who could stop or redirect trade flowing to the Company.
1.3 Methodology and Data
1.3.1 Distribution of Payments
What was the distribution of payments across chiefs? To address this question, I
construct data on share in the total value of payments by rank of recipient, including
head chiefs, officeholders, and chieftains. Appendix A.2 shows the classification used
for the ranks of recipient. There are three steps to constructing the data. Firstly,
I construct data on the different types of payment to various chiefs. For each type
of commodity (e.g. alcohol, cloth, firearms), I take the lowest price from 1679 to
1704 as my baseline measure of its price.38 Secondly, I multiply quantity by price
with the chartered companies, it has long been argued that they had a cost advantage, but it
must be borne in mind that they did face the cost of their illegal activity: acquiring the necessary
cargoes with caution, buying slaves illegally, and being threatened with capture and prosecution
by the Company and the Royal Navy. These were not necessarily insignificant costs because any
probability of being caught raised the average cost per slave delivered. Thus a 17 per cent probability
would raise the average cost per slave delivered in the West Indies by over 20 per cent” (Carlos &
Brown-Kruse, 1996, p. 297). See also Davies (1957, Chapter 3).
35In fact, the withdrawal of privileges can be viewed as a shock to the Company. “But the shock
of the Revolution, the sudden withdrawal of the royal support, so long and generously given that
it had come to be relied on, exposed the company to a storm of criticism and attack for which it
was ill prepared, and in a moment the monopoly derived from the royal prerogative was gone for
ever” (Davies, 1957, p. 104).
36Data on slaves embarked from Africa are drawn from Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade
Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016).
37Data on the number of slaves embarked by the Company is available for 1680, 1681, 1682, 1685,
and 1687 for the pre-1688 period. Data is available for 1689, 1690, 1696, and 1704 for the post-1688
period.
38I take the lowest price in the period from 1679 to 1704, as it biases the value of payments
downwards and keep the results from being price-inflated. Appendix A.6 presents summary
statistics of the price of different types of commodity. The results are robust when the value
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to obtain the value of the payment. I do this for all 24,529 payments. Lastly, I
calculate the share of each rank in the total value of payments. That is,
V alueSharer =
∑
i,rank=rQuantity
r
ic × Pricec∑
iQuantityic × Pricec
(1.1)
where V alueSharer is the share of recipient r in the total value of payments,
Quantityric is the quantity of payment i using commodity c made to recipients of
rank r, Quantityic is the quantity of payment i using commodity c, and Pricec is
the price of commodity c. The total value of commodities made to recipients of rank
r is the summation of Quantityric × Pricec over payments i restricted to cases of
recipient with rank r. The total value of payments is the sum of Quantityic×Pricec
over payments i.
As a robustness check, I calculate the share in the total volume of payments
by rank of recipient. That is, V olumeSharer =
Quantityric∑
iQuantityic
, where V olumeSharer
is the share of rank r in total volume of payments.
Data on payments are drawn from the Company’s Account Journals from
1679 to 1704.39 Appendix A.3 presents a sample of a journal entry. The years
included are determined by the availability of records during the period when
the Company held monopoly rights to English trade in West Africa.40 There
are different types of payments. Appendix A.4 presents a definition of each type
of payment. The most common were trusted or advanced payments, dasheys,
ground payments, customary payments, and ship customs. Each payment contains
information on when the payment was made41, the type of commodity (e.g. alcohol,
cloth, firearm) used as a payment, the quantity of the commodity given, and the
recipient of the payment. Appendix A.5 shows a list of individual recipients. There
are in total 111 individuals named in the Journals.42 Of whom 20 are head chiefs,
of payments is calculated using the average of prices from 1679 to 1704. The results are also robust
when the value is calculated using current prices. I use the closest price in time whenever the
current price is not available from the records.
39The Journals are held at the National Archives in London. The Account Journals are coded
365 to 378 in the T70 series at the National Archives in London.
40The are gaps from January to June 1679, from April to December 1685, from June to December
1687, from January to December 1688, from January to September 1689, from June to December
1691, from January to December 1692, from January to December 1693, from January to December
1694, from January to December 1695, from June to December 1700, from January to August 1701,
and from and May to December 1704. The Journals for the period from May 1713 to March 1717
exist, but 1704 was considered the end date of the present study because the Company effectively
lost its right to monopolise West African trade when the 1698 Act of Parliament expired in 1713.
See, for example, Davies (1957, Chapter 3).
41The date (day, month, year) of the payment is given in the Journals.
42The other recipients are unnamed, which maybe individuals or groups. For example, cabasheer
and cabasheers. The former is an individual chieftain while the latter is a group of chieftains.
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44 are officeholders, 29 are individual chieftains, four are employees of the Company,
nine are traders, and five are soldiers.
Data on prices are also drawn from the Journals. The prices are in units
of gold. As most prices are given in angle unit of gold, I convert other units
of gold (mark, ounce, taccoe) into angles of gold. One ounce is equivalent to 16
angles.43 Appendix A.6 presents summary statistics of the price of different types
of commodity. The most expensive were firearms. There are 165 prices of firearms
observed in the period from 1679 to 1704. The average of these prices is 20 angles.44
The second most expensive was European cloth. The average of the 826 prices
observed in the case of European cloth during this period is ten angles.45 The third
most expensive was other cloth. The average of the 246 prices of other cloth is six
angles.46
1.3.2 Composition of Payments
What commodities were used for payments and how did this change over time? To
address this question I use the same data, and follow the secondary literature to
classify payments by type of commodity, including alcohol, cloth, and firearms.47
Appendix A.7 shows a list of types of commodity used as payments to chiefs. The
first two steps are the same as above. In the third step I calculate the share of each
type in the total value of payments. That is,
V alueSharek =
∑
i,type=kQuantity
k
ic × Pricec∑
iQuantityic × Pricec
(1.2)
where V alueSharek is the share of commodity type k in the total value of payments,
Quantitykic is the quantity of payment i using commodity c classified as type k,
Quantityic is the quantity of payment i using commodity c and Pricec is the price
of commodity c. The total value of commodities classified as type k is the summation
of Quantitykic × Pricec over commodities i restricted to cases of commodity with
type k. The total value of payments is calculated as above.
Another example is quarrenteer and quarrenteers. The former is an individual officeholder while
the latter is a group of chieftains.
43I use the conversion rates given in the secondary literature. See, for example, Law (1997, 2001,
2006). One mark of gold is equivalent to 128 angles. One taccoe is equivalent to 1/12 angles.
44The three most expensive firearms during this period were gunpowder (30 angles), firelock (4.8),
and snaphance (4.2).
45The three most expensive European cloth was boysadoe (17 angles), say (16), and striped satin
(12).
46The three most expensive types of other cloth were blue long cloth (12 angles), white long cloth
(ten), and king cloth (five).
47See, for examples, Eltis (1991), Alpern (1995), Northrup (1998).
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As a robustness check, I calculate the share in the total volume of payments of
each commodity type. That is, V olumeSharet =
∑
iQuantity
t
i∑
cQuantityc
, where V olumeSharet
is the share of commodity type t in the total volume of payments.
1.3.3 Competition and Payments
Did payments rise after the Glorious Revolution in 1688 reduced company privileges,
facilitating competition from other English merchants? To address this question, I
use a triple difference-in-differences estimation strategy and estimate the following
regression equation:
Paymentist =
∑
t
αt(CaravanRoutei ×NonCoasti × Y eart)
+ γi + λt + δs × t+X ′iβt + ist
(1.3)
where Paymentist is payments made to chiefs in settlement i, state s, and year t,
CaravanRoutei is an indicator whether settlement i is on the Akani-Twifo caravan
routes, NonCoasti is an indicator whether settlement i is not a coastal destination,
Y eart is a year dummy, t is year, γi is a vector of settlement fixed effects, λt is
a vector of year fixed effects, δs × t is a set of state-specific trends48, Xi includes
time-invariant control variables, and ist is the error term.
The control variables included in Xi are CaravanRoutei, NonCoasti,
AdministrativeCapitali, and CommercialCentrei. AdministrativeCapitali
indicates whether settlement i is an administrative capital and CommercialCentrei
indicates whether settlement i is a commercial centre. I cluster standard errors by
settlement i. As there are 32 settlements, I calculate standard errors using a wild
cluster bootstrap to adjust for the bias caused by the small number of clusters.49
The coefficient of interest is the vector αt. The hypothesis I test is whether
the αt coefficients are economically and statistically significant. Each coefficient in
αt measures the difference in payments made to chiefs on the non-coast caravan
routes and chiefs in other locations in year t. Increasing estimates are interpreted
as growing differences in payments between the two groups over time.
Data on spatial characteristics of settlements are drawn from secondary
sources.50 Appendix A.8 shows the spatial characteristics of settlements in the
48There are 17 states in the data. These are: (1) Abrem; (2) Accra; (3) Adangme; (4) Adom; (5)
Afutu; (6) Agona; (7) Ahanta; (8) Akani; (9) Akron; (10) Akwamu; (11) Asante; (12) Asebu; (13)
Denkyira; (14) Eguafo; (15) Etsi; (16) Fante; (17) Twifo.
49See, for example, Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008).
50Data on Akani-Twifo caravan routes, settlements that were administrative capital, and
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seventeenth-century Gold Coast. 11 of 32 (34 per cent) settlements were situated
on non-coastal caravan routes.51 Eight of 32 (25 per cent) settlements were situated
on coastal caravan routes.52 The latter settlements were the final destinations at
the coastal edge of the caravan routes. These settlements had less power to hold up
trade for anyone that comes after them, as the routes did not extend beyond those
settlements.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics of variables in Equation 1.3. The
dependent variable is payments to chiefs in each settlement in each year. Payments
are measured in value or volume. The mean value of payments is 77 angles of gold
and its standard deviation is 297.53 The mean volume of payments is 44 items and its
standard deviation is 229.54 The independent variables are the indicator variables
CaravanRoute, NonCoast, AdministrativeCapital, and CommercialCentre. 59 per
cent of the settlements were on the caravan routes. 56 per cent were non-coastal
settlements. 47 per cent were administrative capitals. 38 per cent were commercial
centres. In the estimation strategy, I consider only years when data on payments is
available from January to December. There are 13 of these years.55 Hence, with 32
settlements and 13 years, the panel data has 416 observations.
I perform three main robustness checks. Firstly, I check whether the results
are robust to alternative prices. I use the average price of each commodity from 1679
to 1704, instead of the minimum price of each commodity in the same period, as an
alternative price to calculate the value of payments. Secondly, I check whether the
results are robust to alternative measures of payments. I use the volume, instead
of the value, as an alternative measure of payments. Thirdly, I check whether the
results are robust when “business-related” payments are excluded from the total
value of payments. Business-related payments are customary payments, ground
payments, ship customs, and service payments.56
settlements that were commercial centre in the seventeenth-century Gold Coast were drawn from
Kea (1982, Chapters 2 and 7). Data on settlements that were non-coastal destinations are drawn
from Kea (1982, Chapter 7) and Law (1997, 2001, 2006).
51The 11 settlements on non-coastal caravan routes are (1) Abra, (2) Abrem, (3) Akani, (4)
Asante, (5) Asebu, (6) Denkyira, (7) Great Komenda, (8) Fante, (9) Afutu, (10) Kabestera, and
(11) Twifo.
52The eight settlements on coastal caravan routes are (1) Anashan, (2) Anomabo, (3) Cape Coast,
(4) Cape Coast Castle, (5) Egya, (6) Kormantin, (7) Little Komenda, and (8) Elmina.
53The minimum and maximum values are 0 (no payment) and 3,337 angles of gold, respectively.
54The minimum and maximum values are 0 and 2,764 angles of gold, respectively.
55These years are 1680, 1681, 1682, 1683, 1684, 1686, 1690, 1696, 1697, 1698, 1699, 1702, 1703.
56The following excerpts provide context to business-related payments. “The Dutchman is still
here, haveing noe goods only brandy and a few beades, as for brandy wee shall want for next
Tuseday is the time of their danceing here and according to contract made wee are to give the
Cabasheers of this towne a perpetuanoe and one broad tapsell which wee have not here, as alsoe 2
halfe ankors of brandy” (Correspondence 1/4). “I should have sent my accompt sooner, but have
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I perform additional robustness checks. I check whether the results are
robust when I adjust standard errors for spatial and temporal correlations.57 I
check whether the results are robust when I calculate the value of payments using
current prices. I check whether the results are robust when I control for state-specific
flexible trends, rather than state-specific linear trends. Finally, I check whether the
results are robust to when I exclude a particular type of payment from the total
value of payments one at a time. That is, I check whether the results do not depend
on just one type of payment (e.g. trusted, dashey, ground payments).
To complement the quantitative evidence, I provide qualitative evidence
from the correspondence of the Company called the Rawlinson corpus. Named
after the collector Richard Rawlinson (1690-1755), the Corpus is a collection of
correspondence written and sent by the Company agents to their Agent-General
at the Cape Coast, the headquarters of the Company in the seventeenth-century
Gold Coast.58 Law (1997, 2001, 2006) digitized and annotated the Corpus in three
volumes of more than 3,000 letters. The letters contain inventories of commodities
received from the headquarters, sales and the remittance of sales to the headquarters,
salary expenditures, payments made to transport services provided by canoes, and
other concerns such as food allowance, health of the agents, and supplies (e.g. paper
and ink). The most relevant information for the purposes of the present study is that
which provides details of the payments demanded by chiefs from the Company as
delay’d them that I might advise of the contract with the Queen, with whom I have agreed to pay
her five peze per month, & custome at a new Cheifs comeing and a[t] danceing as already I have
paid, and at cutting her corn a phota longee or any thing else to that value & a case of liquor,
and at Christmas time a say & longee & a case of spirits, & with John Le Grand (the Captain
of the towne) I have agreed to pay him four angles per month, & a red cloth at Christmas &
other dashes as already paid the Cabbosheers, but Prince, Ataquo & Abarraco I cannot come to
an aggrement with, so Ataquoe comes up with these to know what you will please to allow them”
(Correspondence 3/1119). “Just now Griffen is come from Fanteen, and the Quarranteeres and
Braffo; and they would have custome for every ship that comes here” (Correspondence 2/248).
57I follow Fetzer (2014) and Hsiang (2010) in calculating the heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors. As the success of a caravan trade depended
on the frequency of resting, the “suggested maximum distance was probably about ten miles [a
day]” (Kea, 1982, pp. 255-257), I set the distance cut-off to 20 kilometres. I set the maximum lag
of autocorrelation to five.
58The Corpus is held at the Bodleian Library at Oxford. The Corpus is a valuable source of
information on commercial operations of the Company in its African operations. “The value of this
material lies not only in its sheer extent (over 3,000 letters), but also the fact that, unlike most of the
RAC documents in the PRO [Public Record Office], those in the Rawlinson corpus are preserved in
their full original text... As regards English trade, by comparison with other contemporary material,
the principal value of the Rawlinson correspondence lies not only in its much greater density of
detail, but also in its particular focus on the local West African end of the trade” (Law, 2006, p.
viii). See also the Royal African Networks at https://racnetworks.wordpress.com/the-corpus/ for
a brief discussion on the Corpus. The Networks is a collaboration among Anne Ruderman, Mark
Heller, and Harry Xue, who map the letters between the officers at the headquarters and their
agents on the Coast.
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well as details of the payments supplied by the latter to the former.59 Also relevant
is the information on interlopers, whose activities on the coast were reported by
agents to their Agent-General in the Cape Coast Castle.60 Appendix A.9 shows a
directory of correspondence of the Company on interlopers.
1.4 Distribution of Payments
Figure 1.2 shows the frequency of payments made to individuals named in the
Journals.61 The Company made payments to head chiefs more frequently than
it made payments to other chiefs. This is in spite of the small number of head chiefs
relative to the number of other chiefs. Payments made to head chiefs were twice as
frequent as those made to individual chieftains, even if head chiefs were just about
two-thirds the number of individual chieftains. Payments made to head chiefs were
twice as frequent as those made to officeholders, even though head chiefs were less
than half the number of officeholders. The difference in frequency of payments is
starker when comparing head chiefs to groups of chieftains.
Table 1.2 shows the value of payments by rank of recipient. The Company
distributed a disproportionate share of its payments to chiefs in general. The
Company distributed at least 94 per cent of the total value of payments to chiefs.62
The Company distributed 75 per cent of the total value of payments to state chiefs.
Head chiefs received 62 per cent, while officeholders received 13 per cent of the
total value of payments. The Company distributed 19 per cent of the total value of
payments to chieftains. Individual chieftains received 15 per cent, while groups of
chieftains received four per cent of the total value of payments. Employees, traders,
and soldiers received 1.41 per cent, 1.30 per cent, and 0.29 per cent of the total
59Appendix A.1 shows a directory of correspondence of the Company about payments made to
chiefs.
60The correspondence of the Company offers detailed information on various activities performed
by interlopers seen from the coast. “The RAC’s factories also regularly reported on the operations of
other traders operating [in] competition with the Company. In particular, they offer considerable
detailed information on the operations of English ‘interlopers’, trading in competition with the
Company and in defiance of its monopoly rights” (Law, 1997, p. x).
61Recall that there are in total 111 individuals named in the Journals, of whom 20 are head chiefs,
44 are officeholders, 29 are chieftains, four are employees, nine are traders, and five are soldiers.
62It is likely that some of unspecified recipients were chiefs, that some of the traders and employees
were chiefs, and that some of payments made to soldiers actually went to their chief master. For
example, John Kabes, a prominent African merchant, was one of the employees of the Company.
“John Kabes (who died in 1722) of Little Komenda was a highly successful and prosperous merchant
and an ohene. For a number of years he was a broker at the Royal African Company’s Little
Komenda fort. Initially he received a salary of 1,152 dambas [48 angles] a year; in 1698 it was
raised to 4,656 dambas [194 angles]” (Kea, 1982, p. 317). For John Kabes, see also Daaku (1970,
Chapter 6). Another example is Captain Hansico. “He was a nephew of the King of Fetu, commonly
employed by the RAC in the settlement of disputes with African rulers” (Correspondence 1/15).
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value of payments, respectively.
Appendix A.10 shows the volume of payments by rank of recipient. The
results are qualitatively similar to those obtained in Table 1.2. The distribution of
payments is similar if payments are measured in volume rather than in value.
Head chiefs received the greatest value of payments in per capita terms.
Among the chiefs named in the records of the Company are head chiefs, individual
chiefs, and officeholders. 20 head chiefs received 23,577 angles. Each head chief
received 76 angles per year. This is 59 per cent of Company agent’s salary and
447 per cent of the cost of subsistence in the seventeenth-century Gold Coast.
Head chiefs were the smallest group among the chiefs named in the records of the
Company. There are 29 individual chieftains and 44 officeholders in the records. A
head chief received six times as much as an individual chieftain and ten times as
much as an officeholder.63
Before 1688, the share of the total value of payments received by head chiefs
was 34 per cent. In the same period, the share received by officeholders was just
three percentage points lower than what head chiefs received. After 1688, the share
received by head chiefs was 67 per cent, while the share received by officeholders was
ten per cent. The difference between the share received by head chiefs and the share
received by officeholders increased from only three percentage points in the pre-1688
period to 57 percentage points in the post-1688 period. Head chiefs benefited most
substantially after 1688 increased payments, as they were the “first overlord of the
land”64 who could either stop or redirect trade flowing to the Company.
Geographically, the payments received by chiefs on the non-coast caravan
routes were greater than the payments received by chiefs in other locations. Figure
1.3 shows the average value of payments made to chiefs on the non-coast caravan
routes and the average payments made to chiefs in other locations. Before 1688,
the payments received by the former were already greater than those received by
the latter. After 1688, the payments received by the former became much greater
than those received by the latter. Figure 1.6 depicts the change in average value
of payments made to the 32 settlements from the pre-1688 period to post-1688
period. The increase in payments was concentrated on the non-coast caravan routes,
particularly on settlements situated just before final destinations on caravan routes.
63The records suggest that Company payments went directly to head chiefs. Appendix A.11
presents a sample journal entry of itemized payments. It is clear in the records to whom payments
were made and how much of these payments were to be distributed to each recipient. There is a
possibility that the chiefs redistributed payments made to them. That is, it could be that the head
chiefs were just residual claimants of payments. Nevertheless, even if the head chiefs were residual
claimants, they had at least control of where payments went next.
64See Kea (1982, p. 113). For more details, see Kea (1982, Chapter 3).
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The total value of payments across all years was 38,155 angles.65 The value
of payments was quantitatively important from the Company’s point of view. The
total value of payments per year was 2,462 angles.66 The salary per year of a typical
European agent employed by the Company in its forts and factories in Africa during
the period was 140 angles.67 Hence, the total value of payments was 18 times as
much as the Company agent’s salary. Considering that the Company had six to ten
forts and factories in Africa during the period from 1683 to 170468, this value is
not trivial. The total salary per year of six to ten agents ranged from 840 to 1,400
angles. The total value of payments is about twice as much as the total salary of
ten agents serving the Company in the seventeenth-century Gold Coast.
The value of payments was also quantitatively important from the chiefs’
perspective. The allowance per year of an African labourer and an African craftsman
ranged from six to 12 angles and 24 to 48 angles, respectively.69 The total value
of payments was 51 times as much as the allowance of a (skilled) craftsman in the
seventeenth-century Gold Coast. The cost of subsistence per year in the Gold Coast
during this period was 17 angles.70 The value of payments was 145 times the cost
of subsistence in the Gold Coast during this period.
In summary, head chiefs, the highest-ranking chiefs in the seventeenth-century
Gold Coast, received the greatest value of payments per capita. The share received
by head chiefs increased after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. Geographically,
payments received by chiefs on the non-coast caravan routes were greater than
payments received by chiefs in other locations. After 1688, there was an increase in
payments made to chiefs, but the increase was concentrated on settlements situated
just before coastal destinations at the end of caravan routes. Lastly, the value of
payments was quantitatively important from the perspectives of both the Company
65Recall that calculating the value of payments using the lowest price between 1679 and 1704
is biased downward. The downward bias works against the hypothesis that the value of payments
was sizeable. For details, see Section 1.3.
66The annual value of payments is the total value of payments divided by the total number of
years. Adjusting for gaps in the Account Journals, the total number of years is 15.5. For details,
see Section 1.3.
67The information on salary of a typical European agent employed by the Company during this
period is drawn from Law (1997, 2001, 2006). “My [William Cooper] sallary for 12 months after
the rate of [2/3 ds] of 50£per annum in gold at £3.16s per oz (ounce), 1mk (mark) 0oz (ounce)
12a (angels) 4ta (taccoe) [which is equivalent to 140 angles]” (Correspondence 3/957). See also
Correspondences 2/197, 3/798, 3/1169, 3/1312.
68See Davies (1957, pp. 247-248).
69See Kea (1982, Table 8.1). See also (Ro¨nnba¨ck, 2015a) for wage of a typical African worker at
the Cape Coast Castle.
70See, for example, Kea (1982). “Commoners in the higher income brackets, namely those earning
over 300 dambas [13 angles] a year in the 1660s and 1670s and those earning more than 400 dambas
[17 angles] annually in the 1680s and 1690s, were better [able] to satisfy their basic subsistence
needs” (Kea, 1982, p. 313).
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and the chiefs.
1.5 Composition of Payments
Table 1.3 shows the value of payments classified by type of commodity. In terms of
share in the total value of payments, European cloth (44 per cent) was first, firearms
(12 per cent) were second, and alcohol (11 per cent) was third. Most payments were
made using commodities (kind) rather than gold (currency). Commodities were 95
per cent of the total value of payments, while gold was only five per cent. The results
are qualitatively similar when payments are measured in volume. In particular,
most payments were made using commodities (78 per cent) rather than gold (22 per
cent). Appendix A.12 shows the volume of payments by type of commodity. Since
the majority of payments were made using commodities rather than gold, the value
of time and effort expended to identify which commodity to use as a payment should
be considered especially from a rent-seeking point of view.71 The value of payments
from the Journals should therefore be treated as minimum value, as the Journals
did not include information on the time and effort expended by the Company to
satisfy the preference of chiefs.
European cloth was the most expensive type of cloth during this period. The
average price of European cloth is twice the average price of other cloth, thrice the
average price of Indian cloth, and seven times the average price of cloth products
(e.g. blankets, carpets, sheets).72
Africans imported good quality cloth from Europe, but chiefs received finer
cloth as gifts.73 The consumption of European cloth by chiefs during this period
is viewed in the literature as conspicuous consumption, used by chiefs to signal
authority and prestige.74 Chiefs demanded European cloth for protection and
adornment.
71See, for examples, Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), Bhagwati (1982).
72See Appendix A.6 for European commodity prices.
73As Eltis and Jennings (1988, p. 950) put it, “Certainly, fewer of the finer cottons were sent,
except as gifts to rulers, but relative to other regions the African market was not a dumping ground
for cheap cloth.” Moreover, Eltis and Jennings (1988, p. 953) claim that “only a small proportion
of Africans could have been wearing imported cloth.” With the pre-colonial African population
revised upwards (Manning, 2014, p. 139), the volume of imported cloth per capita would even be
lower than Eltis and Jennings (1988)’s calculations.
74See, for example, Thornton (1998). “In fact, the consumption of cloth, much more than the
consumption of iron, is a means of demonstrating prestige, because its principal use is as much
bodily decoration as protection from the elements... With this in mind, we can understand better
the dynamics of the demand for European cloth” (Thornton, 1998, pp. 50-51). See also Ipsen
(2015, Chapter 4) in the case of African women who married Danish men in Africa. As highly
valued status symbol in the nineteenth-century Asante, blankets symbol could be used as security
for obtaining loans (Arhin, 1990, p. 530).
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“Yours of the 18th instant I received, accompanied with a parcell of
necessaryes have received [sic], and should not have troubled you so
suddainly but that am forced to it by the Queen, who I can with no
argument diswaid from the following demands, viz a piece of saye for a
cloth, with somthing for a bre[a]st cloth, with 3 or 4 strings of rangoes
to come round her wa[i]st, and a string or two of corrall to hang round
her neck, a good cl[o]ath for the Prince, as also for her Braffo and
the Kinge of Acroome, with 10 other inferior cloths for Cabbosheers of
Barricue, Mumford, Anguina, Wynnebah & Acroonne” (Correspondence
3/1069).75
Chiefs desired firearms especially during periods of conflict. Conflicts
between states (interstate conflicts) and within states (intrastate conflicts) were
widespread in the seventeenth-century Gold Coast. Appendix A.13 shows the major
interstate and intrastate conflicts in the Gold Coast from 1681 to 169976, according
to company correspondence. 59 conflicts were recorded during this period. Of the
59 conflicts, 47 were interstate and 12 were intrastate conflicts. Conflicts presented
an opportunity for the Company to advance their business interests with chiefs.
For example, chiefs were willing to waive future payments from the Company in
exchange for firearms given in the present. In addition, the chiefs were willing to
sell captured slaves to the Company should the chiefs emerge victorious from the
conflict.
“Just now came down Boneshee from Fanteen, being sent from the Braffo
and Curranters, hereing that the Ackims and Aguinas are comeing upon
them, they say they want powder to fight them, and have sent to be
trusted with four barrells of powder and one ounce in lead barrs, and say
they will pay out of their monthly customes, and if they are conquer[er]s
75Three other excerpts highlight the demand for European cloth. “The occasion of my writing is
the sending of the inclosed, and to acquaint you the Cabushers are very hard upon mee for their
custom, being two perpettuanoes, one anckor of brandy, and a cloath to the Captain of the towne,
which I hope you will be pleased to allow in soe expensive a place” (Correspondence 2/679). “Our
Cabbosheers have been very importunate with me concerning their customes, they refuseing to take
whatt Mr Brownes advice to me specifies, which is three boysadoes instead of five ginghams, and
two Welch plaines. They tell me they are noe women to wear boysadoes, I tell them againe that
though they doe nott wear itt yett they doe sell itt, being a vendable commodity of this country,
and likewise the trade of either money or corne is nott soe great or soe much furthered by any
of them, thatt they should be soe scrupleous of takeing their customes” (Correspondence 3/1041).
“The Queen was very much displeased you did not send her a mourning cloth, her husband being
killed att the warrs, which I excused as well as I could but was forced to give her a piece of sayes
to pacify her” (Correspondence 3/1082).
76The choice of years is determined by the availability of the Rawlinson corpus.
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in slaves” (Correspondence 2/490).77
Chiefs demanded alcohol in occasions such as burial, “dancing,”78 and
harvesting. The Company considered the personal choice of chiefs in giving them
alcohol.
“Yesterday send up Nuna to the King of Aguaffo; with an anchor of
rum, as custome upon putting his corn in the ground, which is accepted
kindly enough, and has promised send to send down 100 scaffold poles,
but told him rum was a liquor the people there did not much care for,
and desired an anchor of brandy more, and that should sattisfie him”
(Correspondence 2/242).79
Chiefs derived personal benefits from these payments. The Company
made payments tailored to their preferences and tastes. As shown above, head
chiefs benefited substantially from these payments, receiving the greatest value of
payments per capita. Appendix A.14 shows the shares in total value of commodity
received by each rank of recipient. The share in the total value of European cloth
received by head chiefs was 69 per cent, which was substantially greater than the
shares received by other chiefs. This share was 55, 57, and 67 percentage points
greater than the shares received by officeholders, individual chieftains, and groups
of chieftains, respectively. The pattern is similar in firearms and alcohol.80
Before 1688, European cloth (23 per cent) was first, gold (21 per cent) was
second, and alcohol (17 per cent) was third in terms of share in the total value of
77Three other excerpts demonstrate the willingness of chiefs to reciprocate the Company’s
provision of firearms with commitment for trade. “Pray do not faile to give Ahenesa a gift,
to be understood firelocks and spirrits, alsoe send some good powder and bright musketts.
Ahenesa desires the same, in soe doeing wee may procure a traid and to hinder our neighbours”
(Correspondence 1/409). “These goes by Domini who with 4 of the Cabushers sonns were sent
to me to desire me to send the Braffo and Quarranters two small gunns which are about 23 of
a hundred[weight] a piece. I told them I would not doe it without your order, they tell us the
Dutch lent them two, so Domini goes himselfe to know your pleasure. They promis reward if they
overcome. I beg pardon for this troble” (Correspondence 2/503). “The King of Soboe hath sent
down to me for 4 barrells powder and about an ounce in lead barrs upon credite, for they intend
to go against the Futures tomorrow night. If the bussiness takes good efect they hope to make you
full satisfaction, if not they will pay for the powder and barrs” (Correspondence 3/530).
78That is, annual ceremonies marked by public dancing. For annual ceremonies in Dixcove, see
Correspondence 3/46. For annual ceremonies in Fante, see Correspondence 3/577.
79See also the following correspondences. “The King will not drink Portuguese rumme but come
to me every day for punch and a dram I had for my selfe, till I have none left. I find he love his
belly well. If your Worshipps please to send a little corne brandy to humour his body, till the Fort
is in good order, I will doe the best I can to mannage him” (Correspondence 3/258). “She I must
needs owne doth her endeavour, therefore if you think it convenient to send her in your names a
good cloth with a screwed jugge with brandy, for she drinks no rumme, now it would very much
encourage her” (Correspondence 3/1082).
80In fact, the pattern is similar in all types of commodity with the exception of other cloth.
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payments. After 1688, European cloth (48 per cent) was still first, but its lead over
the second commodity increased from two to 36 percentage points. Firearms rose
from fifth (11 per cent) to second (12 per cent) during this period. As both interstate
and intrastate conflicts were more frequent in the period after 1688, the share of
firearms in the total value of payments increased during this period. Although its
share decreased by seven percentage points after 1688, alcohol (ten per cent) was
still third in terms of share in the total value of payments.
There are various reasons why European cloth’s share increased after 1688.
Firstly, as discussed above, chiefs personally used European cloth to signal authority
and power. Secondly, European cloth was the least constrained by technology among
the three types of commodities. More reliable firearms were just beginning to replace
less-reliable muskets.81 Thirdly, alcohol was actually meant to be shared among
chiefs and among lower ranks, including slaves.82 Hence, when the bargaining
positions of chiefs improved after 1688, the capacity to get the most exclusive
commodity increased.
In summary, most payments were made using commodities rather than gold.
European cloth was 44 per cent, firearms 12 per cent, and alcohol 11 per cent of
the total value of payments. Chiefs derived personal benefits from these payments.
Head chiefs received the greatest value of payments, especially European cloth. The
share in the total value of European cloth received by head chiefs was 69 per cent,
which was more than 50 percentage points greater than what other chiefs received.
The share of European cloth in total value of payments rose from 23 per cent in the
pre-1688 period to 48 per cent in the post-1688 period.
1.6 Competition and Payments
1.6.1 Results
Did payments rise after the Glorious Revolution in 1688 reduced company privileges,
facilitating competition from other English merchants? I show that the increase in
81See Whatley (2018) for example. “By the 1680s, the more-reliable flintlock technology was
replacing the matchlock technology and firearms became a staple outbound cargo on most slave
ships destined for Africa. By 1690s, the new flintlock technology was influencing military formations
and military strategies along the Lower Guinea Coast, precisely when slave exports from that region
began to increase” (Whatley, 2018, p. 82).
82See, for example, Akyeampong (1996). “The... King ordered a large quantity of rum to be
poured into brass pans, in various parts of the town; the crowd pressing around, and drinking hogs;
freemen and slaves, women and children, striking, kicking, and spilling more than they drank. In
less than an hour, excepting the principal men, not a sober person was to be seen, parties of four
reeling and rolling under the weight of another, whom they affected to be carrying home” (Bowditch
1966, as cited in Akyeampong (1996, p. 6).
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the value of payments after 1688 was greater in settlements on the non-coast caravan
routes than the increase in other settlements. Column 1 of Table 1.4 presents the
baseline estimate of the difference-in-differences coefficients, αt, in Equation 1.3.
None of the estimated coefficients in the pre-1688 period is statistically significant,
validating the parallel trends assumption. In marked contrast, all but one of the
estimated coefficients in the post-1688 period are statistically significant.83 The
results show greater increased value of payments to the chiefs of settlements on the
non-coast caravan routes than increased value of payments to the chiefs in other
settlements. On average, the increased payments to chiefs on non-coast caravan
routes was greater by 471 angles of gold, which is three times as much as the salary of
a Company agent, ten times the allowance of a craftsman at the Cape Coast Castle,
and 28 times the cost of subsistence in the seventeenth-century Gold Coast. The
estimates of post-1688 coefficients are both statistically and economically significant.
1.6.2 Robustness Checks
Columns 2 to 4 of Table 1.4 present the three main robustness checks. Column
2 presents the results when the value of payments is calculated using the average
price instead of the minimum price. The estimates in the pre-1688 period are not
statistically significant, while the estimates in the post-1688 period are statistically
significant. Hence, the results are robust to whether the value of payments is
calculated using the average price. On average, the increase in payments made
to settlements on the non-coast caravan routes is greater by 731 angles. This is
higher than the average of the baseline estimates. In spite of this, the baseline
estimates are still shown to be quantitatively important from the perspectives of
the Company and the chiefs.
Column 3 presents the results when payments are measured in volume (i.e.
count) rather than in value. The pattern is similar to the baseline. The results are
robust as to whether payments are measured in volume. On average, the increase
in payments made to settlements on the non-coast caravan routes is 221 items more
than those made to other settlements. This is five times as much as the average
number of items paid. The Company gave more items to the chiefs on non-coast
caravan routes.
Column 4 presents the results when business-related payments are excluded
from the total value of payments. Excluding these payments from the total would
leave just the “additional” payments. Additional payments increased after 1688,
and the increase was greater in settlements on the non-coast caravan routes than in
83The estimate of the coefficient for 1696 is not statistically significant.
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other settlements. The average increase is 352 angles. This is 2.5 times the salary of
a Company agent, seven times the allowance of a craftsman, and 21 times the cost of
subsistence in the seventeenth-century Gold Coast. The results remain economically
and statistically significant even if business-related payments are excluded from the
total value of payments.
Appendix A.15 presents additional robustness checks. Firstly, the results
are robust as to whether standard errors are adjusted for spatial and temporal
correlations. Of course, the point estimates are the same as in the baseline. However,
the standard errors are different. The maximum distance a caravan merchant could
travel per day is 20 kilometres.84 Many of the settlements, especially settlements
on the coast, were within 20 kilometres of each other. Secondly, the results are
robust to whether the value of payments is measured using current prices instead of
the minimum price. On average, the value of payments increases by more than 677
angles, which is higher than the average of baseline estimates, as expected. Thirdly,
the results are robust whether the regression controls for a state-specific flexible
trend or a state-specific linear trend. Hence, the greater increase in the value of
payments was not because of increasing time trend in the value of payments that
differed across states. Finally, the results are robust to whether a particular type
of payment (e.g. customary payments, dashey, ground payments) is excluded from
the total value of payments one at a time. Hence, the results do not depend on just
one particular type of payment.
1.6.3 Mechanisms
I argue that increased payments can be explained by increased bargaining power of
chiefs. The Company made payments to chiefs in order to monopolise English trade
and keep trade flowing to the Company. The chiefs on the non-coast caravan routes
whose geographical location enabled them to capitalize on their power to stop or
redirect trade had the greatest power to extract payments from the Company. After
1688, the Company faced competition from other English merchants and began to
pay more to the chiefs whose compliance was most important in avoiding competition
from interlopers.
If the bargaining position of chiefs improved after 1688, then their share in
the gross income of the Company should also have increased during this period. I
show that the increase in share of chiefs on the non-coast caravan routes was greater
than the increase in share of other chiefs. I calculate the share of payments in the
gross income of the Company.
84For details, see section 3.3.
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GrossIncomeSharejt =
Paymentsjt
GrossIncomet
(1.4)
where GrossIncomeSharejt is the share of chiefs in j in the gross income of
the Company in year t, j is an indicator of whether a chief is on the non-coast
caravan routes, Paymentjt is the value of payments received by chiefs in j in year
t, GrossIncomet is the gross income of the Company in year t.
The gross income of the Company, GrossIncomet, is estimated as:
GrossIncomet =
∑
s
(pst − cst)Qst + (pgt − cgt)Qgt (1.5)
where s is slave type (man, woman, boy, girl), g is gold, pst is the selling price of s
in the West Indies in year t, cst is the buying price of s in the Gold Coast in year t,
Qst is the number of slaves s purchased by the Company in Africa in year t, pgt is
the selling price of g in England in year t, cgt is the buying price of g in the Gold
Coast in year t, and Qgt is the quantity of gold g bought by the Company in year t.
Data on selling prices of slaves in West Indies, pst, the selling price of gold in
England, pgt, and the buying price of gold in Africa, cgt, are drawn from secondary
sources.85 I convert West Indies currencies to British pounds sterling. The data
on exchange rates between West Indies currencies and British pounds sterling from
1679 to 1704 are also drawn from secondary sources.86 Data on buying prices of
slaves, cst, numbers of slaves, Qst, and quantities of gold, Qgt, are drawn from the
Journals.
Figure 1.4 presents the share of payments in the gross income of the Company.
Before 1688, the value of payments made to settlements on the non-coast caravan
routes was on average 0.7 per cent of the gross income of the Company. On average,
the value of payments made to other settlements was 0.5 per cent during this period.
After 1688, the average value of payments made to settlements on the non-coast
caravan routes rose from just 0.7 per cent in the pre-1688 period to 5.9 per cent
in the post-1688 period. However, the average value of payments made to other
settlements only rose from 0.5 per cent to 1.6 per cent in the post-1688 period.
Increased bargaining power of chiefs can be explained by increased threat
from interlopers. In correspondence, the Company instructed its agents to report
85The data on selling prices of slaves in West Indies, pst, is drawn from Galenson (1979) and
Galenson (1982). The data on selling price of gold in England is drawn from Bean (1974) and
Curtin (1975a).
86The data on exchange rates between West Indies currencies and British pounds sterling are
drawn from McCusker (1978) and Eltis, Lewis, and McIntyre (2010).
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on the presence and activities of interlopers seen from the coast.
“Yesterday receaved yours, and according to your order have inquired
after the interloopers that are here, one is Richard Murphy in the
Primrose from London and Mr John Belwood is an owner, is bound
along the coast for Arda, the other is Roger Mathew in the Exeter
Marchant and is bound to Calabar if cannot gett slaves on the coast,
he is a Devensheer man and came from Dartmouth and belongs to the
Cornish Company” (Correspondence 1/122).87
The Company also instructed its agents to apprehend and send captured interlopers
to the Cape Coast Castle.
“In obedience to your order and Counsells I shall bee verry dilligent in
apprehending such persons as are interloopers and readily send them to
Cape Corso per the first oppertunity” (Correspondence 1/391).
The English government granted the Company rights to seize the ships and
cargoes of interlopers and to detain them in their African forts and factories. After
1688, the Company lost these and other privileges.88 During this period, the
Company headquarters in London stopped issuing orders empowering its captains
to seize interlopers’ ships and cargoes.89
The withdrawal of privileges after 1688 increased the threat of competition
from other English merchants and in turn increased the bargaining power of chiefs,
87Three other excerpts show reporting of interlopers’ activities on the coast by Company agents
to the headquarters at the Cape Coast Castle. “Satureday night last came in this road Captain
Andrews, Captain May and Captain Morphy, interlopers, they provided with all sorts of currant
goods and takes a great deale of money and I to the contrary take not one cracra on shoare in
the Company s factory” (Correspondence 1/78). “The English interloper that lay to windward is
arriv’d in this roade, being a sloop something bigger than the Adventure Sloop. He was fitted out
of Jamaica but the master is a Barbarian [sic: = Barbadian], his name is Steet. He hath a great
cargo aboard of all sorts of goods with a bundall of blew perpetuanoes, by which he takes all the
trade from the shoar, the canoes being continually aboard of him, so that I can take nothing, but
can receive by him noe intelligence of any of the Company ships nor noe other but one which he
suspects to be the pyrate, which gave him chase but could not come up with him” (Correspondence
2/24). “Last night came down a small English interloper and lyes between Annamaboe and Agga,
and his cheife of of his loading is sugar and rum, some allejars and broad nicconees. He tarrys here
to take in fourty chests of corn and on that intent he sent yesterday for Yabboy aboard, who I
beleive will endeavour to supply him” (Correspondence 2/638).
88For details, see Section 1.2.
89See, for example, Davies (1957). “On 11 December 1688 the King left Whitehall. Seven days
earlier, the secretary of the Company had written out a commission in the usual form to Captain
Rickard of the Alexander empowering and requiring him to seize any interlopers he found trading
within the limits of the company’s monopoly. It was the last of hundreds to be issued” (Davies,
1957, p. 123).
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whose cooperation was needed to deter competition. The correspondence reveals two
ways in which the threat of competition with other English merchants increased the
chiefs’ bargaining power. Firstly, chiefs committed to keep trade flowing to the
Company while at the same time barring trade from flowing to interlopers. This
increased the chiefs’ bargaining power with the Company.
“Since my last the Queen arrived (who has sent to make up the palaver),
whom I acquainted with what you ordered me about money being
carried of to interlopers. She say[s] she will stand by me (and lickwise
the Cabbosheers) if you will begin to allow her monthly ground rent
from this tyme, like as is paid at Accra, and the Cabbosheers some
allowance besides, so as noe canoes shall be suffer’d to goe aboard of
ships with money, which I think much better then to be as now it is”
(Correspondence 3/1111).90
Secondly, chiefs threatened to stop the trade flowing to the Company should
it fail to meet the chiefs’ demand for payments.
“When I telld Prince that you would not allow him more then 4a per
month he said if you gave him not what he demanded, [he] would
stop all merchants from comeing hither, & would carry them to & fro
to Barracu towne, so to prevent disturbance after many words have
90Other excerpts highlight this commitment to trade. “I have little to add but that the Queen
is urgent to know what you’l allow &ca for ground rent, which she says when it is agreed on no
canoes shall be suffered to go off to interlopers” (Correspondence 3/1113). “I should have sent my
accompt sooner, but have delay’d them that I might advise of the contract with the Queen, with
whom I have agreed to pay her five peze per month, & custome at a new Cheifs comeing and a[t]
danceing as already I have paid, and at cutting her corn a phota longee or any thing else to that
value & a case of liquor, and at Christmas time a say & longee & a case of spirits, & with John Le
Grand (the Captain of the towne) I have agreed to pay him four angles per month, & a red cloth
at Christmas & other dashes as already paid the Cabbosheers, but Prince, Ataquo & Abarraco I
cannot come to an aggrement with, so Ataquoe comes up with these to know what you will please
to allow them. The two latter ask 4a per month each, & I offer’d them 2a each, which I thought
was verry sufficient, but Prince would not tell me how [much] he would have, but as far as I can
gather he expect half as much as the Queen. I desire to know your pleasure per returne of this
canoe, & instructions what they must sign to. The Queen & John Le Grand say they will take a
fetish in the open market place that none shall be suffered to goe of to interlopers, & if any should
gett off will seize on their goods at their returne, and the other three promise the same when you
agree with them” (Correspondence 3/1119). “This day since the letter that accompanys this was
writt the Cabbosheers of Anguinna have opened to me an unexpected palaver after their difference
was made up with the Queen, which was ended principaly by my means, that they have a bendy
per month paid to the Queen, of which they have made her promise they shall mont[h]ly have one
half part, and if you will not allow it they say noe trade or mony shall come here, but if you will
allow the same they promise that they will unanimously take a fatish that no mony shall be carryed
aboard” (Correspondence 3/1131).
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promised he should have a cloath of scarlett broad cloth or to the
value at Christmas time yearely, an iron barr att rowsawing time”
(Correspondence 3/1121).91
The correspondence of the Company shows that interlopers were causing
more problems to the Company after 1688. Agents were now reporting more of the
negative effect of interlopers’ activities on the Company’s trade business.
“Here is little trade, nor can I expect any as long as these interlopers
ly here, so that I shall send no accompt untill the end of this month”
(Correspondence 3/653).92
Moreover, there were instances when the Company was aggressive towards
interlopers. In one instance, an agent fired cannon shots at an interloper.
“Yesterday came downe here an interloper, a Briganteene, who as I am
told by the Blacks offers 4a per chest for corne, soe fear shall gett none
91Other excerpts highlight this threat. “Yours of the 9th instant yesterday received, and shall
observe and doe accordingly, and that when received your said the King of Aguoffoe his men staying
here for the same [i.e. customs], and that John Cabbess being very earnest for payment of the same,
which said if [I] did not pay he [i.e. the King] would be a mighty hinderance of trade to this Castle
and very troublesome, much against the intrest of the Royall Company at this place, and that [I]
shall not give any custome if can otherways help it, and if [you] think it be not to the intrest of
the Royall Company” (Correspondence 3/443). “The King of Quamboes man Affomadoe has been
here, & demands five month ground rent, four being due at Mr Bloomes departure from hence. I
could give him no other answer then what this certificate derected, only telling him I would advise
you of it, & if any thing was due to the King it should be paid. He went away contented with
that answer, but as soon as he arrived at Aquamboe, came messengers sent by the King to stop all
trade or provitions from us, saying that I was come to cheat him, and I should have no trade before
he had his money, but I agreed with the fellowes that they should not put their fetish up, hearing
[ms. ’hareing’] how chargeable it had been in Mr Whitings time, till I had sent to Quamboe. The
Kings answer was that I cheated him. and that he would make noe pallaver unless I came my selfe,
soe was forced to returne the messenger again with a dashee of a broad sattin & a case of spirrits”
(Correspondence 3/1284).
92Three other excerpts show similar reports. “Haveing received so many unsufferable abusses from
Bonnishee and several others belonging to this town, thought it fitt for the intrest and honour of the
Company to seize upon him, which accordingly yesterday in the afternoon I did, with Humphrey,
Finny, Eggen & Petter Quashi, they all supplying Captains Parish, Bill [= Bell?] & Chantrell with
slaves, corne &ca, likewise threatning to s[e]ize all goods that is bought out of the Factory, oblidging
all to buy of them, insomuch that since the interlopers came here I have not taken one taccoe of
gold, Capt. Parish also keeping a white man in Bonnishees house with goods” (Correspondence
3/646). “The two English interlopers that were lately to the offen of this road being now gone
downe to Whidah, I hope to have some traid, and to returne the effects by the latter end of the
month” (Correspondence 3/874). “It was my ill fortune a little before gott to Whidah, to meet
with the English interloper bound to the same place. He also slaved there, he haveing a much more
sortable cargoe, and almost as much again. They took little notice of me, so that I was hard put
to it to gett my slaves. I brought of 598, have since lost about 20, the rest are pretty well, am in
hopes shall not loose many more. I design, God willing, from hence tomorrow” (Correspondence
3/1401).
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whilst he is here. Bonyshee & Humphry both promissed me some on
Munday next, on the latter I depend but the other I fear will not comply
with his word. I can make noe accompt for this last month, haveing taken
but verry little money... PS. I have forst the above mentioned interlooper
out of road by firing 2 shott att him, but that will not fright him quite
away, he now la[y]ing out of shot of the Castle” (Correspondence 3/789).
In another instance, an agent explained why he failed to advise the headquarters
of the presence of an English interloper, suggesting that the Company wrote to the
agent and reminded him of his duty to report interlopers’ presence and activities to
the Company.
“... and as to my not adviseing you of the English interloper that was
here last, I did not know that it was your desire to give me that liberty,
for you formerly cheidd [= chided] me for putting the Company to the
charge of canoes, but you may be assured I shall be mindfull not to
neglect any of your commands” (Correspondence 3/70).
Why was the increase in bargaining share only temporary? The decline in
the share of gross income among chiefs by the end of seventeenth century can be
explained by the decline in trade with caravan merchants in this period. In 1698,
Denkyira conquered Assin. Denkyira and Assin were both inland states. Assin
was the country of Akani merchants, the merchants responsible for the large-scale
mercantile operations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Human porters
carried caravans and travelled a hundred miles between Assin and the coast to
trade with European merchants.93 The military expansion destroyed the towns and
villages where caravan merchants and their porters could rest and replenish supplies
(e.g. food, water), undermining the geographical and social and economic bases of
the trade.94 Trade with caravan merchants started to decline by the end of the
seventeenth-century, and with it the incentive to pay the chiefs for access.
In summary, payments made by the Company to chiefs increased after 1688.
The increase was greater in settlements on the non-coast caravan routes than in
other settlements. The results remain robust after a battery of robustness checks.
The increased value of payments can be explained by the increased bargaining power
93See Tables 7.1 and 7.2 of Kea (1982, pp. 258-259). Also, see Law (1997, 2001, 2006).
94See, for example, Kea (1982). “Under the social conditions that contributed to the emergence
of militarized expansionist polities the seventeenth-century mercantile organization of the Akani
political formation could not flourish... In other words, the geographical and socioeconomic base of
Akani trade was undermined” (Kea, 1982, pp. 286-287).
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of chiefs. The bargaining power of chiefs increased when the Company faced the
threat of other English merchants competing with them. Chiefs on the non-coast
caravan routes had more power to stop or redirect trade. After 1688, the share of
chiefs on the non-coast caravan routes of the gross income of the Company increased
much more than the increase experienced by other chiefs. The increase in the value
of payments was only temporary, as trade with caravan merchants diminished at
the end of the seventeenth century.
1.7 Conclusion
I have documented the distribution, composition, and dynamics of payments
received by chiefs from the Royal African Company in seventeenth-century Ghana.
I constructed the database of more than 20,000 payments from handwritten
Company archives. The payments were sizeable from the perspectives of both the
Company and chiefs. Head chiefs, the highest-ranking chiefs in seventeenth century
Ghana, received the highest payments per capita. A head chief receivied six times
as much as an individual chieftain and ten times as much as an officeholder. Most
payments were made using commodities, such as European cloth, firearms, and
alcohol, and chiefs derived personal benefits from these payments. Head chiefs
received the lion’s share of the total value of payments, especially of European
cloth, firearms, and alcohol.
After 1688, the Company faced more competition from other English
merchants. The Company paid more to chiefs on the non-coast caravan routes who
had more power to stop or redirect trade during this period than to other chiefs.
The increased payments to chiefs on the non-coast caravan routes can be explained
by their increased bargaining power. Although the share of payments to chiefs on
non-coast caravan routes increased by more than the payments to other chiefs, the
increase was only temporary. The military expansion of inland states at the end of
the seventeenth century diminished trade with caravan merchants and may have
reduced the incentives for the Company to pay for exclusive access to trade. Some
chiefs found themselves in the right place at the right time and took advantage of
the situation.
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Figure 1.1: Slaves Embarked from Africa by the Royal African Company, 1679-1704
Notes: The first vertical line marks the Glorious Revolution in 1688. The second vertical
line marks the military expansion of inland states that started in 1698. Source: Voyages:
The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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Figure 1.2: Frequency of Payments by Rank of Recipient
Notes: The first vertical axis shows the frequency of payments in percent. The second
vertical axis shows the frequency of payments in level. Source: Company of Royal
Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378); Daaku (1970);
Kea (1982); Law (1997, 2001, 2006)
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Figure 1.3: Average Value of Payments by Royal African Company, 1679-1704
Notes: The first vertical line marks the Glorious Revolution in 1688. The second vertical
line marks the military expansion of inland states that started in 1698. Source: Company
of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378)
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Figure 1.4: Share of Payments in Royal African Company’s Gross Income, 1679-1704
Notes: The first vertical line marks the Glorious Revolution in 1688. The second vertical
line marks the military expansion of inland states that started in 1698. Source: Company
of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378); Bean
(1974); Curtin (1975a); McCusker (1978); Galenson (1979, 1982)
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Figure 1.5: Caravan Routes and Settlements in the Seventeenth-Century Gold Coast
Notes: The map depicts the Akani-Twifo caravan routes and African settlements in the
seventeenth-century Gold Coast, namely Abra, Abrem, Accra, Adangme, Adom, Akani,
Ahanta, Akron, Akwamu, Amisa, Anashan, Agona, Anomabo, Asante, Asebu, Cape
Coast, Cape Coast Castle, Denkyira, Dixcove, Great Komenda, Egya, Fante, Afutu,
Kabestera, Kormantin, Little Komenda, Elmina, Sekondi, Takoradi, Tantumkweri, Twifo,
and Winneba. Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and
Successors (T70/365-378); Donnan (1965); Wilks (1975); Kea (1982); Law (1997, 2001,
2006)
34
Figure 1.6: Change in Average Value of Payments by Settlement
Notes: The map depicts the Akani-Twifo caravan routes and African settlements in the
seventeenth-century Gold Coast, namely Abra, Abrem, Accra, Adangme, Adom, Akani,
Ahanta, Akron, Akwamu, Amisa, Anashan, Agona, Anomabo, Asante, Asebu, Cape
Coast, Cape Coast Castle, Denkyira, Dixcove, Great Komenda, Egya, Fante, Afutu,
Kabestera, Kormantin, Little Komenda, Elmina, Sekondi, Takoradi, Tantumkweri, Twifo,
and Winneba. Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and
Successors (T70/365-378); Donnan (1965); Wilks (1975); Kea (1982); Law (1997, 2001,
2006)
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Regression
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Dependent variable: Payments
Value 77.11 297.26 0 3337.41 416
Volume 43.99 229.18 0 2764.25 416
Independent variable:
CaravanRoute 0.59 0.49 0 1 32
NonCoast 0.56 0.50 0 1 32
AdministrativeCapital 0.47 0.50 0 1 32
CommercialCentre 0.38 0.48 0 1 32
Notes: The dependent variable Payments is expressed either in value in constant angles of gold
or in volume of payments. CaravanRoute is an indicator of whether the settlement is on the
Akani-Twifo caravan routes. NonCoast is an indicator of whether the settlement is not a coastal
destination. AdministrativeCapital is an indicator of whether the settlement is an administrative
capital. CommercialCentre is an indicator of whether the settlement is a commercial centre. Source:
Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378); Kea
(1982); Law (1997, 2001, 2006)
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Table 1.2: Value of Payments by Rank of Recipient
All Pre-1688 Post-1688
Rank N % Rank N % Rank N % Rank
State Chief 28712 75.25 3572 64.61 25140 77.05
Head Chief 23577 61.79 1 1858 33.61 1 21719 66.57 1
Officeholder 5135 13.46 3 1714 31.01 2 3421 10.48 3
Chieftain 7277 19.07 1524 27.57 5753 17.63
Individual 5884 15.42 2 603 10.91 4 5281 16.19 2
Group 1392 3.65 4 920 16.65 3 472 1.45 4
Employee 536 1.41 5 276 5.00 5 260 0.80 6
Trader 497 1.30 6 68 1.24 6 429 1.32 5
Soldier 109 0.29 7 2 0.03 7 108 0.33 7
Unspecified 1025 2.69 86 1.56 939 2.88
Total 38155 100 5528 100 32628 100
Notes: The value of payments is in constant angles of gold. All includes payments from 1679
to 1704. Pre-1688 includes payments in 1679, 1680, 1681, 1682, 1683, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1687.
Post-1688 includes payments in 1689, 1690, 1691, 1696, 1697, 1698, 1699, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703,
1704. Rank is rank from highest to lowest: 1 is the highest; 10 is the lowest. Source: Company of
Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378); Davies (1957);
Eltis (1991); Alpern (1995)
37
Table 1.3: Value of Payments by Type of Commodity
All Pre-1688 Post-1688
Type N % Rank N % Rank N % Rank
Alcohol 4321 11.33 3 937 16.96 3 3384 10.37 3
Other Cloth 2545 6.67 5 751 13.58 4 1794 5.50 6
European
Cloth
16974 44.49 1 1297 23.47 1 15677 48.05 1
Indian Cloth 1292 3.39 8 538 9.73 6 754 2.31 8
Cloth
Products
2741 7.18 4 35 0.63 9 2706 8.29 4
Firearms 4421 11.59 2 604 10.93 5 3817 11.70 2
Gold 1883 4.94 7 1139 20.61 2 744 2.28 9
Metals 1201 3.15 9 83 1.51 8 1118 3.43 7
Metalwares 303 0.80 10 10 0.18 10 294 0.90 10
Miscellaneous 2473 6.48 6 133 2.40 7 2340 7.17 5
Total 38155 100 5528 100 32628 100
Notes: The value of payments is in constant angles of gold. All includes payments from 1679
to 1704. Pre-1688 includes payments in 1679, 1680, 1681, 1682, 1683, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1687.
Post-1688 includes payments in 1689, 1690, 1691, 1696, 1697, 1698, 1699, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703,
1704. Rank is rank from highest to lowest: 1 is the highest; 10 is the lowest. Source: Company of
Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378); Davies (1957);
Eltis (1991); Alpern (1995)
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Table 1.4: Estimate of Difference-in-differences Coefficients in Regression
Baseline Main Robustness Checks
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4)
α1680 -124.45 -179.02 -35.80 -104.00
(82.91) (119.27) (23.85) (69.29)
α1681 -69.40 -84.85 -5.67 -65.60
(70.07) (85.68) (5.73) (66.24)
α1682 -65.70 -92.26 -14.61 -61.92
(60.79) (85.37) (13.52) (57.29)
α1683 -53.42 -63.83 16.50 -59.45
(48.82) (58.33) (15.07) (54.32)
α1684 7.95 22.28 55.74 -19.21
(47.01) (131.74) (329.59) (113.60)
α1690 123.28 191.68 56.77 77.71
(67.42) (104.84) (31.05) (42.50)
α1696 293.26 463.06 167.04 207.88
(205.41) (324.34) (117.00) (145.60)
α1697 486.19 786.73 281.14 372.44
(218.56) (353.66) (126.38) (167.43)
α1698 491.78 747.57 181.22 397.25
(239.23) (363.66) (88.16) (193.24)
α1699 708.44 1096.76 362.10 617.81
(351.33) (543.89) (179.57) (306.38)
α1702 696.19 1076.08 294.52 456.39
(295.23) (456.33) (124.90) (193.54)
α1703 496.06 754.20 204.69 333.45
(177.29) (269.55) (73.16) (119.18)
Price Min Ave NA Min
Volume No No Yes No
Business-related Yes Yes Yes No
N 416 416 416 416
Notes: Column (1) shows the results when the value of payments is calculated using minimum
prices from 1679 to 1704. Column (2) shows the results when the value of payments is calculated
using average prices from 1679 to 1704. Column (3) shows the results when payment is measured
in volume rather than in value. Column (4) shows the results when business-related payments
(customary payments, ground payments, service payments, ship customs) are dropped from the
sample. All specifications include settlement and year fixed-effects, state-specific trends, and a
full set of control variables. Standard errors are clustered by settlements and are calculated using
a wild-cluster bootstrap to adjust for the bias caused by the small number of clusters. Source:
Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378)
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Chapter 2
Structural Change in the
Royal African Company
Stock Transfers
2.1 Introduction
English joint-stock companies illustrate how the English stock market developed
in its early years (Carlos, 1993; Carlos, Key, & Dupree, 1998; Murphy, 2009).
Stock transfer records from the Royal African and Hudson’s Bay Companies,
for example, show that the foundations of the London capital market did not
emerge “Phoenix-like from the ashes of the old regime,” where old regime refers
to the period before the Glorious Revolution in 1688 (Carlos et al., 1998, p. 319).
Individuals participated in the market before, not only after, the Revolution, which
in turn complemented the English capital market that flourished immediately after
the Revolution (Dickson, 1967; Neal, 1990). But how concentrated or widespread
was such participation to learning and experience? If only specific groups of
investors participated, for example elites, then the learning and experience were
not as wide-reaching as the literature portrays them to be.
In this paper, I provide quantitative evidence of active participation by elites
and non-elites using data on transfers of Royal African Company (the Company)
stock between 1672 and 1712. The Company attracted people of authority and
power to invest in its stock. Political and wealthy elites served as directors of the
Company during its formative years and bought and sold stock.1 How widely did
1Elites who served as directors and traded Company stock during the Company’s formative years
from 1672 to 1674 include Sir John Ashby, Sir John Banks, John Bence, Lord George Berkeley
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elites and non-elites participate in the market for this stock? I highlight three new
stylized facts. Firstly, both elite and non-elite stock traders had substantial shares
in stock bought and sold in the 1670s and 1680s. Elites bought 56 per cent and sold
55 per cent of the total stock transferred during this period. Non-elites bought 44
per cent and sold 45 per cent. As the data suggests, neither elites nor non-elites
dominated the market before the Company made stock more affordable for investors
in the 1690s.
Secondly, the share of some elites, particularly Company directors, merchants
and titled elites, declined in the period between 1685 and 1690. They became net
sellers to non-elites during this period. This correlates with the political events
of the 1680s that reduced the Company’s royal privileges. The prorogation of
Parliament in 1685 was a contest of power between the Crown and Parliament that
preceded the Glorious Revolution in 1688. These events shifted political power to
Parliament. The reduction in royal privileges and the increased uncertainties faced
by the Company discouraged some investors from trading Company stock.
Thirdly, non-elites dominated the Company stock market in the 1690s. In
1691, the Company gave stockholders a 300 per cent bonus on their stock at no
additional cost. The bonus in effect quadrupled the book value of stock and made
stock more affordable to investors. Using available data, I show that the average
stock price fell after 1691. The price of new stock was only about ten per cent of
the price per stock before 1691. Hence, Company stock was more affordable after
1691. The Bai-Perron (2003) results suggest that the structural change occurred in
1697 when a large amount of new stock was issued at £12 per stock. The new stock
was worth £475,800 in nominal value, which was 76 per cent of the existing stock
(Scott, 1903, 1910).
The data suggests that non-elites who were interested in investing in
Company stock but were constrained by wealth or income benefited from the fall
in stock prices. Between 1672 and 1690, the smallest block of stock (i.e. stock
with book value above £0 but below £100) was only one per cent of the total
transactions. As stock became more affordable after the quadrupling of stock in
(the First Earl of Berkeley), Sir Thomas Bludworth, Jarvis Cartwright, Sir Josiah Child (First
Baronet), Sir Robert Clayton, Sir Peter Colleton, Nicholas Cooke, Sir John Cooke, Sir William
Craven (the Earl of Craven), Thomas Crispe, John Cutting, Sir Francis Dashwood (First Baronet),
Sir Samuel Dashwood, Lawrence du Puy, Thomas Heatley, Sir William Hodges (First Baronet), Sir
Edward Hopegood, John Jefferies, Peter Joye, Sir Andrew King, Ralph Lee, Charles Modyford, Sir
John Morgan, Samuel Moyer, Sir Benjamin Newland, Thomas Nicolls, Sir Peter Paravarini, Henry
Richards, Sir Gabriel Roberts, Edward Rudge, Tobias Rustat, John Searle, Sir John Shaw (First
Baronet), John Short, Benjamin Skutt, Sir William Stevens, Sir Henry Tulse, Sir Thomas Vernon,
Sir Robert Vyner (Baronet), Nicholas Warren, Sir William Warren, Robert Westerne, and Richard
Young.
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1691 and issuance of new stock in 1697, small blocks increased to 33 per cent of
the total transactions. The results suggest that Company decisions played a major
role in explaining the widespread participation of elites and non-elites in the stock
market.
I contribute to the literature arguing that the foundations of the capital
market were laid before the Glorious Revolution in 1688, not after it (Carlos, 1993;
Carlos et al., 1998; Murphy, 2009). In this paper, the data suggests that the capital
market experience was not confined to elites. Non-elites participated substantially in
the stock market. At the same time, the Bai-Perron (2003) results are not dismissive
of the view that political events, such as the Glorious Revolution in 1688, changed
the institution governing investors’ incentives (North & Weingast, 1989; Quinn,
2001; Carlos, Fletcher, & Neal, 2015), as the decline in some stock traders’ share
in stock transfers occurred against the background of these political events. For
instance, Company directors bought 34 per cent less than they sold in the latter
half of the 1680s. Their share in the total stock fell from 43.1 per cent in 1687 to
39.4 per cent in 1688.
I also contribute to the literature emphasizing that Company decisions
explain a lot about its fate as a chartered company (Scott, 1910; Davies, 1957;
Carlos & Brown-Kruse, 1996). I find that both Company decisions and political
events affected the Company’s secondary stock market. However, as Bai-Perron
(2003) results suggest, Company decisions, particularly the issuance of new stock
at lower prices in the 1690s, matter more than political events in explaining the
structural change in stock transfers from 1672 to 1712.
In Section 2.2, I provide historical background. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, I
present the methodology and data, respectively. In Section 2.5, I discuss the results
for the period between 1672 and 1690 and for the period between 1691 and 1712.
The conclusion is in Section 2.6.
2.2 Historical Background
King Charles II granted the Royal African Company its charter in 1672. The
Company exchanged manufactured goods for commodities and slaves from Africa,
which were then exchanged for bills of exchange, bullions, and commodities, such as
sugar and tobacco, from the West Indies. Among the joint-stock companies involved
in the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the seventeenth century, the Company exported
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the greatest number of slaves from Africa.2 When the Company received its charter
in 1672, it was the second-largest joint-stock company in England, after the East
India Company.3
The charter legalized the sale of stock to raise capital for trade operations.
The initial amount of capital stock was £111,100. Since each stock had a nominal
value of £100, there were 1,111 shares (Scott, 1910; Davies, 1957; Carlos, 1993).
The quadrupling of stock on 30 July 1691 raised the book value of capital stock
from £111,100 to £444,400. It gave a 300-per-cent-bonus to current stockholders.
According to Scott (1910), the bonus can be attributed to the Company’s optimistic
view of its finances at the time. As Scott (1910, p. 26) puts it,
“There is reason to believe that the company had accumulated a
considerable reserve out of profits over and above the 10 or 20 guineas
per cent. paid annually as dividend. The assistants in speaking of these
early years mention the ‘great and extraordinary success with which
the trade had been carried on.’ Houghton, too, stated in 1683 the ‘the
Guinea company was as safe as the East India company.’ The wording
of the resolution for the bonus addition of capital confirms this view of
the company’s finances at the time” (Scott, 1910, p. 26).4
Davies (1957) challenges Scott’s view. For Davies, “Only by accounting so
dubious as to be worthless can Scott’s assumption that the bonus payment betokened
the existence of considerable capital reserves be accepted” (Davies, 1957, p. 82).
Instead, the Company implemented the bonus to make stock more affordable to
potential investors and to make it appear that the Company’s trade is robust and
profitable. Davies (1957, p. 82) argues that
2See, for example, Pettigrew (2013, p. 11). “The Royal African Company of England shipped
more enslaved African, women, men, and children to the Americas than any other single institution
during the entire period of the transatlantic slave trade. From its foundation in 1672 to the early
1720s, the African Company transported close to 150,000 enslaved Africans, mostly to the British
Caribbean. It played a role in establishing England’s transatlantic slave trade, stealing market
share from the Dutch and French slave trades, and in Africanizing the populations of England’s
Caribbean plantations. In 1673, soon after the company’s foundation, the English had a 33 per
cent share in the transatlantic slave trade. By 1683, that share had increased to 74 per cent.”
3The East India Company was a “monied” company involved in the purchase of government
debt. The Royal African Company was not one of the monied companies. Carlos, Moyen, and
Hill (2002, p. 62) emphasise that the Company “was not directly involved in the government for
equity swap.” Smith (2018) argues that investors in the East India Company were more likely to
diversify than investors in the Royal African Company. “[Carlos et al. (2015)] did a remarkable
job of reconstructing investment practices. They concluded that only small numbers of investors
showed interest in diversification... the picture was very different a hundred years earlier, and
investors in EIC were much more likely to participate in other ventures” (Smith, 2018, p. 1119).
4See also Scott (1903, p. 250).
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“There may have been a deliberate intention to increase the number of
shares and thus to lower the cost of purchasing the smallest unit in which
transfers were normally made, £100. This might have been intended
to assuage critics of the company’s monopoly who complained that the
benefits of the trade were restricted to too few persons. Alternatively the
Assistants, by advising this step, may have hoped to give some nominal
recompense to stockholders starved of dividends, and, by manufacturing
activity in the company’s stock, to divert attention from the languishing
condition of the trade.”
New stock was issued several times thereafter. In 1693 the Company issued
£180,850 of stock at £40 per £100. Four years later, in 1697, the Company issued
£475,800 of stock at £12 per £100. Appendix B.1 summarizes the capital of the
Royal African Company from 1672 to 1712. I normalise stock transferred to adjust
for the stock split and for the issuance of new stock.
Stock could be transferred from trader to trader, provided that the seller
was not in debt to the Company and was not accused of violating the monopoly
rights of the Company (e.g. by trading goods or slaves without permission from the
Company). After the Company approved the trade the buyer would pay the seller in
a private transaction. Thus, price was not recorded in the transfer books.5 However,
the Company did record the names of the buyer and seller and the book value (i.e
quantity) of stock transferred. The information contained in the transfer books was
valuable for the Company. The Company had to keep track of who should receive
dividends and who could vote.6
The Court of Assistants (the Board of Directors) consisted of managing
directors. Stockholders met annually at the General Court to elect the directors.
To become a director, a stockholder had to have at least £400 worth of stock. In
1691 this requirement was raised to £1,000. Because of the stock split in 1691,
this requirement was equivalent to £250 of the original stock. The Articles of the
Company specified that a director could serve two years and could be re-elected
after three years.7
Appendix B.2 shows elites’ share in the total stock between 1679 and 1692.
Company directors owned on average 45.4 per cent of the total stock in the first half
of the 1680s. The average share fell to 42.5 in the latter half of the 1680s and to 33.7
5See Davies (1957, p. 71) and Carlos et al. (1998, p. 324) for detail.
6According to Carlos et al. (1998, p. 321), the Company “had to know who might not yet
have fully paid for a subscription, who was eligible to vote at the shareholders meetings, commonly
known as the General Court, and who should earn dividends.”
7For more detail, see Davies (1957, pp. 154-155) and Carlos (1993, p. 119).
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per cent in the first two years of the 1690s. Titled elites’ share declined from 39.3
per cent on average in the first half of the 1680s to 36.4 per cent in the latter half of
the 1680s. Merchants’ share declined from 28.3 per cent on average to 27.4 per cent,
while politicians’ share fell from 24.4 per cent to 22.4 per cent. In all cases, shares
were increasing in the first half of the 1680s. In the latter half of the 1680s, shares
were decreasing. The share of other elites, namely clergy, goldsmiths, and Stuart
courtiers, did not fall in the latter half of the 1680s. In the case of the Company,
the majority of stockholders were non-directors. Directors owned on average 45.4
per cent of the total stock between 1679 and 1685. Shareholders preferred dividends
to retained earnings because directors could use the latter for their own benefit
(La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000).
The Company attracted influential and powerful people to invest in its
stock. Noteworthy people served as chief officers and directors. The heads of
the Company, known as the chief officers, were the governor, sub-governor, and
deputy governor. The business administration was organized by committees and
sub-committees. Directly below the chief officers were 24 members of the Board of
Directors. Each assistant or director was assigned to one of four sub-committees:
accounts, correspondence, goods, and shipping. The sub-committees governed the
daily activities of the Company (Scott, 1912; Davies, 1957; Carlos, 1993; Carlos
et al., 1998, 2002). James, the Duke of York and later King James II, was the
governor and the largest stockholder of the Company until 1688.8 Lord George
Berkeley (the Earl of Berkeley), Sir Peter Colleton, Sir William Craven (the Earl
of Craven), Lawrence du Puy, and Sir Joseph Williamson were among the original
subscribers to the Company’s capital stock. Also notable among the original
subscribers were Lord Thomas Clifford (First Baronet), Lord Henry Bennet (Earl
of Arlington), George Villiers (Duke of Buckingham), Anthomy Ashley Cooper
(Third Earl of Shaftesbury), Prince Rupert, Sir William Coventry, John Locke, Sir
George Carteret, Thomas Povey, Lord Hawley, and Mathew Wren (Davies, 1957,
p. 62). Together with merchants, noblemen, politicians, and other notable people,
they served as Company directors.9
However, the Glorious Revolution in 1688 shifted power to the Parliament.
This reduced the Company’s royal privileges and could have increased competition
from other English merchants.10 The Parliament, owing to its “deliberative and
8King James II’s stock was £3,000 (Davies, 1957, p. 65). King William III succeeded King James
II as the governor of the Company after 1688. King William III’s stock was £1,000 (Pettigrew,
2013, p. 45).
9See Davies (1957, Chapter 2), Brewer and Staves (1995, Chapter 21), Pettigrew (2013, Chapter
2) for further detail.
10Carlos and Brown-Kruse (1996, p. 293) compare the situation where the Company lost its
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consultative style,” acted on petitions filed both by those who were lobbying for
monopoly rights for the Company and by those who were against them.11 With
royal privileges reduced and the royal charter criticized by other English merchants,
it was imperative for the Company to obtain a Parliamentary law confirming its
monopoly rights. In 1671, the direct predecessor of the Company attempted to
obtain statutory support for its monopoly but did not succeed.12 The Company
struggled and eventually failed to obtain the support it needed from the Parliament
because of political inertia. Other English merchants thwarted the Company’s
strategy of obtaining statutory support for its monopoly.13
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Shares of Elites and Non-Elites in Stock Tansferred
I examine stock transferred by elites and non-elites from 1672 to 1712. Merchants,
noblemen, politicians, and other political and wealthy elites bought and sold a
substantial amount of stock during the formative years of the Company from 1672 to
1674. I am interested in the correlation between stock transfers and factors internal
to the Company, such as the quadrupling of stock in 1691 and the issuance of new
stock thereafter. For example, the quadrupling of stock in 1691 reduced the price
patent which resulted in competitors increasing market share. “In theoretical terms, the Company
was a dominant firm with a competitive fringe – interlopers or smugglers. Dominant firms, over
time, face market penetration by the fringe. The rate of penetration depends both on the level
of cost advantage and on any government protection the dominant firm might receive, such as
patents. Very important for the Royal African Company is the role played by its charter, which
can be thought of as akin to patent protection. As long as the charter rights could be enforced,
the Company should be more able to maintain its market share. However, if such protection
was removed or became uncertain then the rate of penetration by the fringe firms would become
more rapid and the dominant firm would lose market share and could eventually fail.” Davies
(1957, p. 104) makes a similar point. “While prerogative was unchallenged, the company was safe;
when prerogative was attacked, the company was in danger; when prerogative was overthrown,
the company was doomed... But the shock of the Revolution, the sudden withdrawal of the royal
support, so long and generously given that it had come to be relied on, exposed the company to a
storm of criticism and attack for which it was ill prepared, and in a moment the monopoly derived
from the royal prerogative was gone for ever.”
11See, for example, Pettigrew (2013, Chapter 4).
12The predecessor of the Royal African Company was the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading
to Africa. See Davies (1957, p. 123).
13According to Pettigrew (2013, pp. 118-119), “The principal structural change in this period was
parliamentary supremacy over state regulation of the national economy. Because the monopolistic
African Company expressed the monarchical dominion and the separate traders expressed the use
of parliamentary influence, the shift overwhelmingly favored the separate traders’ campaign to
deregulate the slave trade... The separate traders’ political strategy was to cultivate the broadest
base of public support possible and express that support in petitions to block the African Company’s
attempts to achieve statutory confirmation of its monopoly.”
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of stock and could have encouraged more buying, as stock was now more affordable
from the point of view of stock traders.
The correlations between stock transfers and factors external to the
Company, for example, the Glorious Revolution in 1688, the Nine Years’ War or
the War of the League of Augsburg from 1688 to 1697, are equally interesting.
Initially, elites had an optimistic view of the Company and purchased the lion’s
share of Company stock traded in the market. But the events in the latter half of
the 1680s could have affected the Company’s business prospects. The reduction
of Company privileges and the criticisms from other English merchants competing
with the Company after the Glorious Revolution in 1688 could have diminished the
Company’s business prospects and discouraged elites from purchasing more stock.14
I calculate the share of elite stock traders, e, in stock bought using Equation
2.1,
ShareInStockBoughtet =
∑
e StockBought
e
t∑
i StockBought
i
t
(2.1)
where
∑
e StockBought
e
t is the total book value of stock bought by elites and∑
i StockBought
i
t is the total book value of stock bought by all stock traders in
year t. I use Equation 2.2 to calculate elites’ share in stock sold.
ShareInStockSoldet =
∑
e StockSold
e
t∑
i StockSold
i
t
(2.2)
where
∑
e StockSold
e
t is the total book value of stock sold by elites and StockSoldt
is the total book value of stock sold by all stock traders in year t.
To examine whether stock transfers were concentrated among few individuals
or widespread among many stock traders, I calculate the Hirschman-Herfindhal
Index. In case of stock bought, B, in year t, I use Equation 2.3 to calculate the
Index.
HHIBt =
∑
i
(ShareInStockBoughtit)
2 (2.3)
I use Equation 2.4 to calculate the Index in the case of stock sold, S, in year t.
HHISt =
∑
i
(ShareInStockSoldit)
2 (2.4)
14Another event that could have affected the Company’s business was the Nine Years’ War. For
effects of war on the Company, see Scott (1903), Scott (1910), Davies (1952), Carlos et al. (1998),
Carlos et al. (2002).
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2.3.2 Structural Change in the Shares
Following Bai and Perron (2003), I determine abrupt changes in the mean of elites’
share in the total value of stock bought, ShareInStockBought, around the events.
I estimate Equation 2.5.
ShareInStockBoughtet = αj + ut (2.5)
for t = Tj−1 + 1, ..., Tj and j = 1, ...,m+ 1. T1, ..., Tm are the unknown breakpoints,
m is the number of breaks, and m+ 1 is the number of regimes. Calculating shares
provides a measure of a group’s dominance in the buying and selling of stock and
adjusts for the changes in the capital stock of the Company after 1691.15 The
coefficient αj is allowed to change across regimes. The distribution of the error term
ut is allowed to change over time. That is, when there are at least two regimes, the
variance is permitted to be the same or different across regimes.16
I use Equation 2.6 to test for abrupt changes in the mean of elites’ share in
stock sold, ShareInStockSold.
ShareInStockSoldet = βj + vt (2.6)
As in Equation 2.5, the coefficient βj is allowed to change across regimes and the
distribution of the error term vt is allowed to change over time.
A more general model allows for a structural break in the mean or slope of
elites’ share in the total stock transferred. I use Equation 2.7 to test for abrupt
changes in the mean and slope of elites’ share in stock bought.
ShareInStockBoughtet = γj + δjt+ wt (2.7)
To test for abrupt changes in the mean and slope of elites’ share in stock
sold, I use Equation 2.8.
15See Appendix B.1 for changes in the capital stock of the Company.
16There are 41 data points from 1672 to 1712. Since the test allows for up to five breaks, I use
a 15 per cent trimming and include at least six data points per segment. A 20 per cent trimming
allows for up to three breaks, while a 25 per cent trimming allows for up to two breaks. For details,
see Bai and Perron (2003, p. 14). I allow for serial correlation in the errors and allow the variance
to vary from one regime to another. Hence, I adjust for different error structures across different
segments when testing the null hypothesis that there is no abrupt change in the mean of stock
transfers. Following Bai and Perron (2003) and Andrews and Monahan (1992), I pre-whiten the
residuals using a VAR(1) model and construct a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
covariance matrix using a quadratic kernel with automatic bandwidth selection based on an AR(1)
approximation. See Section 6 of Bai and Perron (2003) for more details.
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ShareInStockSoldet = j + ζjt+ xt (2.8)
The coefficients γj , δj , j , and ζj are allowed to change across regimes and
the distribution of error terms wt and xt are allowed to change over time.
2.4 Data
Information on stock transfers is drawn from the Company’s Transfer Books from
1672 to 1712.17 The Books contain information on the date of transfer, the book
value of stock transferred, and the names of the seller and buyer.18 Sale prices were
not recorded in the Books as these prices were privately agreed between buyers and
sellers.
The total book value of stock transfers for the whole period was £13,720,795.
Appendix B.3 presents the book value per year. The average annual value from 1672
to 1690 was £16,773, while the average annual value from 1691 to 1712 increased
to £609,187. Hence, there was a 36-fold increase in the average value per year.
Some of the increase can be attributed to the stock split in 1691 and to new stock
summarized in Appendix B.1. Following the secondary literature,19 I normalise
book values to isolate the effects of the stock split and issuance of new stock. That
is, I make the figures from 1672 to 1690 equivalent in value to those from 1691 to
1712. In so doing, I can say, for example, that a stock with a nominal value of
£100 in 1672 is equivalent to one worth £400 in 1692. The total value of stock
transfers from 1672 to 1712 reduces to £1,928,511 after normalization. Figure 2.1a
presents the normalized book value of transactions per year. After normalization,
the average value from 1691 to 1712 was £73,174. Still, there was a fourfold increase
in the average value after normalization.
Both transactions and the number of distinct individuals show that the stock
split in 1691 stimulated stock trading. There are 12,048 transactions between 1672
17The Transfer Books of the Company are held at the National Archives in London under the
T70 series. I am grateful to Professor Ann Carlos for sharing the data from 1672 to 1699. I digitized
the data from 1699 to 1712. The manuscript records are numbers 190 to 196 in the T70 series at
the National Archives. Some Books are in journal form. Others are in ledger form. Journal Books
recorded the day-to-day transactions, which were later summarized in Ledger Books for each buyer
or seller. I spell out abbreviated names such as Wm (William), Rob (Robert), Chas (Charles), Sam
(Samuel), and Gab (Gabriel). I follow the literature in dealing with names with variant spellings.
For example, Abarbanel is spelled in the Books as Abarbanell, Abarbonell, and Abrabanell. Other
examples include Caillouel (Caillowel, Cailleul, Caillonel), da Costa (de Costa), de Paz Morenu (de
Paz Morenue, de Paz Morena, de Paz Morenn, de Paz Moroni), and Nicholls (Nichols, Nicolls).
18Names include titles, including Capt., Esq., Sir. Female stock traders had their names prefixed
by the letter F in the Books.
19See, for examples, Carlos (1993), Carlos et al. (1998), Carlos et al. (2015).
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and 1712. I digitized 7,626 (63 per cent) of these transactions. Figure 2.1b shows
the number of transactions per year. There was a marked increase in the number
of transactions in 1691 onwards.20 There were on average 56 transactions per year
in the period from 1672 to 1691. The average number of transactions per year rose
to 499 in the period from 1691 to 1712. Hence, there was a nine-fold increase in
the number of transactions in the period from 1691 to 1712. Appendix B.4 presents
the number of distinct individual names per year. There was a three-fold increase
in the average number of individual names of buyers and sellers in the period from
1691 to 1712. There were 64 names on average from 1672 to 1690. The average rose
to 222 in the period from 1691 to 1712.
The increased book value and number of transactions which started in 1698
and peaked in 1700 can be partly explained by the issuance of new stock in 1697.
The book value of new stock, £475,800, is more than three-quarters of the existing
stock, £625,250.21 However, the price of each new stock, £12, is only about ten per
cent of the price of each stock before 1691. See Appendix B.5 for the average stock
price from 1674 to 1712.22
To distinguish influential and powerful elites, I draw information from the
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography and the secondary literature. Appendix
B.6 summarizes my data sources. I code as elites those who were clergy,23 Company
directors, goldsmiths, merchants (e.g. City of London merchants), politicians, Stuart
courtiers, or noblemen. Appendix B.7 shows summary statistics of the book value
of stock bought and sold, the number of unique individuals, and the number of
book transfer transactions. Elites bought 31.3 per cent of the total value of stock
bought and sold 31.4 per cent of the total value of stock traded during this period.
There are 2,221 unique individual names of stock traders from 1672 to 1712. The
largest group of stock traders is the titled elites, at ten per cent of the total stock
20There is only one recorded transaction in 1701. Data from 1699 to 1700 are drawn from
T70/190. Data from 1701, 1702, 1703, 1704 are drawn from T70/191. However, there can be gap
in years even if there is no gap in series codes of the Transfer Books, as in the case of the Company’s
Journal and Ledger Books.
21The issuance of new capital stock in 1697 brought the capital up to £1,101,050. For a summary
of the capital stock of the Royal African Company, see Scott (1903) and Scott (1910).
22Carlos et al. (1998, p. 327) argue that the issuance of new stock, which can be viewed as an
attempt by the Company to “double” the book value of the stock, resulted in a lower stock price.
But the Nine Years’ War could have also contributed to the fall in stock price. “After the further
stock issue in 1697, when the Company attempted to double the nominal value of the capital stock,
the share price had fallen to £14. A stock split by itself would have reduced the price to £28-22,
but the deleterious effect of the war must have played a role.”
23The clergy are bishops, chaplains, clergymen, independent ministers, and priests. However,
I cannot distinguish between influential clergy (e.g. clergy who served in the royal court) and
ordinary clergy (e.g. clergy in rural parts of England). I check whether the results are robust to
re-coding elites without clergy.
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traders. Company directors and merchants are the second and third largest groups,
respectively. Company directors are 8.4 per cent of stock traders, and merchants
are 8.2 per cent of the total stock holders. Elites participated in 33.1 per cent of
the total number of transactions from 1672 to 1712.
2.5 Results
Figures 2.2a and 2.2b show the actual shares and fitted values of stock bought and
sold by elites over time when the model allows for a structural change in mean, as in
Equations 2.5 and 2.6. It also shows the book values of stock traded by elites over
time. The Bai-Perron results show a structural change in 1697. Tables 2.1 and 2.2
summarize the structural change in stock bought and sold. The first column shows
elite and non-elite stockholders. The second and third columns show periods and
the number of years included in each period. The fourth and fifth columns present
the estimated mean and standard error of the mean for each period. In 1697, elites’
share in stock bought decreased from 56 per cent to 29 per cent. This means that
non-elites’ share increased from 44 per cent to 71 per cent in 1697. In 1698, elites’
share fell from 56 per cent to 28 per cent, while non-elites ’ share rose from 44 per
cent to 72 per cent. Non-elites dominated the Company stock market in the 1690s.
Figures 2.3a and 2.3b show the results when the model allows for a structural
change in mean or slope, such as Equations 2.7 and 2.8. The turning points are 1682,
1689, and 1703 in the case of shares in stock bought. However, the results in the
case of shares in stock sold show a different set of turning points, namely 1689 and
1705. Overall, the Bai-Perron results suggest that there were abrupt changes in the
1680s, the 1690s, and in the 1700s.
2.5.1 Non-Elites Participated Substantially in Stock Transfers,
1670s-1680s
Elite and Non-Elite Participation in Stock Transfers
Both elite and non-elite stock traders had substantial shares in stock bought and
sold in the 1670s and 1680s. In total, elites bought £177,030 (56 per cent of the total
stock bought) and sold £174,400 (55 per cent of the total stock sold). Non-elites
bought £141,650 (44 per cent) and sold £144,280 (45 per cent). There are 410 unique
individual stock traders from 1672 to 1690, of which 154 (38 per cent of the total
individuals) are elites and 256 (62 per cent) are non-elites. Therefore, on average
individual members of the elite spent twice as much per capita on stock as non-elites
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spent. The same can be said for stock sold. That is, on average individual members
of the elite sold twice the value of stock that non-elites sold. Non-elites participated
substantially in the trading of Company stock, albeit at a smaller amount per head.
Figure 2.4 shows the annual Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of shares in
stock bought and sold from 1672 to 1712. It suggests that trading Company stock
was not the business of a few individuals.24 The HHIs for this period are 0.0016 and
0.0017 for stock bought and sold, respectively. These are low indices considering
that the upper bound is one.25 The highest share in stock bought from 1672 to 1690
was 1.73 per cent. 11 out of 410 individuals had at least a one per cent share in
stock bought, nine of whom were elites26, and the other two were non-elites.27 In
the case of stock sold, the highest share was 1.88 per cent. Ten individuals had at
least one per cent share in stock sold. Eight were elites28 and two were non-elites.29
Overall, the evidence suggests that the Company stock trading was not confined to
a few individuals.
Shares of Some Elites in Stock Transfers
The shares of some types of elites in the market for Company stock declined in the
latter half of the 1680s. To begin with, titled elites’, directors’, and merchant elites’
shares declined during this period. Titled elites’ share in 1685 decreased from 33
per cent to 17 per cent. In 1686, directors’ share declined from 44 per cent to 27
per cent. Merchants’ share fell from 26 per cent to 17 per cent in 1688.
Directors’ share in stock bought declined in 1686, but their share in stock
sold did not fall until 1691. Directors’ share in stock bought dropped in 1686, but
their share in stock sold declined only in 1691, from 37 per cent to 22 per cent.
Similar patterns are observed for merchants and titled elites. Merchants’ share in
24Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated as the sum of squared share of individuals. See
Equations 2.3 and 2.4.
25HHI can be written as 1
N
+Nσ2, where N is the number of individuals and σ2 is the statistical
variance of individual shares, si =
1
N
. In the extreme case where N = 1, HHI is 1.
26Elites who had a share in stock bought of at least one per cent are John Bull (1.73 per cent),
John Jefferies (1.66 per cent), Sir William Turner (1.54 per cent), Robert Williamson (1.44 per
cent), Thomas Hall, Esq. (1.27 per cent), Sir William Langhorne, Baronet (1.26 per cent), Lord
George Berkeley, First Earl of Berkeley (1.16 per cent), Sir William Hussey (1.07 per cent), and
Capt. Francis Wilshaw (1.07 per cent).
27Non-elites who had at least one per cent share in stock bought are Rich Mounteney Jr. (1.51
per cent) and Nich Hayward (1.07 per cent).
28Individuals who had at least one per cent share in stock sold are John Bull (1.88 per cent), Sir
Robert Vyner, Baronet (1.44 per cent), Robert Williamson (1.38 per cent), Lord George Berkeley
(1.32 per cent), Sir William Langhorne (1.29 per cent), John Jefferies (1.22 per cent), Sir William
Turner (1.04 per cent), and Sir Thomas Vernon (1.04 per cent).
29Non-elites who had at least one per cent share in stock sold are William Goulston (1.62 per
cent) and Thomas Rider (1.29 per cent).
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stock bought declined in 1688, but their share in stock sold decreased only in 1690,
from 25 per cent to 16 per cent, then to nine per cent a decade later. In 1685, titled
elites’ share in stock bought fell, but their share in stock sold fell only in 1690, from
27 per cent to 14 per cent.
Secondly, the data suggests that some types of elites were selling more
Company stock than they were buying in this period. Table 2.3 shows the percentage
of stock bought categorised by whether the seller was a director, merchant, or titled
elite. In the latter half of the 1680s, all had a percentage less than 100 per cent.
Directors had the lowest percentage in this period. Stock bought by directors from
1686 to 1690 was only 66 per cent of the stock directors sold in the same period.
The amount of stock bought by directors never went below stock sold in the periods
between 1672 and 1685. From 1672 to 1675, directors bought £24,400 of stock. This
was 110 per cent of stock sold by directors in the same period. From 1676 to 1680,
stock bought was 157 per cent of stock sold. As in earlier periods, stock bought as
percentage of stock sold in the period from 1681 to 1685 was above 100 per cent.
Stock bought was 114 per cent of stock sold.
Thirdly, the proportion of directors who were selling more than buying was
high. There are 51 uniquely-named directors between 1686 and 1690. 39 (76 per
cent of directors) were net sellers, of whom 16 (31 per cent) never bought stock after
1690, five were net sellers during and after the period 1686 to 1690, and 18 were
net sellers during the period, but net buyers after 1690. 12 (24 per cent) bought
more stock than they sold during the period. From 1686 to 1690, directors sold
£40,850 and bought only £21,350. Stock bought during this period was just 52
per cent of stock sold. Sir William Langhorne sold £1,850 (45 per cent of the total
amount he sold from 1686 to 1690) to elite stockholders, and 55 per cent of his
sales were to non-elites. Langhorne sold £400 to William Des Bowerie (Company
director), £300 to Jeff Jefferies (member of Parliament), £250 to William Bridges
(London merchant), £200 to Thomas Hall, Esq. (Company director), £200 to Sir
William Hussey (merchant), £200 to Sir Thomas Cooke (merchant and member of
Parliament), £200 to Richard Craddock (Company director), and £100 to Thomas
Bludworth (merchant and mayor of London). King James II transferred all his
shares to James Grahme, who was a member of Parliament, a Stuart courtier,
and Company secretary.30 Edward Colston sold £400 to Thomas Pitt (member of
30King James II appointed James Grahme keeper of the privy purse and master of the
buckhounds. Grahme was the secretary of the Company when King James made the stock transfer.
Scott (1903, p. 241) notes that “The original transfer from James II to Graham, the secretary of
the company, is bound up in one of the minute books (No. 1456, f. 32), and, although it is dated
August 20, 1691, James still entitled ‘the King’s most excellent Majesty’ and ‘King James’.” King
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Parliament), £300 to Henry Nurse (Company director)31, and £100 to Sir William
Fazakerley (Company director). In total, Colston sold £800 (44 per cent of the total
amount he sold during the period) to elites. The remainder was sold to non-elites.
Lastly, the directors who sold more stock than they bought were people of
authority and power. Sir William Langhorne, who was created a baronet in 1668
after inheriting an East India Company holding from his father William Langhorne,
sold £4,100 during the period. This was the largest total sale during the period.
King James II transferred £3,000. Edward Colston, both a politician and a merchant
from Bristol, and John Jefferies, a politician, sold £2,600 each. Others who sold at
least £1,000 were politician and merchant Sir Arthur Ingram (£1,500), politician
and merchant Sir William Turner (£1,400), merchant Robert Williamson (£1,200),
and Henry Nurse (£1,100). Together, they represent about 60 per cent of total stock
sold during the period. Sir Benjamin Bathurst (a city of London elder-merchant)
sold £900, Nicholas Cooke (a goldsmith) sold £800, Sir William Turner (a Tory)
sold £800, Sir John Cooke (a lawyer) and Peter Joye (a merchant) sold £700 each,
Thomas Hall, Esq. (a clergyman) sold £600, and Urban Hall, Esq. sold £550.
Lord George Berkeley (first earl of Berkeley), Sir Benjamin Newland (a merchant
and politician), Sir Dudley North (an economist and merchant), John Smith (a
merchant and politician), Sir Joseph Williamson (a politician), Sir Stephen Evance
(a politician), and Sir Peter Paravani (a merchant) all sold £500.32 The majority
of these prominent stockholders were selling out and bought nothing after 1690.33
Mortality was not the reason for selling more than buying stock. Sir William
Langhorne died 25 years later in 1715. King James II died in 1701, more than a
decade after he left London in December 1688. Edward Colston died in 1721, more
than three decades years after 1690. Sir John Morgan served in the Parliament
between 1689 and 1693, Sir Benjamin Newland between 1689 and 1699, Sir Gabriel
Roberts between 1713 and 1714, Sir William Stevens between 1695 and 1698,
William III and Queen Mary succeeded King James II in 1689. The Company transferred £1,000
from King James II to King William III and Queen Mary. Scott (1903, p. 241) notes that “It may
be mentioned that James II held £1,000 ‘original stock.’ After the Revolution it was decided that
this stock must be transferred to William and Mary.”
31Henry Nurse later became an independent trader.
32Others were sold by Sir John Ashby (£400), Stephen Pitts (£400), Sir Gabriel Roberts (£400),
Sir John Shaw (£400), Sir Henry Tulse (£400), Sir Thomas Vernon (£400), William Sedgwick
(£400), Sir William Stevens (£300), Arthur Bailey (£300), Abraham Hill (£300), Robert Stamper
(£300), Sir William Craven Earl of Craven (£200), Thomas Crispe (£200), John du Bois (£200),
Sir Thomas Bludworth (£100), Sir Thomas Cooke (£100), William Johnson (£300), and Sir John
Morgan (£100).
33There are a few exceptions. The net buyers were Sir Thomas Bludworth, Sir Thomas Cooke,
Sir William of Craven Earl of Craven, Sir James Edwards, Sir William Fazakerley, Thomas Hall,
Esq., Urban Hall, Esq., Sir William Hodges First Baronet, William Johnson, Sir John Moore, Henry
Nurse, and William Sedgwick.
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Sir William Turner between 1690 and 1691, and Sir Thomas Vernon was in the
Parliament session from 1690 to 1691.34 The records indicate that Sir Thomas
Bludworth, Nicholas Cooke, Sir Arthur Ingram, and Stephen Pitts passed away in
this period.35 For most sellers, however, death was not the reason for selling their
stock. Excluding those who died in this period from the sample, stock sold equals
£38,050 while stock bought equals £26,100. Stock sold was 146 per cent of stock
bought.
Political Events in the 1680s
The decline in shares of some elites in stock transfers between 1685 and 1690
occurred against the background of political events in the latter half of the
seventeenth century. One is the prorogation of the Parliament in 1685. King James
II succeeded King Charles II in February 1685. A few months later King James II
thwarted a rebellion headed by King Charles II’s son, James, Duke of Monmouth.
The rebellion began at Lyme Regis in Dorset in June 1685 and ended when the
Duke of Monmouth was executed at the Tower of London in July 1685.36 The
rebellion led by the Duke of Monmouth provided a pretext for James to increase the
size of his army. King James II employed Catholics in the army and commissioned
Catholic officers, violating the Test Acts of 1673, which prohibited the Crown from
employing officers who were Catholic. The Parliament expressed their concern
about the King’s efforts to increase the size of the army and, in so doing, violating
the Test Acts. The Parliament was concerned about absolutism. King James II
reacted by proroguing Parliament in 1685. In addition, in a campaign to pack
the Parliament, King James II abandoned the Tories and turned to Dissenters
(Protestants) for support to repeal the Test Acts.37 King James II reigned without
Parliament until King William III and Queen Mary succeeded him in 1689.38
34Sir John Ashby died in 1693, Sir Benjamin Bathurst in 1707, Lord George Berkeley in 1698,
Edward Colston in 1721, Sir John Cooke in 1710, Sir Dudley North in 1691, John Smith in 1723,
and Sir Joseph Williamson in 1701.
35In case of a deceased stockholder, dummy transactions could occur. Carlos (1993, pp. 122-123)
notes that “shares were transferred to some third party and then transferred to the executor, who
might or might not have the same family name as person who died.”
36See, for example, Pincus (2009, p. 104).
37(J. Miller, 2014, p. 9) suggests that King James II turned to Dissenters for support to repeal
the Test Acts as his agents believed that Dissenters would tolerate Catholics in government offices.
“The king’s agents argued that they could make sure of the liberty they now enjoyed only if they
repealed the Test Acts as well as the penal laws. They claimed that Dissenters had nothing to fear
from the Catholics and that they should be happy to repeal the Test Acts, as gesture of gratitude
to James.”
38J. Miller (2014) provides a summary of the view. “Unfortunately for James, events in 1685
showed not only the bankruptcy of Whiggery but the limits to the Tories’ support. While prepared
to vote him an adequate revenue, the Commons would do nothing to benefit the Catholics.
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The other major political event is the Glorious Revolution in 1688. King
James II served as the governor of the Company from its creation in 1672 until
the Glorious Revolution in 1688. Although the position was honorary39, close
association with the Crown was important for the Company because of the royal
privileges granted by the former to the latter. The Company’s rights and royal
privileges enabled it to monopolise English trade in West Africa. The Company
could seize ships and cargoes of “interlopers.”40 It could file cases against
interlopers at a royal-sponsored court in West Africa. It could detain interlopers in
the Company’s forts on the West African coasts. After the Glorious Revolution in
1688, many of these privileges were either withdrawn or became uncertain.
The literature offers different mechanisms through which the Glorious
Revolution in 1688 could have affected the Company. Firstly, the sudden
withdrawal of royal privileges could be considered a shock to the Company that
drew “a storm of criticism and attack.”41 Secondly the Company, anticipating its
decline, could have used its charter and royal privileges to optimally manage its
decline over time.42 Thirdly, the shift of power from the Crown to the Parliament
after the Glorious Revolution in 1688 made it challenging for the Company to obtain
a Parliamentary statute owing to “political inertia.” The other English merchants
successfully thwarted the Company’s strategy of obtaining Parliamentary statute
In November both Houses expressed their concern about James’s enlarging the army and his
commissioning eighty to ninety Catholic officers, in defiance of the Test Acts. Standing armies
were always seen as instruments of absolutism and James’s conduct seemed doubly sinister at the
time when Louis XIV was using his army to convert Huguenots to Catholicism. Incensed by what
he saw as its groundless suspicion and insubordination, James prorogued the most exuberantly
monarchist parliament of the century. It never met again” (J. Miller, 2014, pp. 5-6).
39See, for examples, Scott (1903, p. 245) or Scott (1910, p. 20).
40The Company referred to other English merchants trading without permission from the
Company as “interlopers.” See, for examples, Davies (1957, Chapter 3), Carlos and Brown-Kruse
(1996), Zahedieh (2010), and Pettigrew (2013).
41“While prerogative was unchallenged, the company was safe; when prerogative was attacked,
the company was in danger; when prerogative was attacked, the company was in danger; when
prerogative was overthrown, the company was doomed... But the shock of the Revolution, the
sudden withdrawal of the royal support, so long and generously given that it had come to be relied
on, exposed the company to a storm of criticism and attack for which it was ill prepared, and in
a moment the monopoly derived from the royal prerogative was gone for ever” (Davies, 1957, p.
104).
42Carlos and Brown-Kruse (1996, p. 293) consider the royal charter as a patent that inhibited
other English merchants from joining the slave trade. “In theoretical terms, the Company was a
dominant firm with a competitive fringe – interlopers or smugglers. Dominant firms, over time,
face market penetration by the fringe. The rate of penetration depends both on the level of cost
advantage and on any government protection the dominant firm might receive, such as patents. Very
important for the Royal African Company is the role played by its charter, which can be thought
of as akin to patent protection. As long as the charter rights could be enforced, the Company
should be more able to maintain its market share. However, if such protection was removed or
became uncertain then the rate of penetration by the fringe firms would become more rapid and
the dominant firm would lose market share and could eventually fail.”
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in support of its monopoly.43
Such political events reduced the Company’s royal privileges and increased
uncertainties faced by the Company. These in turn could have discouraged stock
traders and “stock jobbers,” or those who buy and sell Company stock for gain,
from investing in the Company stock. Since the Company attracted elites during
the Company’s formative years, elites were particularly vulnerable to such events.
Sir William Langhorne bought £4,000 from 1683 to 1684. He sold £4,100 from
1688 to 1689, and never bought or sold stock again after 1689. An example of a
stock jobber who stopped buying and selling stock in the latter half of the 1680s
was Lord George Berkeley. On 17 August 1677, he bought £400 worth of stock. He
sold £100 a week later, on 25 August. On 25 September and 8 November of the
same year, he bought £500 and £300, respectively. On 20 December he sold £600.
He continued doing this until 1688. On 15 April 1687, he bought £100. The last
transaction he made in the 1680s was on 11 January 1688, when he sold £50. Similar
cases include John Bull, John Jefferies, Sir William Turner, Robert Williamson, Sir
William Hussey, Capt. Francis Wilshaw, and Sir Benjamin Bathurst.
2.5.2 Non-Elites Dominated Stock Transfers, 1690s-1700s
By 1698, non-elites’ share in stock bought and sold had already reached 71 per
cent and 72 per cent, respectively. Figures 2.2a and 2.2b show the shares and book
values of stock bought and sold by elites over time. Both figures show that elites’
shares were declining not because elites were buying or selling less stock. Neither
stock bought nor stock sold by elites was declining in absolute value. Instead, elites’
shares were falling because non-elites bought and sold much more than elites did.
The quadrupling of stock in 1691 was essentially a stock split that provided
a 300 per cent bonus to every stockholder. The literature provides three possible
explanations for the bonus. One is to make the smallest unit of stock cheaper. The
second is to signal that there was “great improvement” in the Company’s trade.
Lastly, there was indeed a great improvement in the Company’s trade, and the
bonus was a reflection of a profitable trade. Stock prices fell after the stock split.44
43“The principal structural change in this period was parliamentary supremacy over state
regulation of the national economy. Because the monopolistic African Company expressed the
monarchical dominion and the separate traders expressed the use of parliamentary influence, the
shift overwhelmingly favored the separate traders’ campaign to deregulate the slave trade... The
separate traders’ political strategy was to cultivate the broadest base of public support possible and
express that support in petitions to block the African Company’s attempts to achieve statutory
confirmation of its monopoly” (Pettigrew, 2013, pp. 118-119).
44Carlos et al. (1998, p. 327) argue, “As one would expect, once the company started to increase
the nominal value of the capital stock, the share prices fell. After the fourfold increase in shares in
57
In particular, average stock price fell in the post-1691 period. Appendix B.5 shows
the average stock price before and after the quadrupling of stock in 1691.45
Non-elites were interested in investing in Company stock but were
constrained by wealth or income. They benefited from the stock split as it made
stock more affordable. Table 2.4 shows the number of transactions for different
blocks of stock before and after the stock split in 1691. The total number of
transactions increased more than ten-fold after 1691. From 1672 to 1690, the
smallest block (i.e. £0-99) was only one per cent of all transactions. However,
as stock became more affordable after 1691, the £0-99 block increased from one
per cent to 33 per cent of the total number of transactions. The results suggest
that non-elites were interested in investing in Company stock but were initially
constrained by wealth or income and benefited from the fall in stock prices. When
stock became more affordable, they bought it.
As a group, non-elites dominated the stock market. Individually, however,
none of them dominated. The HHI for this period is 0.00019 for stock bought and
0.00018 for stock sold. The indices are too low to conclude that stock trading was
dominated by a few individuals. William Shepherd, a goldsmith banker, had the
highest share in total stock bought and sold. But his shares were too few to say
that he dominated the market. His shares between 1691 and 1712 are only 2.7 per
cent of stock bought and 2.3 per cent of stock sold.
The results suggest that stock traders were not interested in controlling the
Company’s organization in the period after 1691.46 42 per cent of transactions were
in the £101-200 block. Only six per cent were in the £301-500 block, reflecting the
number of stock required to get elected to the Company’s directorship. Instead,
stock traders were interested in the buying and selling of stock. William Shepherd
is an example. He was the most active buyer and seller after 1691. From 1691 to
1700, he bought £362,125 in 434 transactions and sold £313,700 in 448 transactions.
Hence, William Shepherd sold 87 per cent of the amount he bought at an average
turn-over rate of 50 transactions per year.
1691, Scott lists the price of a share in 1692 as between £56 and £44, which is close to what one
might expect if the presplit market price was £173.”
45Stock price data for the Company is sparse before the 1690s. See, for examples, Scott (1903),
Davies (1957), Carlos et al. (2002), and Carlos et al. (2015).
46Carlos et al. (1998, p. 329) make the same point for the period before 1691. “More than 50
percent of the activity between 1672 to 1691 was taking place in the £100 to £200 range, with
29 per cent of transactions in the £301 to £500 range reflecting the election requirement. These
data suggest that people mainly held one or two shares in this company and were not interested in
control over the actual activities of the organization.”
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2.6 Conclusion
I have analyzed the composition of the Royal African Company stock transfer from
1672 to 1712. Consistent with the literature arguing that capital market experience
was already widespread even before the bull market in the 1690s, I have shown
quantitative evidence that non-elites participated substantially in the Company
stock market from 1672 to 1712. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, I have
shown that the experience was not confined to a few stock holders. The evidence
supports the view that there was already participation in the London capital market
before 1688. It shows that the participation was widespread and included both elites
and non-elites. Non-elites dominated the market for Company stock when it became
more affordable after the stock split in 1691.
The shares of some types of elites, particularly Company directors and
merchants, declined in the latter half of the 1680s. The decline happened at a
time of political upheaval that reduced the Company’s royal privileges and future
prospects. Certain types of investors could have reacted to this by trading less
Company stock or by holding less stock. The evidence supports the view that
the political turmoil in the latter part of the 1690s had an effect on the business
prospects for the Company.
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Figure 2.1: Stock Transfers, 1672-1712
(a) Normalized Book Value
(b) Number of Transactions
Notes: (a) The book values of transactions from 1672 to 1712 are normalized after the stock
split in 1691 and issuance of new stock summarized in Appendix B.1. (b) The number of
transactions is derived from the number of stock bought or sold. Source: T70/190-196
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Figure 2.2: Elites’ Share in Total Stock Bought and Sold, 1672-1712
(a) Bought
(b) Sold
Notes: (a) Share is elites’ share in the total stock bought from 1672 to 1712. Fitted is
the fitted values estimated using Equation 2.5. The turning point is 1697. Stock Bought is
the normalized book value of stock bought by elites. Source: T70/190-196. (b) Share is
elites’ share in the total stock sold. Fitted is the fitted values estimated using Equation 2.6.
The turning point is 1697. Stock Sold is the normalized book value of stock sold by elites.
Source: T70/190-196
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Figure 2.3: Elites’ Share in Total Stock Bought and Sold, 1672-1712
(a) Bought
(b) Sold
Notes: (a) Share is elites’ share in the total stock bought from 1672 to 1712. Fitted is the
fitted values estimated allowing for abrupt change in mean or slope. The turning points
are 1682, 1689, and 1703. Stock Bought is the normalized book value of stock bought by
elites. Source: T70/190-196. (b) Share is elites’ share in the total stock sold. Fitted is the
fitted values estimated allowing for abrupt change in mean or slope. The turning points
are 1689 and 1705. Stock Sold is the normalized book value of stock sold by elites. Source:
T70/190-196
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Figure 2.4: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of Shares in Stock Sold and Bought,
1672-1712
Notes: Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices for stock bought and sold are given by Equations 2.3
and 2.4, respectively. Source: T70/190-196
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Table 2.1: Structural Change in Stock Bought by Stock Traders, 1672-1712
Stock Trader Period N αˆj SE
Elite 1672-1696 25 56.1 1.7
1697-1712 15 28.6 1.5
Clergy 1672-1680 9 0.2 0.2
1681-1689 9 3.3 0.5
1690-1712 22 1.0 0.2
Director 1672-1685 14 43.7 3.1
1686-1696 11 26.6 2.7
1697-1712 15 13.8 1.9
Goldsmith 1672-1701 29 5.6 1.5
1702-1712 11 0.05 0.03
Merchant 1672-1687 16 26.1 1.6
1688-1696 9 16.6 1.7
1697-1712 15 9.5 1.0
Politician 1672-1690 19 18.2 1.5
1691-1712 21 4.4 0.7
Stuart Courtier 1672-1712 40 1.5 0.6
Titled 1672-1684 13 33.0 3.9
1685-1699 15 16.9 2.3
1700-1712 12 8.2 0.8
Non-Elite 1672-1690 25 43.9 1.7
1697-1712 15 71.4 1.5
Notes: I estimate the mean share in stock bought by each group of stock traders using Bai
and Perron (2003). The model is given in Equation 2.5. There are in total nine separate
regressions. The αˆj column reports the estimated mean for each regression. Following Bai and
Perron (2003) and Andrews and Monahan (1992), I pre-whiten the residuals using a VAR(1) and
construct a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix using a quadratic
kernel with automatic bandwidth selection based on an AR(1) approximation. SE refers to
the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. N refers to the number of
observations relevant to the period. Source: T70/190-196; Andrews and Monahan (1992); Carlos
et al. (1998); Bai and Perron (2003)
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Table 2.2: Structural Change in Stock Sold by Stock Traders, 1672-1712
Stock Trader Period N βˆj SE
Elite 1672-1697 26 55.6 2.5
1698-1712 14 28.3 1.8
Clergy 1672-1712 40 1.3 0.3
Director 1672-1690 19 36.5 5.4
1691-1699 9 22.4 1.3
1700-1712 12 13.0 0.9
Goldsmith 1672-1712 40 3.6 0.8
Merchant 1672-1684 13 29.6 2.4
1685-1699 15 18.2 1.5
1700-1712 12 9.3 0.7
Politician 1672-1697 26 14.1 1.9
1698-1712 14 3.7 0.3
Stuart Courtier 1672-1694 23 2.4 0.4
1695-1712 17 0.3 0.5
Titled 1672-1689 18 27.3 2.8
1690-1712 22 14.1 2.1
Non-Elite 1672-1697 26 44.4 2.5
1698-1712 14 71.7 1.8
Notes: I estimate the mean share in stock sold by each group of stock traders using Bai
and Perron (2003). The model is given in Equation 2.6. There are in total nine separate
regressions. The βˆj column reports the estimated mean for each regression. Following Bai and
Perron (2003) and Andrews and Monahan (1992), I pre-whiten the residuals using a VAR(1) and
construct a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix using a quadratic
kernel with automatic bandwidth selection based on an AR(1) approximation. SE refers to
the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. N refers to the number of
observations relevant to the period. Source: T70/190-196; Andrews and Monahan (1992); Carlos
et al. (1998); Bai and Perron (2003)
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Table 2.3: Directors, Merchants, and Titled Elites, 1672-1690
Director Merchant Titled
Year Bought Sold % Bought Sold % Bought Sold %
1672-1675 24400 22100 110 17000 20100 85 19300 17700 109
1676-1680 31570 20100 157 19750 15300 129 28300 17400 163
1681-1685 40210 35250 114 19350 23000 84 24600 26100 94
1686-1690 27100 40850 66 18800 20000 94 21800 27850 78
1691-1695 216500 217500 100 156300 160600 97 146550 150900 97
1696-1700 502910 493050 102 370040 436340 85 437510 462050 95
1701-1705 329823 336900 98 182110 256500 71 249000 325650 76
1706-1710 610802 661100 92 575692 434800 132 457450 558700 82
1711-1712 232000 165700 140 65900 94100 70 41000 75200 55
Notes: Bought shows the book value of stock bought for each period. Sold shows the book value of
stock sold for each period. % shows the percentage of stock bought in terms of stock sold. Source:
T70/190-196
Table 2.4: Royal African Company Share Size, 1672-1712
Share Size
Period 0-99 100 101-200 201-300 301-500 > 500 Total
1672-1690 20 630 592 222 512 168 2144
1% 29% 28% 10% 24% 8%
1691-1712 7217 606 9223 2840 1212 845 21943
33% 3% 42% 13% 6% 4%
Notes: Both the number of transactions and percentage of the total transactions in the period are
given for each share size. Block sizes are adopted from Carlos (1993) and Carlos et al. (1998).
Source: T70/190-196; Carlos (1993); Carlos et al. (1998)
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Chapter 3
Turning Points in the
Slave Trade
3.1 Introduction
The literature suggests that slave exports from Africa as a whole responded to
external demand. Curtin (1975b, p. 114) provides a summary of the traditional view
on the supply and demand factors in the slave trade saying, “Where ‘Africa’ appears
to supply slaves in response to economic demand, the individual coastal regions
appear to supply slaves in response to their own patterns of political affairs, anarchy,
civil and international warfare.” But previous analysis of the slaves embarked from
Africa relied only on decennial or quadranscentennial data. As Behrendt (1997, p.
211) points out, relying only on these data when yearly data are available might leave
out important details, such as significant annual turning points in the slave trade.
I ask to what extent were turning points in slave exports unique to specific regions,
and to what extent were they common across all of Africa? Analysis of individual
African regions shows that slave exports are determined by both external demand
and response to such demand. This is important because it helps us understand the
determinants of demand for and supply of slaves from Africa.
Using the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, I determine whether
structural breaks in slaves exported from different African regions are related to
factors external or internal to Africa. I use the Bai and Perron (2003) methodology
to test for structural breaks in slaves exported from eight African regions, namely
Senegambia, Sierra Leone, the Windward Coast, the Gold Coast, the Bight of
Benin, the Bight of Biafra, West Central Africa, and Southeast Africa from 1514
to 1866. The Bai-Perron test determines structural breaks in the mean and trend
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of time-series data. It distinguishes a structural break from a mere deviation from
the mean or trend of the data.
The Bai-Perron results show that external demand shocks are relatively
important in explaining the end of the slave trade. Slave exports from Africa started
decreasing in 1815. When efforts to abolish the slave trade started in the 1780s,
slave exports from the Bight of Biafra diminished quickly. The slave trade in the
Windward and Gold Coasts declined immediately when Britain abolished its slave
trade in 1807. For a map of the major regions of Africa, see Appendix C.1. In 1815,
slave exports from West Central Africa, the Bight of Benin, and Southeast Africa
dropped discontinuously. Senegambia and Sierra Leone are exceptions, as slave
exports from these regions declined earlier than in other regions. Slave exports from
Senegambia and Sierra Leone started declining in 1752 and 1760, respectively.
Supply shocks are also relatively important in explaining how slave exports
changed over time. Generally, slave exports increased with conflicts and decreased
with peace. Some examples include the collapse of the Wolof Kingdom in
sixteenth-century Senegambia, religious wars in eighteenth-century Sierra Leone
and the Windward Coast, the Asante expansion in the seventeenth-century Gold
Coast, the Oyo expansion in eighteenth-century Bight of Benin, and inland
expansions of slavery in eighteenth-century Bight of Biafra, West Central Africa,
and Southeast Africa.
The results are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error
term. Furthermore, the results are robust when the error term is allowed to vary
across regimes or time periods determined by structural breaks.
I contribute to a growing literature that analyzes supply and demand factors
in the slave trade (Curtin, 1972; Behrendt, 1997; Eltis & Richardson, 2010; Walvin,
2014). In this paper, I use the Bai-Perron structural break test to analyze annual
data on slaves embarked from Africa during the slave trade. Africa exported 12.5
million slaves during the trans-Atlantic slave trade (Eltis, 2016). Contrary to
existing views, the abolition of the slave trade had an immediate and significant
impact on the slave trade, even if countries such as Portugal and Brazil continued
transporting slaves after the abolition. The abolition was the beginning of the end
of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.
I also contribute to the economic literature on the slave trade (Nunn, 2008;
Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011; Whatley & Gillezeau, 2011; Whatley, 2012; Dalton &
Leung, 2015; Fenske & Kala, 2015; Obikili, 2016; Whatley, 2018). To the best of
my knowledge, this paper is the first to use a structural break test to relate the
chronology of historical events to the rise and fall of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.
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In Section 3.2, I provide historical background. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, I
discuss the Bai-Perron methodology and data, respectively. In Section 3.5, I present
and discuss the results for each African region. I provide an overall discussion at
the end of Section 3.5. The conclusion is in Section 3.6.
3.2 Historical Background
In 1482, the Portuguese built the El Mina Castle on the Gold Coast and gained
access to the gold mines inland. They bought slaves from other African regions,
from Benin for example, and traded them to African merchants in exchange for
gold. Slaves worked in gold production. Direct slave trade between Africa and
the New World began in the 1520s. In 1526, King Afonso of the Kingdom of
Kongo told Portuguese officials of the adverse effects of the slave trade on the
Kingdom, particularly depopulation, and expressed the wish to prohibit the slave
trade within the Kingdom. In response, the Portuguese created a new slave port
at Luanda in 1576 (Iliffe, 2017, pp. 137-138). Brazil demanded slaves to work
in its new plantations in the late sixteenth century (Curtin, Feierman, Thompson,
& Vansina, 1995, p. 184). Slave exports increased until about 1640s. After the
union between Spain and Portugal ended in 1640, it became illegal for Portuguese
merchants to deliver slaves to Spanish territories (Eltis & Richardson, 2010). Slave
exports temporarily decreased during this period, as shown in Figure 3.1. Slave
exports picked up in the 1650s with the rise of the New World sugar plantations.
European and African diseases decimated the local population and African slaves
became the main source of labour for sugar and other New World products (Gemery
& Hogendorn, 1974). The supply of slaves increased in response to demand during
this period and, as a result, the price of slaves did not increase (Manning, 1990, pp.
129-130).
The trans-Atlantic slave trade entered a new era by the end of the seventeenth
century. It was during this period that slaves replaced gold as the most valuable
African export (Bean, 1974). The literature suggests that the slave trade peaked
in the latter half of the eighteenth century (Curtin, 1972; Curtin et al., 1995;
H. S. Klein, 2010; Iliffe, 2017) and attributes the decline in the trans-Atlantic slave
trade to the European wars of the 1790s. According to Curtin (1972, pp. 266-267),
for example, “The slave trade began to decline in the 1790s – not after 1808 with the
legal abolition of the British trade. The drop of the 1790s seems to be accountable
to the Napoleonic Wars, and it continued into the decade of the 1800s.” Figure 3.1,
however, suggests that the peak was reached during the first half of the nineteenth
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century. The demise of the slave trade is correlated to its legal abolition by major
countries involved in the trade, such as Britain and the U.S.A.
Appendix C.2 shows the number of slaves embarked from Africa by country
of purchaser from 1514 to 1866. Portugal and Brazil1 embarked 39 per cent of the
total slaves purchased from Africa. Great Britain embarked 31 per cent. Together,
Portugal and Brazil and Great Britain, embarked 70 per cent. France, which
embarked 13 per cent, was third in terms of the number of slaves embarked from
Africa. The Netherlands, Spain and Uruguay2, the U.S.A., and Denmark and Baltic3
embarked 6, 5, 4, and 1 per cent, respectively. Whether it was due to moral or
economic pressures (Williams, 1994; Solow & Engerman, 2004; Eltis, 2016), the slave
trade was legally abolished in these slave-trading nations. Denmark abolished its
slave trade in 1803, and, among these nations, it was the first to do so. Great Britain
and the U.S.A. abolished their slave trades in 1807. The Netherlands and France
ended their slave trades in 1814 and 1815, respectively. In 1817, a treaty was signed
between Great Britain and Spain in which the latter agreed to end its slave trade
in 1820. Also in this year, Portugal and Spain joined Great Britain in establishing
courts that determined cases of slave ships captured trading illegally. Brazil ended
its slave trade in 1831, while Portugal abolished its slave trade in 1836. Rebellions
and revolutions with anti-slavery and anti-colonial sentiments occurred prior to the
abolition of the slave trade. Such events include the Jamaican revolts in the 1760s
and the Haitian revolution in St. Domingue in the 1790s. The latter resulted in
Haiti’s independence from France in 1804 (Eltis & Walvin, 1981; Manning, 1990;
Thornton, 1998; Eltis & Richardson, 2010; Walvin, 2014).
3.3 Methodology
The Bai and Perron (2003) methodology endogenously determines sudden changes in
the intercept and slope of a series. The methodology uses the time-series properties
of a series to determine the structural breaks. Consider a model given by Equation
3.1.
yt = z
′
tδj + ut (3.1)
for t = Tj−1 + 1, ..., Tj and j = 1, ...,m+ 1, where m is the number of breaks, m+ 1
1Portuguese and Brazilian traders are coded as Portugal/Brazil in the Trans-Atlantic Slave
Trade Database.
2Spanish and Uruguayan traders are coded as Spain/Uruguay in the Database.
3Danish and Baltic traders are coded as Denmark/Baltic in the Database.
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is the number of regimes, and the indices T1, ..., Tm refer to break points.
4 yt is the
dependent variable and zt is a vector of covariates. Following Bai and Perron, the
model I run includes an intercept and a trend that are allowed to change across
regimes. That is, I allow the error term, ut, to change across regimes. I also allow
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. As in Bai and Perron, I
follow Andrews and Monahan (1992) in adjusting for heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation.5 Such adjustment produces heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors. In all regression analyses, I check whether the
results are robust to heterogeneity in the error terms across regimes and whether
the results are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term.
The Bai-Perron test differentiates long-term from short-term changes in the mean
or trend of a time-series data. The test is useful when a structural break is visually
difficult to differentiate from a blip or deviation from the long-run trend of a series.
Economists and economic historians use the Bai-Perron methodology to
determine the impact of historical events on social and economic outcomes. Fenske
and Kala (2017) find a permanent increase in African conflicts after Britain abolished
its slave trade in 1807. One of the methodologies Fenske and Kala used to determine
structural breaks in African conflicts is a Bai-Perron test. Kaila, Singhal, and Tuteja
(2018) use a Bai-Perron test to determine the effect of a border that divides the
Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir into a Pakistan-controlled and Indian-controlled
areas. Kaila, Singhal, and Tuteja find that the border aided peace and economic
development in the state. Chaney (2016) applies a Bai-Perron test to a data set
of scientific books produced in the seventeenth-century Istanbul and finds that the
production of scientific books decreased with the rise of political elites. Kelly and
O´ Gra´da (2010) use a Bai-Perron test and quantify the impact of the Little Ice
Age, the period of sustained drop in the temperature from the fourteenth to the
nineteenth centuries, on crop yields in pre-industrial Western Europe. Kelly and O´
Gra´da find no structural breaks in the climate and suggest that the Little Ice Age
had little economic impact on Western Europe. Waldenstro¨m and Frey (2008) use
a Bai-Perron test and analyze turning points in Nordic sovereign bond yields and
spreads during the Second World War. Contrary to a conventional Nordic view,
Waldenstro¨m and Frey conclude that people in Nordic countries did perceive the
Second World War as a risky event, reflected in the sudden shifts in the sovereign
4The convention is to set T0 = 0 and Tm+1 = T , where T is the total number of observations in
a series.
5Andrews and Monahan (1992) use a VAR(1) model to pre-whiten the residuals and construct
a heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix using quadratic kernel with
automatic bandwidth selection based on an AR(1) approximation. For more details, see Section 6
of Bai and Perron (2003).
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debt yields and spreads. The Bai-Perron test is a useful toolkit for analyzing turning
points in history.
A visual inspection of data on slaves exported from Africa from 1514 to 1866
suggests that the peak was reached in 1825. Figure 3.1 shows the overall time-trend
of the slave trade in Africa. The Bai-Perron test, however, suggests that a structural
break in slave exports occurred in 1815. The peak in 1825 is not a structural break
but a mere deviation from the trend that changed in 1815. Failing to recognize
1815 as a turning point undermines the importance of the events in 1815. After
the wars in 1815, when major countries such as Britain, the Netherlands, France,
and the U.S.A. became opponents of the slave trade, the trend of the slave trade
started moving towards zero. In 1815, in particular, Britain started using its navy
to suppress the slave trade.
The traditional literature argues that the “effective end” of the Atlantic slave
trade occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century when American countries,
such as Brazil and Cuba, ended their slave trade with Africa.6 The Bai-Perron
results suggest that the effective end of the Atlantic slave trade began in 1815,
although illegal slave trading continued after that year. The Napoleonic Wars
between 1793 and 1815 disrupted the slave trade (O’Rourke, 2006, p. 130).
Another turning point in African slave exports is the increase in 1698. Eltis
and Richardson (2010) and Walvin (2014) provide a timeline of major events in the
slave trade. This includes events such as the discovery of gold in Brazil in 1695 and
the end of Nine Years’ War in 1697, which could explain the sudden increase in slave
exports from Africa in 1698. However, the timelines fail to mention other potentially
relevant events such as the Komenda Wars from 1694 to 1700 and the “Ten Per
Cent” Act of 1698. The Komenda Wars in the Gold Coast were primarily fought
between the Kingdom of Eguafo and the Dutch West India Company, but other local
settlements, including Ahanta, Adom, and Fetu, and the Royal African Company
were also involved in the War (Law, 2007). Another significant event in 1698 was
the passing into law of the Ten Per Cent Act. The Act allowed English merchants to
participate in the slave trade upon paying ten per cent duties on imports and exports
to the Royal African Company (Davies, 1957; Pettigrew, 2013). This increased the
demand for slaves, particularly from English merchants. Appendix C.2 suggests that
a majority of slaves exported from Africa during the the 1690s was purchased by
English merchants. Appendix C.7 suggests that slaves exports from the Gold Coast
6See, for examples, Curtin et al. (1995), Eltis and Richardson (2010), Lovejoy (2011). “The
effective end of the Atlantic slave trade came only when American countries began to enforce their
own anti-slave-trade laws, as Brazil did after 1850, and as Cuba did after the late 1860s.” (Curtin
et al., 1995, p. 332).
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surged during the Komenda Wars and that a majority of slaves exported from the
Gold Coast during the period was purchased by English merchants. The evidence
suggests, then, that the Komenda Wars and the Ten Per Cent Act were important
in explaining the increase in slave exports from Africa, particularly from the Gold
Coast, in 1698.
3.4 Data
The source of data on slaves embarked from Africa is the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade
Database.7 The Database contains information on 34,948 slave-trading voyages
between 1514 and 1866.8 I draw information on slaves embarked from the major
regions of Africa, namely Senegambia, Sierra Leone, the Windward Coast, the Gold
Coast, the Bight of Benin, the Bight of Biafra, West Central Africa, and Southeast
Africa, as defined in the Database. See Appendix C.1 for a map of the major regions
of Africa. In many cases, the authors of the Database have to impute the number of
slaves embarked from Africa. Out of 29,095 ships that left Africa with slaves, only
8,272 (28 per cent) have information on the number of slaves embarked.
To make a reasonable inference about the number of slaves on other voyages
from Africa, the authors of the Database depended on existing information,
including deaths among slaves embarked based on 6,438 voyages.9 In particular, the
authors imputed the number of slaves embarked based on the information provided
by the 8,272 voyages and subtracted from this the number of slaves who died in
the Middle Passage based on the information provided by the 6,438 voyages.
In this paper, I calculate the annual number of slaves embarked for each
region from 1514 to 1866. Eltis and Richardson (2010) provide summary statistics
from the Database. The number of slaves embarked from Africa between 1514 and
1866 is 12,520,170.10 Appendix C.3 provides a summary of slaves embarked from
the African regions. West Central Africa exported the most slaves. It exported 32.8
per cent of the total slaves from Africa. The Bight of Benin, also called the Slave
Coast, which exported 14.5 per cent of the total slaves, is the second highest. The
Bight of Biafra, which exported 10.5 per cent of the total slaves, is the third largest
7The database is accessible from http://slavevoyages.org/voyage/.
8Dalton and Leung (2019) notes that the Database is widely used by economists and historians
in their African studies. Eltis (2016) provides an introduction to the database.
9The deaths-to-slaves-embarked ratio for all Africa based on the available information is 11.9
per cent. The ratio is highest in Southeast Africa (19.3 per cent) and lowest in West Central Africa
(9.1 per cent). See the section entitled “Imputing Number of Slaves” in Eltis (2016).
10See Table 4 in Eltis and Richardson (2010). There is a discrepancy between Table 4 and the
figures obtained from the website because of the rounding rules adopted by Eltis and Richardson.
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slave exporter. Together, these regions exported 57.8 per cent of the total slaves
from Africa. The rest of the regions, namely the Gold Coast (seven per cent of the
total), Senegambia (5.7 per cent), Southeast Africa (3.8 per cent), Sierra Leone (2.3
per cent), and the Windward Coast (1.9 per cent), exported a total of 20.7 per cent
of the total slaves. The remaining 21.6 per cent is exported by Other Africa. These
slaves came from different regions, but it is not clear how many came from each
region (Eltis & Richardson, 2010, p. 89).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Senegambia
Figure 3.2 shows three turning points in Senegambian slave exports between 1514
and 1866. The turning points are 1601, 1677, and 1752, and they divide the period
into four regimes. Senegambia’s slave exports grew by 4.65 per cent annually
between 1514 and 1600.11 It exported 1,851 slaves per year during this period.
Slave exports increased from 1514 to 1600, which could be the result of political
instability and state wars. Once the new political situation became relatively stable
in the period from 1601 to 1676, slave exports decreased. From 1601 to 1676, annual
exports contracted by 1.72 per cent and average slave exports fell to 927 slaves. Slave
exports increased again from 1677 to 1751, as slaves from the interior were brought to
the Senegambian coasts. In the 1677-1751 regime, slave exports rebounded to 1,521
per year with an annual growth rate of 0.19 per cent. The region exported 2,240
slaves per year in the final regime from 1752 to 1866. The average slave exports
is higher in the final regime, but starting from 1752 it began declining annually
by 7.24 per cent. The rise of Muslim states from 1752 to 1866 coincides with the
decrease in trans-Atlantic slave exports. Also, the 1752-1866 regime coincides with
decreased demand for slaves in this region owing to European wars, particularly the
Anglo-French wars.
The first panel of Table 3.1 summarizes the structural change in intercept of
the slope of Equation 3.1 for Senegambia. The results of the structural break test
are robust to heteroskedascity and serial correlation in the error term. Such results
are robust when heterogeneity in error terms across four regimes is allowed.
The breaking up of the Wolof empire in the Senegambian region explains the
11The growth formula I use is
ln(1+SlaveExportst)−ln(1+SlaveExportst−1)
T
, where SlaveExportst is
the number of slaves exported at the end of period T and SlavesExportst−1 is the number of slaves
exported at the beginning of period T . I calculate the natural logarithm of one plus slave exports
because there are zero observations.
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increase in slaves exported between 1514 and 1600. Wolof was the major source of
slaves during this period (Curtin, 1972; Curtin et al., 1995). The estimated annual
average of slave exports from Senegambia between 1526 and 1550 is 499, of which
271 (54 per cent) were from Wolof.12
Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the political situation was relatively
stable. In particular, there was political stability between 1601 and 1676. Slave
exports declined as war captives declined.
Slaves from inland flowed to the Senegambian coasts from the middle of the
seventeenth century. New states in the interior produced new sources of slaves. One
example is the rise of the Kingdom of Segu. The rise of Mamari Kulubali of the Segu
Kingdom was associated with the new source of Bambara slaves (Curtin, 1975a, p.
179). The rise in slave exports between the 1720s and and 1740s could be due to
the Islamic religious wars (H. S. Klein, 2010, p. 59). Slave exports from 1677 to
1751 increased, as depicted in Figure 3.2.
In 1752, slave exports started to decline. Spikes in slave exports, such as those
in the 1750s and the 1770s, are consistent with slave revolts during the period. A
Muslim clerical party revolted against Fulbe state of Futa Tooro in the 1750s (Iliffe,
2017, p. 149). In the 1770s, there was a religious revolution involving a torodbe
faction against the Denianke rulers of Fuuta Tooro (Eltis & Walvin, 1981, p. 83).
But the downward trend of slave exports started in 1752. Two events coincided
with the decline in slave exports. Firstly, the Muslim states effectively banned the
sale of Muslim slaves and preferred trans-Saharan trade to trans-Atlantic trade.
Secondly, wars broke out among European countries involved in the slave
trade. Britain and France, two major European slave buyers in the Senegambian
region, were involved in these wars. The decline in European countries’ interest
in Senegambia is related to the Anglo-French wars in the middle of the eighteenth
century (Curtin, 1975a, p. 112).13 Ships were either embargoed or redeployed for
privateering (Davies, 1957). Fewer ships were available for the slave trade.
3.5.2 Sierra Leone
Figure 3.3 shows 1760 as a turning point in slave exports from Sierra Leone. The
turning point divides the whole period into two regimes, from 1514 to 1759 and
from 1760 to 1866. On average, Sierra Leone exported 114 slaves per year between
1514 and 1759. During this period, slave exports grew by three per cent annually.
12The annual average of slave exports in Senegambia is 271 in Wolof, 110 in Malinke, 110 in
Serer, four in Fulbe, and four in Tukulor (Curtin, 1972, p. 100).
13Also, see Barry (1998, p. 97)
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It exported 2,040 slaves per year in the 1760-1866 regime, which is higher than the
previous regime’s yearly slave exports. Slave exports, however, started declining in
1760, which continued until 1866 at an annual rate of 7.49 per cent.
Table 3.1’s second panel summarizes the results for Sierra Leone. The
structural break test results are robust even if heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation are allowed. The results are also robust when heterogeneity between
the two regimes is allowed.
The spikes in the 1560s could be attributed to invasions from the inland
savanna.14 Slave exports dropped in 1570 when these invasions stopped. Religious
wars in the early decades of the eighteenth century, such as the Fulbe jihad in Futa
Djalon in the 1720s, peaked in 1760 and continued until the nineteenth century.
Slave exports surged during religious wars, as in the 1780s. The high slave
exports in the decades between the 1760s and 1780s could be attributed to further
wars waged by Ibrahima Sori of the Almamate in Fuuta Tooro (Curtin, 1975b, p.
116). However, the downward-sloping trend of slave exports started in the 1750s,
when peace and stability were reinstalled. In the 1750s, the Kingdom of Fuuta
Tooro was established. Trans-Atlantic slave trade fell as Muslim states rose, and
Sierra Leone is similar to Senegambia in this respect.
3.5.3 Windward Coast
Figure 3.4 suggests 1752 and 1808 as turning points in the Windward Coast. Slave
exports from the Windward Coast grew by 3.21 per cent annually and averaged
96 slaves per year between 1514 and 1751. The next two regimes are periods of
declining slave exports. The decline had two phases between 1752 and 1807, and
again in 1808. Between 1752 and 1807, slave exports declined by 0.83 per cent per
annum. The region exported 3,047 slaves during this period. In the final regime,
from 1808 to 1866, slave exports contracted by 9.48 per cent annually. The region’s
annual average fell to 152 slaves per year.
As the third panel of Table 3.1 shows, the structural break test results
are robust to heterogeneity across three regimes. The results are also robust to
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. However, the specification with HAC
standard errors suggests 1700 as an additional turning point. The rise in slave
exports between 1700 and 1751 is consistent with wars in the early decades of the
eighteenth century. The surge in slave exports in the 1720s could be attributed to
Fulbe jihads in Fuuta Djalon (Curtin et al., 1995, p. 199).
14Mande, an offshoot of the Mande people of the savanna, invaded parts of Sierra Leone (Curtin
et al., 1995, p. 198).
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As in Senegambia and Sierra Leone, the decline in slave exports that started
in 1752 coincides with the rise of Muslim states. The westward expansion of Asante,
a kingdom in the Gold Coast, and the Baule wars it triggered could explain the spikes
in slave exported in the 1770s.15 But these are mere deviations from the downward
trend that started in 1752.
Britain abolished its slave trade in 1807. This immediately affected the
Windward Coast. The effect on Senegambia and Sierra Leone is not as immediately
visible as it is in the Windward Coast. British ships dominated the slave trade in
all three regions just before 1808. See Appendices C.4 to C.6 for Senegambia, Sierra
Leone, and the Windward Coast, respectively. When Britain outlawed the trade in
1807, British traders stopped purchasing slaves while traders from other countries,
particularly Portugal and Brazil, continued purchasing slaves. This was not the
case in the Windward Coast. In the Windward Coast, there was no corresponding
increase in the number of slaves purchased by other countries when countries such
as Britain and the U.S.A. abolished their slave trades in 1807.
3.5.4 Gold Coast
The turning points in the Gold Coast are 1650, 1703, and 1808. See Figure 3.5.
There was virtually no slave trade during the 1514-1649 regime, as gold was the
primary export from this region during this period. Slave exports started increasing
when multinational companies, such as the English Company of Royal Adventurers
in 1660 and the Royal African Company in 1672, were chartered. This could be why
slave exports increased in the 1650-1702 regime. African states, such as Akwamu,
Denkyira, and Asante, became powerful and a new regime of increased slave exports
occurred from 1703 to 1807. Slave exports during the 1650-1702 and 1752-1807
regimes grew annually by 3.46 per cent and 0.52 per cent, respectively. The Gold
Coast exported 1,135 slaves per year during the 1650-1702 regime and 6,434 per
year during the 1752-1807 regime. Slave exports dropped suddenly in 1808, when
Britain abolished its slave trade. Its annual slave exports fell to 138 between 1808
and 1866. Slave exports during this period contracted by 13.01 per cent annually.
The fourth and last panel of Table 3.1 summarizes the results for the Gold
Coast. The structural break test results are robust to heterogeneity across regimes
as well as to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term.
Europeans were initially interested in African gold in the Gold Coast, and
15See, for examples, Engerman and Genovese (1975, p. 121) and Curtin et al. (1995, p. 199).
Both refer to Baule wars as a possible source of the spikes in slaves exported from the Grand Lahou,
a coastal town in Ivory Coast, during this period.
77
this probably why Europeans positioned their headquarters close to mining activities
in the Gold Coast (Hopkins, 1973, p. 87). In addition, Europeans did not consider
the Gold Coast as a place where they could purchase slaves. Evidence suggests that
there was no organized slave trade in this region before 1650.16
Slave exports increased after 1650. In 1664, Britain acquired the Cape Coast
Castle from Sweden and competed with the Netherlands for African commodities
and slaves flowing from inland.17 Local wars broke out during the period, including
the war between Akwamu and Accra in 1680 and the war between Denkyira and
Assin in 1698. The Komenda Wars of the 1690s also broke in this period. These
wars increased the supply of war captives, who were subsequently sold as slaves on
the coasts. As Davies (1957, p. 226) observes, “The slave-trade thrived on war and
declined in peace.”
The Gold Coast became a major slave exporter at the end of the seventeenth
century (Daaku, 1970; Hopkins, 1973; Bean, 1974; Kea, 1982; Donkoh, 2007; Inikori,
2007, 2014). But the structural break in slave exports occurred in the early decades
of the eighteenth century. Asante conquered Denkyira in 1701. Asante thus gained
political power in the Gold Coast.18 The rise in the trans-Atlantic slave trade in
this region is consistent with the rise of Asante as a powerful state. Asante used
slaves to obtain firearms from European merchants. The firearms in turn were used
to maintain a militaristic-political social order and to expand Asante territory, for
example by raiding weaker states or by making them pay slaves as a tribute to the
empire, thereby increasing the capture of slaves (Arhin, 1990; Whatley, 2018).
At the same time, the Ten Per Cent Act expired in 1712. The Act’s expiration
increased competition for the chartered companies, such the English Royal African
Company and the Dutch West India Company, from English merchants, which in
turn increased demand for slaves on the Gold Coast (Davies, 1957; Daaku, 1970;
Carlos & Brown-Kruse, 1996; Pettigrew, 2013).
As in the Windward Coast, there was a sudden drop in slave exports in 1808.
Appendix C.7 shows that British traders were the dominant purchasers of slaves
in this region. There was no corresponding increase in slaves purchased by other
countries after 1808. The difference with the Windward Coast is the magnitude
16Daaku (1970, p. 9) argues, for example, that English activities in this region were “unorganized”
and without a purpose. British traders began to organize their activities when joint-stock
companies, such as the Company of Royal Adventurers, were established during the reign of James
I of England.
17See Davies (1957, p. 240). The Dutch acquired the Elmina Castle from the Portuguese in 1637
(Davies, 1957, p. 8). The Elmina Castle was founded in 1480 (Van Dantzig, 1980, p. 90).
18Asante lost political control over the Gold Coast in 1826 in a battle against the British (Iliffe,
2017, p. 160).
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of the sudden drop in slave exports. On the Windward Coast, slave exports fell
suddenly by about 2,000 in 1808. In the same year, slave exports dropped by about
6,000 on the Gold Coast.19
3.5.5 Bight of Benin
Figure 3.6 suggests four turning points in the Bight of Benin, or the Slave Coast,
namely 1646, 1704, 1757, and 1815. The Bight of Benin exported 70 slaves per
year during the 1514-1645 regime. Slave exports grew annually by 5.16 per cent
during this period. The 1646-1703 regime had a similar annual growth rate at 5.56
per cent. Slave exports rose to 3,521 per year in the 1646-1703 regime. States
such as Dahomey and Oyo became powerful and supplied slaves between 1645 and
1756. The average slave exports increased to 11,680 in the subsequent regime, from
1704 to 1756, before declining to 9,205 in the 1757-1814 regime, then to 3,155 in
the 1815-1866 regime. Enslavement eventually drained the source of slaves during
the 1757-1814 regime. Unlike the Windward and Gold Coasts, slave exports did not
drop suddenly in 1808 in the Bight of Benin. Instead, slave exports dropped in 1815,
when Britain began using its navy to suppress the slave trade. In summary, slave
exports started contracting from the 1704 to 1756 regime, and went from an annual
contraction rate of 0.14 per cent in the 1704-1756 regime to annual contraction rates
of 0.02 per cent and 17.08 per cent in the 1757-1814 and 1815-1866 regimes.
The 1645 and 1815 turning points are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation, according to the first panel of Table 3.2. 1704 and 1757, however, are
not robust to these checks. The specification with HAC standard errors determines
1614, 1737, and 1815 as turning points, but not 1704 and 1757.
On the supply side, slave exports increased when states and trade routes were
established between 1646 and 1703. Oyo, a Yoruba state, was active in the slave
trade during this period.20 Oyo won the contest over control of the coastal port of
Whydah and made Dahomey, the state that absorbed Whydah, its tributary in the
1720s (Law, 1977b; Eltis, 2000; Lovejoy, 2011; Iliffe, 2017). Conflicts among local
settlements are consistent with the surge in slave exports, especially in the 1720s.
On the demand side, it was during this period that European merchants became
more competitive by responding to the taste and preferences of African merchants.
English merchants, for instance, became better than their Dutch competitors at
19Slavery in the Gold Coast did not end in 1808. Quantitative evidence suggests that slave
ownership and slavery within Africa rose in the nineteenth century. In the case of Asante, see
Austin (2005).
20Law (1977b, p. 34) argues that the capital of the Oyo Kingdom is not Oyo Ile but Oko, a place
further north and closer to the Niger River.
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choosing the merchandise that they would exchange for African commodities and
slaves (Ryder, 1969, p. 95).
Oyo achieved its greatest military power in the 1780s (Law, 1977a, p. 245).
However, slave exports declined from 1757, not in the 1780s. Excessive raiding of
slaves resulted in population decline and fewer people who could be captured as
slaves. As Manning (1982, p. 10) points out,
“For the Aja peoples in particular the heavy drain on population actually
led to population decline in the eighteenth century: an average of 8,500
Aja slaves per year... were exported for 50 years from 1690 to 1740,
which amounted to some 3% of the total population per year. No birth
rate would have been high enough to prevent depopulation under these
conditions.”
Slave exports declined further in 1815. Dahomey rose to power following the
collapse of the Oyo Empire in the 1820s. One notable revolt against the Oyo Empire
was the jihad in 1817.21 But such events did not increase the number of slaves traded
across the Atlantic. Instead, the fall in slave exports is more consistent with the
British enforcement of the anti-slave-trade law in 1815. According to Curtin et al.
(1995, p. 332), “After 1815... Great Britain began using its navy in a large-scale
attempt to suppress the trade at sea.” In 1848, King Gezo of Dahomey told British
officials that he was reluctant to yield to the British demand to abolish the slave
trade. Such reluctance resulted in more political pressure from Britain to abolish
the slave trade and in the occupation of Lagos, a Yoruba city heavily involved in
the slave trade, in 1851. The drop in slave exports in 1851 is visible in Figure 3.6.
Usman dan Fodio waged and subsequently won a religious war against the
local rulers of Gobir, a kingdom of Hausaland. Usman dan Fodio’s jihad resulted in
the capture of the city, killing of its ruler, and the establishment of a new capital
at Sokoto (Curtin et al., 1995, p. 329). As in the Upper Guinea Coast, as Muslim
states rose, the Atlantic part of the slave trade fell. The rise of the Sokoto Caliphate
under dan Fodio is consistent with the fall of slave exports from the region in the
early decades of the nineteenth century and with the rise of slave trade within Africa
(Lovejoy & Hogendorn, 1993; Lovejoy, 2011).22
21See, for examples, Lovejoy (2011), Reid (2014), Iliffe (2017). Reid (2014, p. 404) argues that
“[Dahomey] expanded considerably its range of military operations in the course of the nineteenth
century - including westward, into Yoruba country, following the collapse of Oyo - and was one of
the worst offenders in the illegal slave trade down to the 1850s, whereupon it turned increasingly
to the export of agricultural produce.”
22Lovejoy (2011, p. 46) cites evidence from Lovejoy and Hogendorn (1993) suggesting that “there
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In the later decades of the nineteenth century, the Benin Kingdom withdrew
from the slave trade. Ryder (1969, p. 22) suggests that the Kingdom withdrew
from the slave trade to protect itself from Britain, which now had influence on the
Kingdom’s neighbouring states, particularly Yorubaland. In the 1870s, for example,
the Kingdom closed the Oke Igbo route, a slave trade route between the Kingdom
and the Benin coast.
3.5.6 Bight of Biafra
Figure 3.7 suggests 1711 and 1784 as turning points in the Bight of Biafra. The
region exported 624 slaves per year during the 1514-1710 regime. The 1615-1710
regime is a period of gradual increase in slave exports from the region. Slave exports
increased steeply in the 1711-1783 regime. The Bight of Biafra’s annual slave exports
grew by 4.02 and 4.08 per cent during the 1514-1710 and 1711-1783 regimes. The
increase coincides with the rise of Bonny, displacing the Old Calabar and Elem
Kalabari (New Calabar) as major slave-trading ports in the region. Bonny is known
for institutions that established trust between the local and European merchants.
The average rose to 5,945 in the following regime, from 1711 to 1783. In the final
regime, from 1784 to 1866, annual exports increased further to 6,675 per year, but
slave exports declined by 11.95 per cent annually. The period from 1784 to 1866 is a
regime of rising customs duties paid to African rulers and declining slave exports in
the region. It is also during this period that wars involving European merchants, for
example the Anglo-French wars and the War of Independence in the North American
colonies, occurred.
For the Bight of Biafra, the second panel of Table 3.2 summarizes the results.
Both 1711 and 1784 turning points are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation as well as to heterogeneity across regimes. In addition to 1711 and
1784, the specification also suggests 1644 as a turning point.
Slave exports from the region increased in the 1640s and increased rapidly in
the first decade of the eighteenth century (Dike, 1956; Lovejoy, 2011). Competition
among multinational companies increased in the period, and the Bight of Biafra is
similar to the Gold Coast and Bight of Benin in this respect.
Slave exports in the 1711-1783 regime increased steeply. This was in spite of
the relatively high mortality rate of slaves transported to the New World (Eltis, 2000,
p. 185). It was during this period that Bonny replaced the Old Calabar as the major
were probably as many enslaved people in 1860 in the Sokoto Caliphate, in the interior of West
Africa, as the number of enslaved African Americans who were in the U.S.A. at the outbreak of the
American Civil War.”
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slave-trading port in the Bight of Biafra. Lovejoy and Richardson (2004) argue that
institutions in Bonny were better for slave-trading than those in neighbouring ports,
such as the Old and New Calabars, at enforcing trust and exchange between local
and European merchants. The enforcement of credit arrangements, for example, was
more effective in Bonny than in Old Calabar. Bonny relied on state intervention,
while Old Calabar depended on human pawnship and local organizations, such as
the Ekpe society, for credit enforcement.23
Wars between the British and their colonies in North America in the 1780s
reduced demand for slave exports, which “was the continuation of the six-year lull
that started in 1777” (Behrendt, 1997, p. 199). Wars increased the risk of attack
from enemy ships as well as the cost of insuring a ship, which discouraged the slave
trade. It could also be the case that some slave vessels were forced to redeploy
as privateers. Local events could have also played a role in explaining the decline
of slave exports in the region during the period. There was a sudden increase in
customs duties or “comey” during the period, particularly in Old Calabar.24
3.5.7 West Central Africa
Figure 3.8 suggests three turning points in West Central Africa. These are 1640,
1723, and 1815. Slave exports were growing during the 1514-1639 regime. West
Central Africa exported 2,138 slaves per year between 1514 and 1639. Annual slave
exports during this regime grew by 2.52 per cent. The Portuguese founded Luanda
in 1575 and established a relationship with the Kongo and Imbangala people, who
supplied slaves to Portuguese merchants. Slave exports declined in the 1640s, but
started to increase again at the onset of the civil wars in the latter half of the
seventeenth century. The wars resulted in the disintegration of the Kongo Kingdom.
The annual slave exports slightly increased to 2,941 slaves, but growth slowed to 1.04
per cent between 1640 and 1722. Slave exports then increased substantially in the
1723-1814 regime. In the 1723-1814 regime, the region’s slave exports rose steeply
to 20,651 per year, although annual growth slowed further to 0.70 per cent. Wars
further inland from Luanda and increased participation in the slave trade by inland
states produced more slaves for export during the period. The annual slave exports
between 1815 and 1866 is similar to the previous regime. The region exported
20,225 slaves per year during the 1815-1866 regime. During this regime, however,
exports were shrinking by 20.09 per cent each year from 1815 until 1866. Slave
23See Lovejoy and Richardson (2004) for comparative analysis of credit enforcement between
Bonny and Old Calabar. Also, see Sparks (2002, 2009).
24See Lovejoy and Richardson (2004, p. 371) for “exorbitant” duties requested by Old Calabar
chiefs from English merchants.
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exports started to decline in 1815, as major European countries began enforcing
their anti-slave-trade laws.
The 1640, 1723, and 1815 turning points are all robust to heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation as well as to heterogeneity across regimes. See the third panel
of Table 3.2. In addition to 1640, 1723, and 1815, the specification with HAC
standard errors suggests 1588 as a turning point. The political stability during the
1514-1587 regime, such as King Afonso I’s reign in the first half of the sixteenth
century, produced a relatively lower number of slaves for export. King Afonso I of
the Kingdom of Kongo reigned from 1504 to 1543 (Iliffe, 2017, p. 149). After the
collapse of the Kingdom of Kongo in the latter half of the seventeenth century, slave
exports began to increase until 1815.
In the first half of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese had access to
slaves by employing African allies, particularly the Imbangala people, to raid people
from the southern Kongo (J. C. Miller, 1988, p. 142). The Kingdom of Kongo
collapsed in the latter half of the seventeenth century. The slave trade provided
access to firearms to the Kongo and other African peoples. For example, the trade
with the Portuguese in Luanda after 1576 gave the rulers from the southern province
independent access to imported goods, particularly firearms (Iliffe, 2017, p. 150).
The Kongo Kingdom’s rulers faced a series of civil wars and struggled to maintain
the political stability they had in the latter half of the seventeenth century. King
Garcia II’s successor as ruler of the Kingdom of Kongo died in the Battle of Mbwila
in 1665 (Iliffe, 2017, p. 149). This was a source of political instability for the
Kongo Kingdom. By 1683, the Portuguese established their position in the slave
trade in this region (Eltis, 2000, p. 189). As a result, slave exports increased in the
1614-1722 regime. Wars and plunder, as Lovejoy (2011, p. 74) points out, resulted
in widespread enslavement.
Slave exports increased further during the 1723-1814 regime. The structural
change in slave exports in this period is consistent with Portuguese efforts to expand
inland in search of more slaves. The wars are related to the consolidation of states
who raided weaker states and sold their captives as slaves to European merchants
(J. C. Miller, 1988; Thornton, 1998; Northrup, 2002; Lovejoy, 2011; Iliffe, 2017).
Firmly established networks among African enslavers, such as the rulers of the Lunda
Empire in the center and Ovimbundu Kingdom in the southern parts of the region,
aided the transportation of slaves along the routes to the ports of West Central
Africa. The wars led by inland states produced “captives for sale” and the “coalitions
of African entrepreneurs” organized the transportation and exchange of slaves for
imported goods (Northrup, 2002, p. 229).
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Appendix C.10 shows that the Portuguese continued buying slaves until
the 1850s. But the results suggest that slave exports started declining in 1815.
Slave exports started declining when major European countries, such as Denmark,
England, and France, denounced the slave trade, for example, during the Congress
of Vienna, not after Portugal and Brazil abolished their slave trades in 1836 and
1851 (Eltis & Richardson, 2010; Walvin, 2014). The major slave purchasers in this
regime were Portuguese and Brazilian purchasers. If the slave trade ended in the
1850s in this region, then 1815 was the beginning of this end.
3.5.8 Southeast Africa
There are two turning points in Southeast African slave exports. Figure 3.9 suggests
1763 and 1815 as the turning points. 92 slaves per year were exported from Southeast
Africa from 1514 to 1762. During this regime, slave exports grew annually by 2.39
per cent. The highest growth is observed during the 1763-1814 regime. Slave exports
began increasing substantially in 1763 and this could be because of increased demand
from France for slaves to work in its sugar plantations in the Indian Ocean islands.
Slave exports grew 15.62 per cent annually, exporting 2,022 slaves per year during
this regime. As in West Central Africa, slave exports from Southeast Africa started
declining in 1815. During the 1815-1866 regime, annual slave exports rose to 5,308
on average, but the trend was declining at an annual rate of 16.44 per cent.
As the bottom panel of Table 3.2 shows, both 1763 and 1815 turning points
are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation as well as to heteregoneity
across regimes.
Increased demand from sugar producers in the islands of the Indian Ocean,
such as Mauritius and Reunion to the east of Madagascar, is consistent with
increased exports of Southeast African slaves from the middle of the eighteenth
century (Newitt, 1995, p. 245). Manning (1990, p. 138) notes that the increase in
demand from French planters of the Indian Ocean compensated for the decreased
demand owing to the slave rebellion in St. Dominique in the West Indies. Appendix
C.11 shows that slaves purchased by France increased during the period. The
spikes in the 1780s coincide with the Madagascar revolt (Hawthorne, 2003, p. 10).
Similar to West Central Africa, the decline in 1815 was due to the abolitionist
efforts. Contrary to existing views, the results suggest that abolitionist efforts did
curb the slave trade in this region. For example, Lovejoy (2011, p. 140) maintains
that “abolitionist efforts failed to stem the flow of the enslaved traffic in the first
half of the 19th century, although some parts of the African coast were blockaded,
thereby forcing the trade to adjust.” The results show that slave exports declined
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from 1815. The decline happened even if other countries, particularly Portugal and
Brazil, continued their purchase of slaves from Africa. The spikes in the 1820s are
consistent with mfecane wars, where warring groups such as Ngoni and Shangaans
captured slaves for sale in the coast (Cobbing, 1988; Manning, 1990; Eldredge,
1992; Hamilton, 1992; Omer-Cooper, 1993; Gordon, 2009; Fenske & Kala, 2017).
The wars continued throughout the nineteenth century.25 However, the spikes are
just deviations from a downward-sloping trend that began in 1815.
3.5.9 Discussion
The trans-Atlantic slave trade began declining in 1815. Slave exports from West
Central Africa, the Bight of Benin, and Southeast Africa followed the same pattern.
Together, these regions exported 51.1 per cent of the total slaves produced from
1514 to 1866. West Central Africa exported 32.8 per cent of the total slaves, the
Bight of Benin exported 14.5 per cent, and Southeast Africa exported 3.8 per cent.
The downward-sloping trend of slave exports from the Windward and Gold Coasts
began in 1808. The Windward and Gold Coasts exported 1.9 per cent and 7.0 per
cent of total slaves. Slave exports from the Bight of Biafra started declining in 1784.
In total, these regions exported 70.5 per cent of African slaves produced in the whole
period.
The abolition, therefore, affected African regions that exported at least 70 per
cent of the total slaves produced in Africa from 1514 to 1866. Contrary to traditional
views, the abolition’s effect on the trans-Atlantic slave trade was substantial. After
the abolition, West Central Africa became the most important source of slaves for
Portuguese and Brazilian purchasers. But even in this region, slave exports started
declining in 1815, not in the middle of the nineteenth century when Portugal and
Brazil abolished their slave trades.
Trade opportunities other than slaves were different for each region.
European merchants were initially interested in gold in the Gold Coast region.
Physical structures, such as forts and factories (i.e. trading posts), dotted the Gold
25See, for example, Newitt (1995). “During the wars of mfecane and the expansion of Gaza
power in the 1830s and 1840s, large numbers of slaves found their way to Delogoa Bay and the
export of slaves was to continue almost thoughtout the century in spite of the emphatic denials
by the Portuguese and claims that the trade had definitely ceased by 1845” (Newitt, 1995, p.
293). Also, see Reid (2002). “The Ganda fought wars for a number of reasons, with both short-
and long-term gain in mind. The mistake must not be made of assuming that the immediate
and most tangible yields of a battle – for example, cattle, women and slaves – represent the final
desired result, although such booty was clearly important. This was particularly true in the late
nineteenth century, with the increased demand for slaves among the coastal merchants, although
the argument that the Ganda fought more wars at this time to fulfil this demand is unconvincing
and unsubstantiated” (Reid, 2002, p. 178).
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Coast and were used to store gold and other African commodities. Slave exports
from the Gold Coast increased at a later period than in Senegambia. European
merchants, particularly Portuguese, were supplying slaves to the Gold Coast in
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Slave exports from Senegambia increased
with the collapse of a local kingdom in the late sixteenth century. Slave exports in
some regions increased at a much later period. Southeast African slave exports, for
example, did not increase until the middle of the eighteenth century.
On one hand, demand-side shocks (e.g. abolition of the slave trade) were
relatively important in explaining the beginning and the end of the trans-Atlantic
slave trade. Supply-side shocks (e.g. African conflicts), on the other hand, were
relatively important in explaining the dynamics of the trade. Generally, slave
exports rose with conflicts or wars, but fell with peace. But incentives could differ
across regions according to whether slaves would be sold on the Atlantic coasts or
across the Sahara desert. Slave exports from Senegambia and Sierra Leone declined
in 1752 and 1760, respectively. These structural breaks are about half a century
earlier than 1808. The Anglo-French wars could explain the decline of slave exports
in this region. But there is some historical evidence that Muslim states in the
Upper Guinea Coast traded more with Muslim merchants of North Africa than
with European merchants on the Atlantic coasts. It is therefore possible to observe
Muslim conflicts with decreasing trans-Atlantic but increasing trans-Saharan or
within-Africa slave trades.
Slave exports increased in periods of conflict or war. In periods of war, slaves
were captured and exchanged for imported goods. The imported goods were then
used to either expand or defend a territory. When imported goods, particularly
firearms (Inikori, 1977), are used to expand a territory, then slave production
increases further (Whatley, 2018). The Asante in the Gold Coast is a case in
point. In other regions, imported goods like iron were used to make agricultural
implements and to defend a territory. One example is the Balanta people of Guinea
Bissau (Hawthorne, 2003). These had opposite effects. While the former resulted
in increased slave production, the latter led to decreased slave production. The
gun-slave cycle, indeed, is far from a simple idea (Reid, 2012).
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed the turning points in the trans-Atlantic slave
trade between 1514 and 1866. I have shown that demand shocks, particularly
the abolition of the slave trade by countries involved in it, such as Britain, the
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Netherlands, France, and the U.S.A., and wars among major slave purchasers
(e.g the Anglo-French and Napoleonic Wars) are significant factors in the era of
diminishing trans-Atlantic slave trade. Other demand shocks, such as the creation
of sugar plantations and increased competition from European merchants, played
a role in the beginning of the slave trade. Supply shocks, specifically wars and
conflicts, can also explain the rise and fall of slave exports. Both demand and
supply factors were important in describing how the slave trade began. Demand
factors were relatively more important in the ebbing of the slave trade. The
literature that has relied only on decennial or quadranscentennial data has missed
this important insight, which is visible only in the annual series of slave exports.
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Figure 3.1: Structural Change in Slaves Embarked from Africa, 1514-1866
Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org.
(2016)
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Figure 3.2: Structural Change in Slaves Embarked from Senegambia, 1514-1866
Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org.
(2016)
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Figure 3.3: Structural Change in Slaves Embarked from Sierra Leone, 1514-1866.
Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org.
(2016)
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Figure 3.4: Structural Change in Slaves Embarked from the Windward Coast,
1514-1866
Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org.
(2016)
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Figure 3.5: Structural Change in Slaves Embarked from the Gold Coast, 1514-1866
Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org.
(2016)
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Figure 3.6: Structural Change in Slaves Embarked from the Bight of Benin,
1514-1866
Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org.
(2016)
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Figure 3.7: Structural Change in Slaves Embarked from the Bight of Biafra,
1514-1866
Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org.
(2016)
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Figure 3.8: Structural Change in Slaves Embarked from West Central Africa,
1514-1866
Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org.
(2016)
95
Figure 3.9: Structural Change in Slaves Embarked from Southeast Africa, 1514-1866
Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org.
(2016)
96
Table 3.1: Structural Change in Slaves Embarked from Senegambia, Sierra Leone,
the Windward Coast, and the Gold Coast, 1514-1866
Region Period N Intercept Slope
Senegambia 1514-1600 87 -84221.80 55.28
(11916.00) (7.69)
1601-1676 76 27042.10 -15.94
(10445.10) (6.31)
1677-1751 75 -18842.87 11.88
(15871.92) (9.32)
1752-1866 115 91393.81 -49.28
(11207.42) (6.12)
Sierra Leone 1514-1759 246 -2739.40 1.74
(1257.97) (0.79)
1760-1866 107 66291.62 -35.44
(8303.60) (4.53)
Windward Coast 1514-1699 186 -91.53 0.06
(59.02) (0.04)
1700-1751 52 -30915.56 18.17
(11122.31) (6.49)
1752-1807 56 116650.50 -63.84
(39126.90) (21.8)
1808-1866 59 11430.53 -6.14
(3823.18) (2.07)
Gold Coast 1514-1649 136 -330.43 0.21
(217.16) (0.14)
1650-1702 53 -52888.36 32.23
(13855.12) (8.30)
1703-1807 105 -42862.12 28.09
(14513.47) (8.29)
1808-1866 59 15748.39 -8.50
(5721.12) (3.10)
Notes: I estimate the intercept and slope of Equation 3.1. There are in total four separate
regressions in this table, one for each region. Following Bai and Perron (2003) and Andrews and
Monahan (1992), I pre-whiten the residuals using a VAR(1) and construct a heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix using a quadratic kernel with automatic
bandwidth selection based on an AR(1) approximation. The number in parenthesis refers to
the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard error. N refers to the number of
observations relevant to the period. Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database,
http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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Table 3.2: Structural Change in Slaves Embarked from the Bight of Benin, the Bight
of Biafra, West Central Africa, and Southeast Africa, 1514-1866
Region Period N Intercept Slope
Bight of Benin 1514-1645 132 -3845.86 2.48
(1491.59) (0.96)
1646-1731 86 -327385.50 197.71
(23630.20) (14.03)
1732-1814 83 53511.33 -24.73
(18577.77) (10.42)
1815-1866 52 135534.20 -71.93
(35231.34) (19.24)
Bight of Biafra 1514-1643 130 -4844.42 3.20
(1268.55) (0.81)
1644-1710 67 -3880.49 3.17
(21279.62) (12.61)
1711-1783 73 -235664.30 138.30
(137695.70) (79.43)
1784-1866 83 422690.60 -227.95
(82546.92) (44.88)
West Central Africa 1514-1587 74 -788.00 0.53
(4857.70) (3.16)
1588-1639 52 -219836.70 139.43
(51045.13) (31.92)
1640-1722 83 -72174.10 44.68
(31321.06) (18.74)
1723-1814 92 -358579.10 214.44
(55096.44) (31.46)
1815-1866 52 1554161.00 -833.43
(317417.90) (170.77)
Southeast Africa 1514-1762 249 -1873.06 1.20
(582.71) (0.37)
1763-1814 52 -156371.20 88.56
(31521.10) (17.74)
1815-1866 52 442091.00 -237.32
(65979.57) (35.61)
Notes: I estimate the intercept and slope of Equation 3.1. There are in total four separate
regressions in this table, one for each region. Following Bai and Perron (2003) and Andrews and
Monahan (1992), I pre-whiten the residuals using a VAR(1) and construct a heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix using a quadratic kernel with automatic
bandwidth selection based on an AR(1) approximation. The number in parenthesis refers to
the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard error. N refers to the number of
observations relevant to the period. Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database,
http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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Appendix A
Chapter 1: Competition and
Rent-Seeking During the Slave
Trade
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A.1 Correspondence of the Company on Payments to Chiefs
Settlement Vol. Letter
Accra 1 407, 409, 414, 425, 428, 440
Accra 2 723, 731, 793
Accra 3 1232, 1284, 1285, 1287, 1288, 1291, 1297
Amisa 3 1043
Anashan 1 125, 149
Anashan 2 361, 362, 363, 378, 379, 381
Anashan 3 511, 516, 518, 520, 521, 523, 526, 549, 556, 574, 577, 582,
591
Anomabo 1 247, 248, 276, 277, 332
Anomabo 2 382, 383, 384, 407, 411, 453, 455, 463, 464, 486, 498, 499,
503, 520, 521, 522, 524, 525, 531, 532, 538, 540, 541, 547,
549, 550, 554, 561, 596, 606, 609
Anomabo 3 612, 613, 614, 629, 655, 656, 667, 682, 687, 694, 706, 707,
708, 716, 717, 744, 767, 790, 791, 817, 836, 871, 873, 877,
885, 886, 887, 925
Dixcove 3 1, 14, 23, 30, 31, 36, 38, 43, 46, 56, 65, 78, 79, 83, 90, 91,
107, 108, 112, 117, 135, 137
Egya 1 381
Egya 2 618, 627, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 642, 663, 664, 665,
666, 667, 674, 679, 684, 691, 693, 694, 701, 702, 704
Egya 3 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 938, 939, 942, 948, 949, 1026, 1041
Komenda 1 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 85, 105
Komenda 2 166, 171, 186, 190, 192, 194, 199, 201, 206, 210, 215, 216,
224, 227, 242, 246, 247, 248, 251, 254, 255, 261, 262, 276,
281, 299, 314, 320, 326, 329, 332, 333
Komenda 3 263, 264, 265, 271, 278, 279, 280, 281, 286, 287, 288, 297,
298, 304, 305, 306, 325, 327, 329, 332, 337, 341, 343, 346,
347, 353, 358, 365, 378, 379, 390, 392, 416, 426, 430, 440,
442, 443, 447, 448, 450
Sekondi 1 1, 2, 4, 13, 15, 23, 28
Sekondi 2 4, 7, 10, 36, 37, 39, 42, 49, 69, 90, 107, 109, 119, 120, 122,
123, 125, 128, 129, 136
Sekondi 3 156, 161, 162, 167, 240, 246, 254, 256, 257, 259, 260, 262
Tantumkweri 3 1051, 1053, 1054, 1059
Winneba 1 385
Winneba 3 1067, 1069, 1072, 1076, 1080, 1082, 1083, 1086, 1098, 1103,
1104, 1105, 1106, 1111, 1113, 1116, 1119, 1121, 1122, 1123,
1131, 1132, 1134, 1137, 1141, 1143, 1144, 1172, 1179, 1180
Source: Rawlinson Corpus in Law (1997, 2001, 2006)
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A.2 Rank of Recipient
Rank Description
State Chief
Head Chief Ahenfo kese = royal; ahenfo = noble by birth
Officeholder Afahene = ruler of administrative units; okyeame = the
cancellar or cancellatius, called fetere or fitiro; day = the
state treasurer, governor of the capital, and chief of the
army); brafo = high-ranking military officer
Chieftain
Individual Cabasheer = chieftain; Quarrenteer = chieftain
Group Cabasheers = chieftains; Quarrenteers = chieftains
Trader Batafo = merchants
Employee African employee
Soldier Retainer or commoner
Unnamed Any of the above
Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors
(T70/365-378); Daaku (1970); Kea (1982); Law (1997, 2001, 2006)
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A.3 A Journal Entry
Notes: The picture shows a sample of an Account Journal entry. The entry reads “Royall
African Company Dr to Brandy for 3 Pints Sent the King of Fetu for a dashey” (T70/366,
folio 63). Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and
Successors (T70/365-378)
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A.4 Type of Payment
Payment Definition
Customary Payments made in relation to customary laws, for example
“rowsowing,” planting, harvesting, “dancing,” burial
Dashey Gifts
Ground Payments made in exchange of rights to build and maintain
forts and factories on the land
Palavara Payments made associated with settling differences
Promise Gift Payments made after taking an oath of allegiance to the
Company
Service Payments made for services rendered by dependants of chiefs
Ship Customs Payments made for anchored ships of the Company
Trade Gift Payments made by the Company to promote trade
Trusted Advanced payments made by the Company in relation to any
payments, especially ground payments and ship customs
War Aid Payments made to allies of the Company amidst war or
conflict
Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors
(T70/365-378); Law (1997, 2001, 2006)
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A.5 Individual Recipient
Rank Named Recipient
Head Chief King of Accra, King of Adangme, King of Adom, King of Ahanta,
King of Akani, King of Akron, King of Akwamu, King of Agona,
King of Asebu, King of Denkyira, King of Eguafo, King of Afutu,
King of Komenda, King of Twifo, Queen of Akwamu, Queen of
Agona, Queen of Asebu, Queen of Afutu, Prince of Agona, Prince
of Eguafo
Officeholder Brafo of Abra, Brafo of Anomabo, Brafo of Asebu, Brafo of Fante,
Brafo of Afutu, Brafo of Takoradi, Brafo of Tantumkweri, Day
of Asebu, Day of Eguafo, Day of Fante, Day of Afutu, Fetere
of Adom, Fetere of Asebu, Fetere of Eguafo, Fetere of Afutu,
Fetere of Komenda, General of Adom, General of Anashan, Herald
of Cape Coast, Herald of Denkyira, Herald of Twifo, Mareen
of Cape Coast, Mareen of Egya, Mareen of Fante, Mareen of
Afutu, Mareen of Komenda, Messenger of Adom, Messenger of
Anomabo, Messenger of Asebu, Messenger of Denkyira, Messenger
of Fante, Messenger of Little Komenda, Quarrenteer of Anashan,
Quarrenteer of Fante
Chieftain Cabasheer of Abra, Cabasheer of Abrem, Cabasheer of Accra,
Cabasheer of Adangme, Cabasheer of Adom, Cabasheer of
Ahanta, Cabasheer of Akani, Cabasheer of Akron, Cabasheer
of Amisa, Cabasheer of Anashan, Cabasheer of Agona,
Cabasheer of Anomabo, Cabasheer of Asebu, Cabasheer of
Cape Coast, Cabasheer of Denkyira, Cabasheer of Dixcove,
Cabasheer of Eguafo, Cabasheer of Egya, Cabasheer of Fante,
Cabasheer of Afutu, Cabasheer of Kabestera, Cabasheer of
Komenda, Cabasheer of Kormantin, Cabasheer of Little Komenda,
Cabasheer of Mina, Cabasheer of Sekondi, Cabasheer of
Tantumkweri, Cabasheer of Twifo, Cabasheer of Winneba
Employee Employee from Agona, Employee from Anomabo, Employee from
Cape Coast, Employee at Cape Coast Castle
Trader Trader from Akani, Trader from Anomabo, Trader from Asante,
Trader from Asebu, Trader from Cape Coast, Trader from
Denkyira, Trader from Afutu, Trader from Kabestera, Trader from
Komenda
Soldier Soldier from Adom, Soldier from Akani, Soldier from Cape Coast,
Soldier from Eguafo, Soldier from Afutu
Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors
(T70/365-378)
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A.6 Price of Commodity
N Min Max Mean SD
Alcohol 297 0.5 6 2.7 1.5
Spirits 90 4 6 4.7 0.8
Spirits Half 12 2 2.5 2.4 0.2
Brandy 122 0.5 4 2 0.3
Rum Barbados 16 1 2 1.5 0.2
Rum 57 0.5 1.5 1.2 0.3
N Min Max Mean SD
European Cloth 826 1 30 10.4 5
Boysadoe 84 10 30 17.1 4
Say 121 10 24 16 3.2
Satin Stripe 13 10 12 11.8 0.6
Perpetuana 62 8 13 11.2 1.3
Welsh Plain 52 8 12 9.8 0.6
Welsh Plain Blue 40 8 11 9.6 0.9
Welsh Plain Red 38 8 11 9.6 0.9
Perpetuana Blue 111 7 12 9.5 1.1
Perpetuana Red 61 6 11 8.5 0.9
Welsh Plain Green 9 6 10 8 1.1
Perpetuana Green 53 5 9 7.9 0.9
Welsh Plain Yellow 3 7 8 7.7 0.6
Sletia Fine 54 6 16 7.6 1.7
Satin Stripe Narrow 7 6 8 6.6 1
Sletia Coarse 107 4 10 4.9 1.3
Sletia Paper 4 3 3 2.9 0
Annaba 7 1 1.5 1.1 0.2
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Appendix A.6 Price of Commodity (Cont’d)
N Min Max Mean SD
Indian Cloth 996 0.6 10 4 1.9
Photae 2 5 10 7.5 3.5
Gingham 66 3 7 6.7 0.6
Tapseils Broad 78 5 7 6.6 0.5
Allejar 59 4 7 6.5 0.6
Salampores 27 5 8 5.6 0.6
Chintz Broad 22 4 6 5.2 0.5
Nicanee Broad 50 3.5 7 5.2 1.1
Bafta Blue Broad 56 3.5 6 4.9 1
Longee Flowered 12 4 5 4.9 0.3
Pintado Broad 59 1.5 6 4.7 0.6
Chercolees 27 4 6 4.3 0.7
Tapseils Narrow 50 3 6 4.1 0.6
Bafta White 7 4 4 4 0
Salampores White 10 3 4 3.9 0.3
Chintz 28 3 5 3.8 0.5
Nicanee Narrow 67 2 5 3.6 0.7
Longee Silk 57 1 7 3.4 1.1
Bafta Blue Narrow 22 2.5 4 3.3 0.5
Pintado Narrow 7 2 5 2.9 1.1
Longee Herba 56 1 4 2.7 0.9
Brawl 85 1.5 2.5 2 0.4
Pautke White 2 0.6 2.5 1.6 1.3
Pautke Blue 64 1 2 1.5 0.1
Guinea Cloth 83 0.6 1.5 1.2 0.2
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Appendix A.6 Price of Commodity (Cont’d)
N Min Max Mean SD
Other Cloth 246 0.5 12 5.6 3.6
Cloth Long Blue 11 11.5 12 11.9 0.2
Cloth Long White 64 6 12 10.4 1.9
Cloth King 2 5 5 5 0
Cloth Silk Stripe 9 1 5 4.1 1.3
Cloth Broad Scarlet 42 3.7 5 4 0.2
Cloth Scarlet 29 3.7 4 4 0.1
Cloth Gambia 5 2.5 5 3.7 1.2
Cloth Violet 10 3 4 3.1 0.3
Cloth Blue 12 3 3 3 0
Cloth Green 3 3 3 3 0
Cloth Long Broad Blue 15 2 4 3 0.5
Cloth Red 23 2 4 3 0.3
Cloth Arda 4 1 3 2.5 1
Cloth Cape Verde 8 1 5 2.3 1.2
Cloth Benin 9 0.5 1.5 1 0.3
N Min Max Mean SD
Cloth Product 325 0.5 4 1.4 0.7
Carpet Stripe 14 2.5 4 3.6 0.4
Blanket White 38 1 3 2.1 0.7
Carpet English and Turkey 39 1 3 1.9 0.3
Carpet Birds Eye 16 1 4 1.3 0.8
Blanket 60 1 2 1.2 0.4
Carpet Painted 14 1 1 1 0
Sheet 142 1 1.2 1 0.1
Canvas 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0
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Appendix A.6 Price of Commodity (Cont’d)
N Min Max Mean SD
Firearm 165 2 48 20.1 14.3
Gunpowder 102 16 48 30 8.4
Firelock 6 4 5 4.8 0.4
Snaphance 6 4 5 4.2 0.4
Carbine 9 4 4 4 0
Musket 40 2 5 4 0.5
Pewter Gun 2 4 4 4 0
N Min Max Mean SD
Metal 255 1 2.5 1.6 0.3
Iron Bar 152 1.1 2.5 1.7 0.3
Lead Bar 103 1 2 1.5 0.1
N Min Max Mean SD
Metalware 283 0.1 4 1.8 1.3
Pewter Screwed Jug 69 1 4 3.8 0.6
Pewter Jug Spout Pot 29 1.3 3 1.7 0.6
Pewter Basin 72 0.25 3 1.3 0.7
Pewter Tankard 11 1 2 1.1 0.3
Brass Diglin 11 0.5 2 1 0.7
Knife 58 0.1 1.5 0.9 0.3
Brass Kettle 13 0.4 2 0.6 0.4
Kettle 7 0.5 1 0.6 0.2
Brass Pan 13 0.5 0.5 0.5 0
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Appendix A.6 Price of Commodity (Cont’d)
N Min Max Mean SD
Miscellaneous 231 0.3 14 1.4 0.7
Loozes 2 12 14 13 1.4
Tallow 119 5 12 7.2 1.3
Paper Blue 2 4 4 4 0
Hat 3 3.5 4 3.8 0.3
Wherry 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 0
Cowries 13 0.3 4 2.1 1.7
Looking Glasses 7 0.3 6 1.8 2.3
Bouges 7 0.4 2.5 1.7 2.5
Coral 21 1.5 2 1.5 0.1
Beads Graneta 3 0.9 1 1 0.1
Guilt Skin 2 1 1 1 0
Beads 46 0.5 2 0.8 0.5
Beef 3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0
Notes: Prices are in angles of gold. N is the number of observations from 1679 to 1704. 1 ounce of
gold is equivalent to 16 angles of gold. Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading
with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378); Eltis (1991); Alpern (1995)
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A.7 Type of Commodity
General Specific
Alcohol Brandy, rum, spirits
Other Cloth Plain, Benin, blue, blue broad, green, king’s, long white, red,
red broad, silk, scarlet, scarlet blue, scarlet broad, violet
European Cloth Boysadoe, perpetuana, perpetuana blue, perpetuana green,
perpetuana red, satin stripes broad, say, silk, sletia coarse,
sletia fine, Welsh plain, Welsh plain blue, Welsh red
Indian Cloth Bafta, bafta blue, bafta blue narrow, brawl, chintz, chintz
broad, chintz narrow, gingham, Guinea cloth, longee flower,
longee herba, longee silk, longee silk flowered, nicanee broad,
nicanee narrow, pautke, pautke blue, pautke white, photae,
pintado broad, pintado narrow, salampores, tapseil broad
Cloth Product Blankets, white blankets, carpets, bird’s eye carpets, English
and Turkey carpets, painted carpets, sheets
Firearm Fire lock muskets, fuzees, gunpowder, muskets, match locks
muskets, snaphances
Gold Gold
Metal Copper bar, iron bar, lead bar
Metalware Brass, brass basin, brass diglin, brass kettle, brass pan,
knife, pewter basin, pewter screwed jug, pewter tankard
Others Bead coral and cowry, cane, hat, hat and band, guilt skin,
looking glass, pipe, tallow, tobacco
Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors
(T70/365-378); Eltis (1991); Alpern (1995); Northrup (1998)
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A.8 Settlements in the Seventeenth-Century Gold Coast
Settlement State Caravan
Route
Non
Coast
Administrative
Capital
Commercial
Center
Abra Fante Y Y N N
Abrem Abrem Y Y Y Y
Accra Accra N Y Y Y
Adangme Adangme N Y N N
Adom Adom N Y Y Y
Ahanta Ahanta N Y Y N
Akani Akani Y Y N N
Akron Agona N Y Y N
Akwamu Akwamu N Y Y Y
Amisa Fante N N N N
Anashan Fante Y N N N
Agona Agona N Y Y N
Anomabo Fante Y N N Y
Asante Asante Y Y Y N
Asebu Asebu Y Y Y N
Cape Coast Afutu Y N N Y
Cape Coast Castle Afutu Y N N Y
Denkyira Denkyira Y Y Y Y
Dixcove Ahanta N N N N
Great Komenda Eguafo Y Y Y N
Egya Fante Y N N N
Fante Fante Y Y Y N
Afutu Afutu Y Y Y N
Kabestera Etsi Y Y Y N
Kormantin Fante Y N N Y
Little Komenda Eguafo Y N N Y
Elmina Eguafo Y N N Y
Sekondi Ahanta N N N N
Takoradi Ahanta N N N N
Tantumkweri Fante N N N N
Twifo Twifo Y Y Y N
Winneba Agona N N N Y
Notes: Y = Yes; N = No. Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading
with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378); Kea (1982); Law (1997, 2001, 2006)
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A.9 Correspondence of the Company on Interlopers
Settlement Vol. Letter
Accra 1 391, 398, 399, 446
Accra 2 711, 720
Amisa 3 1043, 1243, 1244, 1273, 1288
Anashan 1 122
Anomabo 1 209, 211, 219, 223, 228, 334, 339, 340, 341, 343, 371
Anomabo 2 555, 561
Anomabo 3 633, 635, 636, 642, 653, 687, 690, 789, 807, 853, 854, 874,
882, 895, 926
Dixcove 3 5, 17, 22, 37, 38, 70, 72, 74, 96, 100, 102, 105, 118, 133, 135
Egya 1 384
Egya 2 638, 666
Fredericksburg 2 343
Komenda 1 36, 53, 54, 56, 62, 72, 75, 78, 80, 84, 86, 93, 105, 106, 107,
108
Komenda 2 165, 166, 167, 212, 221, 222, 259, 260, 268, 285
Komenda 3 287, 354, 355
Sekondi 1 6, 7, 8, 23
Sekondi 2 4, 5, 6, 13, 15, 16, 24, 26, 39, 40, 51, 67, 83, 87, 96
Sekondi 3 158, 160, 162, 163, 168, 170, 176, 179, 216, 221, 236
Winneba 1 387
Winneba 3 1066, 1076, 1085, 1086, 1111, 1113, 1116, 1119, 1132, 1171,
1176
Source: Rawlinson Corpus in Law (1997, 2001, 2006)
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A.10 Volume of Payments by Rank of Recipient
All Pre-1688 Post-1688
Rank N % Rank N % Rank N % Rank
State Chief 18722 76.33 3846 72.27 14876 77.45
Head Chief 14003 57.09 1 1401 26.32 2 12602 65.61 1
Officeholder 4719 19.24 2 2445 45.95 1 2274 11.84 3
Chieftain 4370 17.82 1162 21.83 3208 16.70
Individual 3420 13.94 3 454 8.53 4 2966 15.44 2
Group 950 3.87 4 708 13.30 3 242 1.26 4
Employee 446 1.82 5 222 4.17 5 224 1.16 6
Trader 333 1.36 6 29 0.54 6 304 1.58 5
Soldier 89 0.36 7 3 0.06 7 86 0.45 7
Unspecified 569 2.32 60 1.13 509 2.65
Total 24529 100 5322 100 19207 100
Notes: The value of payments is in constant angles of gold. All includes payments from 1679
to 1704. Pre-1688 includes payments in 1679, 1680, 1681, 1682, 1683, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1687.
Post-1688 includes payments in 1689, 1690, 1691, 1696, 1697, 1698, 1699, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703,
1704. Rank is rank from highest to lowest: 1 is the highest; 10 is the lowest. Source: Company of
Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378); Davies (1957);
Eltis (1991); Alpern (1995)
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A.11 An Itemized Journal Entry
Notes: The picture shows a sample of itemized Account Journal entry; the entry reads “3
Gallo Brandy, 2 Iron barrs to the King of Fettu; 1.5 Gallo Brandy, 1 Iron barr to the Dey;
1 Gallo Brandy, 1 Iron Barr to the Fettera; 1 Gallo Brandy, 1 Iron Barr to the Braffoe,
and is accustomary att their putting the Corne into the Ground” (T70/374B, folio 36).
Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors
(T70/365-378)
114
A.12 Volume of Payments by Type of Commodity
All Pre-1688 Post-1688
Type N % Rank N % Rank N % Rank
Alcohol 5889 24.01 1 1542 28.98 2 4347 22.63 1
Other Cloth 967 3.94 8 232 4.36 5 735 3.83 8
European
Cloth
2310 9.42 5 160 3.00 6 2150 11.19 5
Indian Cloth 650 2.65 10 258 4.85 3 392 2.04 10
Cloth
Products
2741 11.17 4 35 0.66 9 2706 14.09 3
Firearms 878 3.58 9 20 0.37 10 629 3.27 9
Gold 5308 21.64 2 2692 50.58 1 2616 13.62 4
Metals 2809 11.45 3 74 1.39 7 2735 14.24 2
Metalwares 1974 8.05 6 60 1.13 8 1914 9.97 6
Others 1002 4.08 7 250 4.69 4 983 5.12 7
Total 24529 100 5322 100 19207 100
Notes: The value of payments is in constant angles of gold. All includes payments from 1679
to 1704. Pre-1688 includes payments in 1679, 1680, 1681, 1682, 1683, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1687.
Post-1688 includes payments in 1689, 1690, 1691, 1696, 1697, 1698, 1699, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703,
1704. Rank is rank from highest to lowest: 1 is the highest; 10 is the lowest. Source: Company of
Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378); Davies (1957);
Eltis (1991); Alpern (1995)
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A.13 Interstate and Intrastate Conflicts, 1681-1699
Period Pre-1688 Post-1688 Change %
Interstate 19 28 9 47
Intrastate 4 8 4 100
Total 23 36 13 57
Notes: Pre-1688 shows the number of conflicts before the Glorious Revolution in 1688. Post-1688
shows the number of conflicts after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. Change shows the difference
between Post-1688 and Pre-1688. % shows the percentage change between Post-1688 and Pre-1688.
The pre-1688 intrastate conflicts were: Ahanta v. English (1683); Eguafo v. English (1680); Abrem
v. Abrem (1683); Allada v. English (1681). The post-1688 intrastate conflicts were: Ahanta v.
English (1694); Ahanta v. English (1698); Braffo Fante v. Chiefs Fante (1697); Braffo Fante
v. Chiefs Fante (1699); Dutch v. Komenda (1694); English v. Great Taggee (1698); Akwamu
v. Danish (1693); Akwamu v. Akwamu (1693). The pre-1688 interstate conflicts were: Adom
v. Ahanta (1681-1682); Akron v. Agona (1681); Akwamu v. Accra (1681); Akwamu v. Akyem
(1682); Akwamu v. Tafo (1682); Akwamu v. Kwaman (1682); Akwamu v. Adangme (1682);
Akwamu v. Adangme (1683); Adom v. Wassa (1688); Afutu v. Akyem (1687); Afutu v. Agona
(1687); Akwamu v. Akyem (1686); Akwamu v. Akani (1686); Akwamu v. Kyerepong (1686);
Akwamu v. Adangme (1688); Akwamu v. Agona (1688); Elmina & Dutch v. Komenda & English
(1688); Fante v. Akyem & Agona (1687); Fante v. Afutu (1688). The post-1688 interstate conflicts
were: Adom v. Ahanta (1690-94); Asirifi v. Yankey (1691-92); Asirifi v. English & Adom (1694);
Ahanta & Little Taggee & Dutch v. English & Adom (1698); Dutch & Little Taggee v. English &
Great Taggee (1696); Dutch & Akani v. Eguafo (1697); Dutch & Twifo v. Eguafo (1695); Adom
& Dutch v. Eguafo (1696); Fante & Akani v. Kabestera-Etsi (1693-94); Fante v. Asebu & Afutu
(1692); Fante v. Afutu (1691); Fante v. Komenda (1695); Fante v. Komenda (1697); Fante &
Akani v. Denkyira (1698); Akwamu v. Agona (1689); Akani v. Denkyira (1698); Akwamu v.
Adangme (1690s); Akwamu & Little Popo v. Whydah (1692-93); Akwamu & Little Popo v. Anlo
(1695); Akwamu v. Kyerepong (1697); Basua v. Ado (1693); Akwamu v. Akyem (1699-1700);
Offra & Whydah v. Allada (1690-91); Allada & Little Popo v. Offra (1692); Allada & Little Popo
v. Whydah (1692); Little Popo v. Adangme (1693-95); Whydah v. Great Popo (1694); Fante v.
Kabestera-Etsi (1696). Source: Law (1997, 2001, 2006)
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A.14 Share Received by Rank of Recipient
State Chief Chieftain
Commodity Head Chief Officeholder Individual Group Employee Trader Soldier Unnamed
Alcohol 37.33 19.17 28.40 6.55 1.97 2.15 0.82 3.62
European Cloth 69.26 13.17 12.22 2.37 0.25 0.29 0.12 2.32
Indian Cloth 39.30 13.97 21.19 10.20 6.76 3.10 0.00 5.49
Other Cloth 21.54 17.24 45.39 3.50 3.25 8.04 0.00 1.06
Cloth Product 74.74 9.61 1.90 9.07 0.33 2.39 0.00 1.97
Firearm 67.75 12.07 9.62 4.82 0.32 0.90 0.90 3.62
Gold 52.43 19.54 16.57 11.05 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
Metal 79.84 10.67 5.89 1.00 0.00 0.28 1.08 1.23
Metalware 43.95 40.34 6.23 0.26 1.30 0.00 0.00 7.91
Miscellaneous 82.02 1.48 3.15 0.00 8.25 0.10 0.00 4.99
Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378); Davies (1957); Eltis (1991); Alpern (1995)
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A.15 Plot of Estimated Coefficients
Notes: Plot of Estimated αt in Equation 1.3: Baseline. The value of payments is calculated using
the minimum price from 1679 to 1704. The specification includes settlement and year fixed-effects,
state-specific trends, and a full set of control variables. Standard errors are clustered by settlements
and are calculated using a wild-cluster bootstrap to adjust for the bias caused by small number of
clusters. Each vertical band represents 95% confidence interval. The first vertical line marks the
Glorious Revolution in 1688. The second vertical line marks the military expansion of inland states
that started in 1698. Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and
Successors (T70/365-378)
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Appendix A.15 Plot of Estimated Coefficients (Cont’d)
Notes: Plot of Estimated αt in Equation 1.3: HAC Standard Errors. The value of payments
is calculated using the minimum price from 1679 to 1704. The specification includes settlement
and year fixed-effects, state-specific trends, and a full set of control variables. Standard errors are
clustered by settlements and are calculated using a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors to correct for spatial and temporal correlation. Each vertical band represents 95%
confidence interval. The first vertical line marks the Glorious Revolution in 1688. The second
vertical line marks the military expansion of inland states that started in 1698. Source: Company
of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378)
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Appendix A.15 Plot of Estimated Coefficients (Cont’d)
Notes: Plot of Estimated αt in Equation 1.3: Value in Current Prices. The value of payments is
calculated using current prices from 1679 to 1704. If current price is unavailable, I adopt the closest
price in time. The specification includes settlement and year fixed-effects, state-specific trends, and
a full set of control variables. Standard errors are clustered by settlements and are calculated using a
wild-cluster bootstrap to adjust for the bias caused by small number of clusters. Each vertical band
represents 95% confidence interval. The first vertical line marks the Glorious Revolution in 1688.
The second vertical line marks the military expansion of inland states that started in 1698. Source:
Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378)
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Appendix A.15 Plot of Estimated Coefficients (Cont’d)
Notes: Plot of Estimated αt in Equation 1.3: State-specific Flexible Trends. The value of payments
is calculated using the minimum price from 1679 to 1704. The specification includes settlement
and year fixed-effects, state-specific flexible trends, and a full set of control variables. Standard
errors are clustered by settlements and are calculated using a wild-cluster bootstrap to adjust for
the bias caused by small number of clusters. Each vertical band represents 95% confidence interval.
The first vertical line marks the Glorious Revolution in 1688. The second vertical line marks the
military expansion of inland states that started in 1698. Source: Company of Royal Adventurers
of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378)
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Appendix A.15 Plot of Estimated Coefficients (Cont’d)
Notes: Plot of Estimated αt in Equation 1.3: Customary Payments and Dasheys.
Customary Payments shows the results when customary payments are dropped from the
data. Dasheys shows the results when dasheys are dropped from the data. The value of
payments is calculated using the minimum price from 1679 to 1704. Both specifications
include settlement and year fixed-effects, state-specific flexible trend, and a full set of
control variables. Standard errors are clustered by settlements and are calculated using
a wild-cluster bootstrap to adjust for the bias caused by small number of clusters. Each
vertical band represents 95% confidence interval. The first vertical line marks the Glorious
Revolution in 1688. The second vertical line marks the military expansion of inland states
that started in 1698. Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with
Africa and Successors (T70/365-378)
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Appendix A.15 Plot of Estimated Coefficients (Cont’d)
Notes: Plot of Estimated αt in Equation 1.3: Ground Payments and Palavara. Ground
Payments shows the results when ground payments are dropped from the data. Palavara
shows the results when palavara are dropped from the data. The value of payments
is calculated using the minimum price from 1679 to 1704. Both specifications include
settlement and year fixed-effects, state-specific flexible trend, and a full set of control
variables. Standard errors are clustered by settlements and are calculated using a
wild-cluster bootstrap to adjust for the bias caused by small number of clusters. Each
vertical band represents 95% confidence interval. The first vertical line marks the Glorious
Revolution in 1688. The second vertical line marks the military expansion of inland states
that started in 1698. Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with
Africa and Successors (T70/365-378)
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Appendix A.15 Plot of Estimated Coefficients (Cont’d)
Notes: Plot of Estimated αt in Equation 1.3: Promise Gifts and Service Payments.
Promise Gifts shows the results when promise gifts are dropped from the data. Service
Payments shows the results when service payments are dropped from the data. The value
of payments is calculated using the minimum price from 1679 to 1704. Both specifications
include settlement and year fixed-effects, state-specific flexible trend, and a full set of
control variables. Standard errors are clustered by settlements and are calculated using
a wild-cluster bootstrap to adjust for the bias caused by small number of clusters. Each
vertical band represents 95% confidence interval. The first vertical line marks the Glorious
Revolution in 1688. The second vertical line marks the military expansion of inland states
that started in 1698. Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with
Africa and Successors (T70/365-378)
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Appendix A.15 Plot of Estimated Coefficients (Cont’d)
Notes: Plot of Estimated αt in Equation 1.3: Ship Customs and Trade Gifts. Ship Customs
shows the results when ship payments are dropped from the data. Trade Gifts shows the
results when trade gifts are dropped from the data. The value of payments is calculated
using the minimum price from 1679 to 1704. Both specifications include settlement and
year fixed-effects, state-specific flexible trend, and a full set of control variables. Standard
errors are clustered by settlements and are calculated using a wild-cluster bootstrap to
adjust for the bias caused by small number of clusters. Each vertical band represents 95%
confidence interval. The first vertical line marks the Glorious Revolution in 1688. The
second vertical line marks the military expansion of inland states that started in 1698.
Source: Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors
(T70/365-378)
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Appendix A.15 Plot of Estimated Coefficients (Cont’d)
Notes: Plot of Estimated αt in Equation 1.3: Trusted and War Aid. Trusted shows the
results when trusted are dropped from the data. War Aid shows the results when war
aid are dropped from the data. The value of payments is calculated using the minimum
price from 1679 to 1704. Both specifications include settlement and year fixed-effects,
state-specific flexible trend, and a full set of control variables. Standard errors are clustered
by settlements and are calculated using a wild-cluster bootstrap to adjust for the bias
caused by small number of clusters. Each vertical band represents 95% confidence interval.
The first vertical line marks the Glorious Revolution in 1688. The second vertical line marks
the military expansion of inland states that started in 1698. Source: Company of Royal
Adventurers of England Trading with Africa and Successors (T70/365-378)
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Appendix B
Chapter 2: Structural Change
in the Royal African Company
Stock Transfers
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B.1 Capital Stock of the Royal African Company, 1672-1712
Date Stock % Period
1 January 1672 111,100 100 01 January 1672 - 30 July 1691
30 July 1691 444,400 400 31 July 1691 -27 March 1693
27 March 1693 625,250 563 28 March 1693 - 7 October 1697
7 October 1697 1,101,050 991 8 October 1697 - 9 April 1706
9 April 1706 1,052,550 947 10 April 1706 - 11 July 1706
11 July 1706 1,055,650 950 12 July 1706 - 15 July 1706
15 July 1706 1,056,350 951 16 July 1706 - 25 September 1712
25 September 1712 451,350 406 26 September - 31 December 1712
Notes: Date shows the date when new stock was issued. Stock shows the book value of stock. % is
calculated as the present stock divided by the initial stock on 1 January 1672, multiplied by 100.
444,400, for example, is 400% of the initial stock. Period accounts for the period when the stock
was available for transfer. Source: Scott (1903); Scott (1910); Carlos et al. (1998); Carlos et al.
(2015)
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B.2 Share of Elites in Total Stock, 1679-1692
Notes: Shares are calculated from dividend payments made by the Royal African Company to each
individual stockholder. The data on dividend payments are drawn from the Minute Books of the
Company. Source: T70/78-83
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B.3 Book Value of Transactions, 1672-1712
Notes: Book values are not normalized after the stock split in 1691 and issuance of new stock
summarized in Appendix B.1. Source: T70/190-196
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B.4 Number of Unique Individual Names, 1672-1712
Notes: Individual names are added up per year. Source: T70/190-196
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B.5 Average Stock Price Before and After 1691
Notes: Course of the Exchange refers to data on stock prices compiled by Professor Larry Neal
from John Castaing’s Course of the Exchange. I am grateful to Professor Neal for sharing the data.
Davies (1957) refers to the price data compiled by Davies (1957, p. 72). The vertical line marks
the quadrupling of stock in 1691. Source: Course of the Exchange; Davies (1957)
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B.6 Data and Sources
Data Source
Date of transfer, book value of
stock transferred, name of buyer
and seller
Numbers 186 to 189 of the T70
series for Transfer Books from
1672 to 1699 (from Professor Ann
Carlos) and numbers 190 to 196
of the same series for Transfer
Books from 1700 to 1712
Clergy, Directors of the
Company, goldsmiths, merchants
(e.g. City of London merchants),
politicians, Stuart courtiers,
titled elites.
Brewer and Staves (1995), Davies
(1957), Dickson (1967), Hayton
(2002), Lee (1878), J. Miller
(2014), Neal (2015), Oxford
Directory of National Biography,
Pettigrew (2013), Pincus (2009),
Scott (1903, 1910, 1912)
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B.7 Summary Statistics, 1672-1712
Stock Bought Stock Sold Unique Individual Transaction
Stock Traders Value % Value % Number % Number %
Elite 4294932 31.30 4310640 31.42 477 21.48 3989 33.11
Clergry 131550 0.96 129500 0.94 19 0.86 137 1.14
Director 2016115 14.69 1991750 14.52 186 8.37 1720 14.28
Titled 1425510 10.39 1661550 12.11 223 10.04 1340 11.12
Goldsmith 417525 3.04 414240 3.02 14 0.63 544 4.52
Merchant 1424442 10.38 1461240 10.65 182 8.19 1415 11.74
Politician 585060 4.26 573600 4.18 75 3.38 553 4.59
Stuart Courtier 40800 0.30 49800 0.36 17 0.77 89 0.74
Non-Elite 9425863 68.70 9407601 68.58 1744 78.52 8059 66.89
Total (Elite and Non-Elite) 13720795 100 13718241 100 2221 100 12048 100
Notes: Value is the book value of stock bought or sold. Number is the number of unique individuals or transactions. % is the share in percentage terms.
Source: T70/190-196
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Appendix C
Chapter 3: Turning Points
in the Slave Trade
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C.1 Major Regions of Africa Where Slaves Were Embarked
Notes: Major regions of Africa where slaves were embarked. The regions include Senegambia, Sierra
Leone, Windward Coast, Gold Coast, Bight of Benin, Bight of Biafra, West Central Africa, and
Southeast Africa. Source: Eltis and Richardson (2010); Iliffe (2017)
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C.2 Slaves Embarked from Africa by Country of Purchaser, 1514-1866
Notes: Slaves embarked are calculated from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. The groups
Spain/Uruguay, Portugal/Brazil, and Denmark/Baltic are adopted from the original data. Source:
Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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C.3 Number of Slaves Embarked by African Regions, 1514-1866
Year Senegambia Sierra
Leone
Windward
Coast
Gold Coast Benin Biafra West
Central
Africa
Southeast
Africa
1501-1525 324 0 0 0 0 359 624 0
1526-1550 28673 0 0 0 0 2154 359 0
1551-1575 37737 1408 0 0 0 2980 0 0
1576-1600 86589 0 0 0 0 6290 32614 0
1601-1625 37456 0 0 0 4386 9579 144523 0
1626-1650 20141 90 0 1061 5550 15691 112263 0
1651-1675 13661 793 316 15180 31242 29227 40141 940
1676-1700 32815 1997 180 41461 142981 41819 89076 10424
1701-1725 29116 3217 5156 123796 279540 43123 127321 7035
1726-1750 50912 7305 14979 134389 290807 93109 368406 1887
1751-1775 111734 72298 113257 184545 248041 266920 477818 4167
1776-1800 72608 69923 44746 182374 242382 302415 603285 44958
1801-1825 63594 47381 17257 54201 162501 186863 788395 158939
1826-1850 10132 35866 3779 2983 104692 101163 592738 160889
1851-1875 0 1640 0 0 12834 675 70275 11280
Total 595492 241918 199670 739990 1524956 1102367 3447838 400519
% of Africa 5.7 2.3 1.9 7.0 14.5 10.5 32.8 3.8
Notes: Senegambia includes the Offshore Atlantic. Bight of Biafra includes Gulf of Guinea Islands. West Central Africa includes St. Helena. Southeast Africa includes Indian Ocean
Islands. The total does not include Other Africa. Other Africa is 21.6 per cent of the total slaves embarked from Africa. Source: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database,
http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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C.4 Slaves Embarked from Senegambia by Country of Purchaser,
1514-1866
Notes: Slaves embarked are calculated from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. The groups
Spain/Uruguay, Portugal/Brazil, and Denmark/Baltic are adopted from the original data. Source:
Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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C.5 Slaves Embarked from Sierra Leone by Country of Purchaser,
1514-1866
Notes: Slaves embarked are calculated from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. The groups
Spain/Uruguay, Portugal/Brazil, and Denmark/Baltic are adopted from the original data. Source:
Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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C.6 Slaves Embarked from the Windward Coast by Country of
Purchaser, 1514-1866
Notes: Slaves embarked are calculated from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. The groups
Spain/Uruguay, Portugal/Brazil, and Denmark/Baltic are adopted from the original data. Source:
Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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C.7 Slaves Embarked from the Gold Coast by Country of Purchaser,
1514-1866
Notes: Slaves embarked are calculated from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. The groups
Spain/Uruguay, Portugal/Brazil, and Denmark/Baltic are adopted from the original data. Source:
Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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C.8 Slaves Embarked from the Bight of Benin by Country of
Purchaser, 1514-1866
Notes: Slaves embarked are calculated from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. The groups
Spain/Uruguay, Portugal/Brazil, and Denmark/Baltic are adopted from the original data. Source:
Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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C.9 Slaves Embarked from the Bight of Biafra by Country of
Purchaser, 1514-1866
Notes: Slaves embarked are calculated from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. The groups
Spain/Uruguay, Portugal/Brazil, and Denmark/Baltic are adopted from the original data. Source:
Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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C.10 Slaves Embarked from West Central Africa by Country of
Purchaser, 1514-1866
Notes: Slaves embarked are calculated from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. The groups
Spain/Uruguay, Portugal/Brazil, and Denmark/Baltic are adopted from the original data. Source:
Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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C.11 Slaves Embarked from Southeast Africa by Country of
Purchaser, 1514-1866
Notes: Slaves embarked are calculated from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. The groups
Spain/Uruguay, Portugal/Brazil, and Denmark/Baltic are adopted from the original data. Source:
Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org. (2016)
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